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Article 
RESCISSION, RESTITUTION, AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF FAIR REDRESS:  A RESPONSE 
TO PROFESSORS BROOKS AND STREMITZER 
Steven W. Feldman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Analyzing a remedy that the reporter for the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment describes as having “[e]normous 
practical importance and theoretical interest,”1  scholars in recent years 
have produced a flood of articles covering contract rescission and 
restitution.2  In their 2011 Article in the Yale Law Journal, Remedies on and 
off Contract, Professors Richard Brooks and Alexander Stremitzer weigh 
in on the discussion.3  Relying on microeconomic theory, which reflects 
the perspective of rational buyers and sellers, the authors’ thesis is that 
current legal doctrine is too restrictive in allowing buyers’ rescission and 
too liberal in granting them restitution.4  Although other commentators 
                                                 
* Attorney-Advisor, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville, Alabama.  The author 
expresses deep appreciation to Dr. Gayla Feldman for her love and support, including our 
springtime walks discussing law and economics.  Thanks to Meredith Miller and Doug 
Rendleman for their input and especially to Andrew Kull and Jeremy Telman for their 
extensive and challenging critiques.  This Article is written in honor of Joseph Perillo and 
Stewart Macaulay, two giants in contract scholarship who also graciously provided helpful 
comments in its preparation.  All opinions are solely those of the author. 
1 Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1491 
(1994). 
2 See Symposium, A Conference on Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 763 
(2012); Symposium, Restitution Rollout: The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust 
Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 865 (2011); Symposium, The Restitution Roundtable, 65 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 889 (2008); Symposium, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1763 (2001).  These symposia issues are four prominent examples of the spate of 
articles covering contract rescission and restitution that have been produced in recent 
years. 
3 Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, 120 YALE 
L.J. 690 (2011) [hereinafter Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract].  Richard R.W. 
Brooks is Leighton Homer Surbeck Professor of Law at Yale Law School, and Alexander 
Stremitzer is Acting Professor of Law at UCLA Law School.  Both authors hold doctorates 
in economics in addition to their law degrees.  The authors have reprised their views from 
their Yale Law Journal article in a contribution to the Washington and Lee Law School’s 
symposium, Restitution Rollout:  The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.  
See Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, Beyond Ex Post Expediency—An Ex Ante 
View of Rescission and Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1171 (2011). 
4 See Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 693. 
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in prominent journals have cited this Article with approval,5 I 
respectfully suggest that it has some fundamental flaws on both legal 
and economic grounds.  In my Article, I summarize the authors’ 
argument, identify my concerns, and propose an alternative formulation. 
Brooks and Stremitzer write that a limited rescission model is 
“excessive” and based on a “misunderstanding” of the economic effects 
of these remedies.6  Their key premise is that legal authorities have 
exaggerated the threat to contract stability and other normative values 
posed by liberal access to rescission.7  Therefore, the authors posit that 
rational parties from an ex ante perspective would often bargain for 
broad rights of rescission even if damages for breach “were fully 
compensatory and costless to enforce.”8 
While they oppose rescission where the promisee acts 
opportunistically to avoid unfavorable bargains, Brooks and Stremitzer 
contend that the existence of a buyer’s expanded ability to rescind after a 
breach, even if not implemented, influences contracting behavior in 
several ways.9  First, the seller will reduce the likelihood of promisee 
rescission by investing to enhance the quality of performance.10  Second, 
the seller will minimize the buyer’s possible use of rescission by 
reducing prices.11  In this regard, the authors say that allowing the buyer 
greater rights of rescission would actually benefit the contracting system 
by allowing rational parties to create efficient incentives to avoid 
breach.12 
The authors further argue that, with regard to monetary redress, the 
law is trending inappropriately from “‘rescission and restitution’ toward 
‘rescission and expectation’ [damages].”13  Brooks and Stremitzer’s major 
concern is that the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) allows buyers 
                                                 
5 See Daniel Friedmann, Does the Dead Contract Rule Restitution from Its Grave?, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. 811, 817 n.30 & n.32 (2012); Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of 
International Law:  Optimal Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. 
L. REV. 243, 252 n.26 (2011); Note, (In)Efficient Breach of International Trade Law:  The State of 
the “Free Pass” After China’s Rare Earths Export Embargo, 125 HARV. L. REV. 602, 605 n.17 
(2011).  But see generally Michael Aikins, Off-Contract Harms:  The Real Effect of Liberal 
Rescission Rights on Contract Price, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 69, 69–70 (2011) (criticizing Brooks 
and Stremitzer’s Yale Law Journal article solely on economic grounds and concluding that 
they present an incomplete analysis of the effects of rescission on the marketplace); see also 
infra Part III.E (discussing an additional economic critique). 
6 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 693. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 699. 




13 Id. at 702. 
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returning defective goods to revoke their acceptance and to obtain 
expectation damages, including lost profits.14  The authors deem these 
cumulative remedies as especially harmful because they give the rational 
buyer an improper incentive to rescind as a dominant strategy.15  Yet 
another critique is that the disaffirming buyer receives a windfall of 
expectation damages if he gets to both exit the contract and obtain the 
same payoff (except with a losing contract) as though the bargain had 
been fully performed.16  This legal trend, Brooks and Stremitzer contend, 
ironically “poses the real threat to contractual stability.”17  Therefore, the 
authors suggest the law should be changed so the buyer must elect 
between rescission and damages.18 
As another part of their proposal and to promote more efficient 
contracting, Brooks and Stremitzer argue that restitution after rescission 
should only “come at a price.”19  This concept means the relief should be 
limited to restoration of the purchase price or the other benefits that the 
buyer has conferred upon the seller.20  Therefore, the authors do not 
support redress for the buyer’s damages in reliance on the contract.21  
They also do not endorse a remedy for disgorgement of the seller’s ill-
gotten gain from the breach, such as where the defaulting seller has 
taken the buyer’s payment, invested it, and earned additional profits.22  
Brooks and Stremitzer contend that the latter remedies conflict with 
sound economic theory because they disincentivize the above seller’s 
investments and price reductions.23  The authors also advocate that these 
recoveries contradict the fundamental objective of restitution as restoring 
the status quo ante, because these remedies can leave the seller worse off 
or the buyer better off than if the contract never existed initially.24 
In their critique, Brooks and Stremitzer focus almost exclusively on 
economic issues and sources.  Even though they strongly contend that 
current contract law undermines sound economic theory, they do not 
                                                 
14 Id. at 701–02 n.28. 
15 Id. at 701–02. 
16 Id. at 698. 
17 Id. at 694. 
18 See id. at 693 (“Hence, the final point of our argument:  the remedy in restitution 
following rescission should be limited to restoration of price or other conferred benefits to 
the promisor under the contract.”). 
19 Id. at 719. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 692–93.  While in several passages the authors favor only restoration of the 
purchase price and other benefits conferred upon the seller, they do hedge on the buyer’s 
entitlement to reliance damages.  See infra notes 299–312 and accompanying text. 
22 Id. at 719. 
23 Id. at 704–11, 719. 
24 Id. at 718 n.81 and accompanying text. 
Feldman: Rescission, Restitution, and the Principle of Fair Redress:  A Re
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
402 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
adequately analyze whether the restricted rescission and excessive 
restitution model actually exists in statutory and case law.  Their legal 
analysis consists mainly of isolated references to the U.C.C., the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(“CISG”), the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and seven decisions (none of which 
were published later than 1988).25  The authors’ chief point of doctrinal 
discussion is their emphasis on the element of material breach, which 
they describe as an important restraint upon the buyer’s ability to obtain 
rescission and a deterrent to promisee opportunism.26 
In contrast, I will perform an intensive case law and statutory 
analysis showing that the law appropriately follows a principle of “fair 
redress,” which follows a liberal rescission/fair restitution approach.  
Indeed, the authors’ opposition to reliance and disgorgement is 
particularly counterproductive because their stance undermines the core 
policy of rescission and restitution, which is to afford the injured party 
an equitable remedy.  Brooks and Stremitzer do not mention that when 
courts act in equity, judges must avoid rigid formulas that automatically 
disqualify a particular mode of relief.  To this end, courts are free to 
fashion flexible remedies for the injured party to meet the needs of 
justice on a case-by-case basis.27 
Brooks and Stremitzer’s economic analysis is also faulty.  The 
authors’ undue reliance on hypothetical buyers and sellers largely 
ignores the unique situational factors and relational issues that 
frequently contribute to whether a particular buyer will rescind for 
breach.  By consistently emphasizing the supposed choices of rational 
parties, the authors necessarily subscribe to a strong version of rational 
choice theory, which many commentators have discredited as an all-
encompassing conception of economic and contracting behavior.28  
                                                 
25 See generally sources cited id. at 692–727. 
26 Id. at 717.  “Much of the mischief here is regulated by the materiality condition that 
triggers the election to rescind.”  Id.  See also 23 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS § 63:3, at 438–39 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2002) (explaining that a 
“material breach,” as a pre-requisite for the buyer’s rescission, “must ‘go to the root’ or 
‘essence’ of the agreement between the parties, or be ‘one which touches the fundamental 
purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the parties in entering into the contract’”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
27 See Umphres v. J.R. Mayer Enters., Inc., 889 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (“Courts 
in equity must remain free to consider all equitable considerations and to fashion flexible 
remedies to meet the needs of justice on a case by case basis.”); see also infra notes 33, 40, 76, 
151, 248–49, 268 and accompanying text (highlighting additional cases that recognize the 
“equitable” nature of these remedies). 
28 See infra Part III.E (providing a thorough discussion of rational choice theory and its 
implications for  contract principles). 
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Besides their speculations, the authors have not offered any data that 
liberal rights of rescission, followed by restricted restitution, would 
enhance contractual stability by strongly encouraging seller investments 
and price reductions.  Because the authors’ economic premises are 
unsupported, their proposals for legal reform lack a sound foundation. 
Little danger exists that any court would overturn the decades of 
precedent, as described below in my Article, and adopt the authors’ 
proposed remaking of rescission and restitution.  Nevertheless, a 
detailed rebuttal of Brooks and Stremitzer’s highly-placed Article is 
important, because my counter-analysis should benefit other academics 
writing on these topics.  My basic proposition is that no major reforms 
are necessary (except for the vague material breach doctrine) because 
existing law satisfactorily protects both buyer and seller. 
Part II of this Article describes the right of withdrawal that exists in 
contract law in both legal and non-legal settings.  I first address the 
nature of rescission and the validity of the authors’ description of this 
remedy.  The authorities are far more liberal in granting this remedy 
than Brooks and Stremitzer describe in their Article.  Second, I review 
rescission and the U.C.C., with emphasis on the buyer’s right of rejection 
under U.C.C. section 2-601 and the buyer’s right to revoke acceptance 
under U.C.C. section 2-608.  Here, the case law shows a decidedly pro-
buyer perspective.  Third, I analyze a sampling of special domestic 
statutes and regulations, most notably the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 
the Federal Trade Commission’s Door-to-Door Sales Cooling Off Rule, 
and the laws of New York and California.  Fourth, I examine common 
mercantile practice on rescission in the United States and overseas.  Fifth, 
I examine whether the authors are correct that the material breach 
doctrine is a strong barrier to rescission.  Sixth, I explain why the law 
actually favors liberal rights of rescission in what I call the principle of 
“fair redress.”  On a deeper level, besides being the first full-length legal 
analysis of Brooks and Stremitzer’s Article, I show the consistent thread 
in diverse areas of U.S. commercial law and practice liberally granting 
rescission, so that the injured party can protect his or her reasonable 
expectations. 
Part III of my Article analyzes the parameters of restitution after 
rescission.  First, I consider the election of remedies doctrine as between 
rescission and monetary recovery under the common law and the U.C.C.  
Both regimes, in their own way, properly follow the basic policy of 
avoiding duplicate recovery for the promisee.  Second, I analyze the 
merits of permitting both rescission and damages (including profits) 
under the U.C.C.  These combined remedies are not a windfall as argued 
by Brooks and Stremitzer but are consistent with the fundamental rule of 
Feldman: Rescission, Restitution, and the Principle of Fair Redress:  A Re
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
404 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
making the injured party whole.  Third, I analyze whether the contract 
price should limit restitution in quantum meruit, focusing on the 
authors’ approach to the well-known California Court of Appeals case of 
Boomer v. Muir.29  The analysis will show that the authors have 
misconstrued the case, and I will further prove that the majority rule 
allowing redress in excess of the contract price has a sound legal, 
normative, and economic basis.  Fourth, I critique Brooks and 
Stremitzer’s inflexible rejection of the buyer’s reliance and disgorgement 
interests in restitution.  Fifth, I contest both the authors’ adoption of 
what amounts to rational choice theory and their failure to incorporate 
relational contracting principles in their view of rescission and 
restitution.  As with Part II of this Article, the analysis in Part III 
demonstrates the common thread of achieving fair redress for the buyer, 
which supports making the injured party whole but no further than 
complete redress, through the sound exercise of equitable discretion. 
II.  THE RIGHT OF BUYER WITHDRAWAL:  LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL RELIEF 
A. The Nature of Rescission 
Rescission of a contract is awardable to the injured party with the 
other side’s material breach, fraud, or with other grounds for avoidance, 
such as mutual mistake, impossibility of performance, failure of 
consideration, or mutual agreement.30  Both Brooks and Stremitzer and 
this Article largely focus on rescission as a predicate for the buyer to 
obtain restitution for the seller’s breach of contract.31 
                                                 
29 24 P.2d 570 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933). 
30 See Crown Ice Mach. Leasing Co. v. Sam Senter Farms, Inc., 174 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (identifying the fundamental requirements necessary to state a cause of 
action for rescission or cancellation of a contract); Newton v. Aitken, 633 N.E.2d 213, 216 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting the circumstances when a court may award rescission); Callanan 
v. Powers, 92 N.E. 747, 752 (N.Y. 1910) (describing specific occurrences when rescission is 
generally permitted). 
31 Following Brooks and Stremitzer’s analysis, this Article focuses on the buyer’s right of 
rescission and restitution for the seller’s breach and not the seller’s right of rescission and 
restitution for the buyer’s breach.  The latter remedy is disallowed at common law, as well 
as the U.C.C., in the usual case of a buyer on credit that fails to pay the price.  Further, 
modern statutes have eliminated most of the usual fraud claims, as well as the contention 
that the buyer received goods while insolvent.  See 11 U.S.C § 546(c)(1) (2006); U.C.C. § 2-
702 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37(2) & cmt. c 
(2011).  This Article also does not address where the party in default seeks restitution for 
the value of its part performance.  See 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 5.1, 
at 568 (1978 & Supp. 2012) (discussing recovery at the contract rate for part performance).  
See generally Richard H. Lee, The Plaintiff in Default, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1023 (1966) (discussing 
generally the issue of whether a defaulting party can recover for part performance).  This 
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Unquestionably, certain aspects of the authors’ legal analysis are 
valid.  Generally, the authors are correct that an aggrieved buyer 
encountering a seller’s breach may elect between (1) affirming the 
contract and seeking money damages or specific performance or (2) 
disaffirming the contract and pursing rescission followed by 
restitution.32  Brooks and Stremitzer properly define “rescission” as 
undoing the contract and “eliminating all obligations under the contract 
from the time of breach.”33  They are also correct that “restitution” after 
disaffirmance means the parties return the money, property, or other 
benefits that restores their pre-contract position.34 
                                                                                                             
Article does, however, explore rescission in favor of the seller.  See infra Part III.C 
(examining in more depth the decision in Boomer v. Muir). 
32 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 692. 
33 Id. at 692 n.2.  Compare PWS, Inc. v. Ban, 285 Cal. Rptr. 598, 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) 
(“The effect of rescission is to void the contract ab initio.”), McEnroe v. Morgan, 678 P.2d 
595, 598 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (“Rescission is an equitable remedy that totally abrogates the 
contract and restores the parties to their original positions.”), Busch v. Model Corp., 708 
N.W.2d 546, 551 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (“Rescission is an equitable remedy that seeks to put 
the parties in the same position they would have been had the contract never existed.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), and Bossie v. Boone Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 568 S.E.2d 1, 5 
(W. Va. 2002) (“Generally speaking, the effect of a rescission is to extinguish the contract 
and to annihilate it so effectually that in contemplation of law it has never had any 
existence, even for the purpose of being broken.”) (quoting 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 600 
(1991)), with infra notes 39–46 and accompanying text (explaining that this all-
encompassing language is itself not always correct, because some cases and authorities say 
that rescission is an “on contract” remedy). 
34 See Head & Seemann, Inc. v. Gregg, 311 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981), aff’d, 
318 N.W.2d 381 (Wis. 1982) (“Rescission is always coupled with restitution[.]”); see also 
Glendale Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The idea 
behind restitution is to restore—that is, to restore the non-breaching party to the position 
he would have been in had there never been a contract to breach.”). 
 “It is an accepted part of American contract law that there are remedies for breach 
called ‘restitution,’ but the multiple connotations of the word ‘restitution’ are such that 
‘restitution for breach of contract’ can refer to a number of different things entirely.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 4, topic 2, at 606 (2011).  
The confusion comes about primarily because restitution is not limited to rescission cases.  
The injured party may select restitution as an alternative to protecting its expectation or 
reliance interests.  See Harris v. Metro. Mall, 334 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Wis. 1983) (explaining 
that restitution is not limited to rescission cases and noting other situations when it is 
used). Commentators also have pointed out the confusion surrounding restitution.  See, e.g., 
Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution:  Coordinating Restitution with Compensatory 
Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 977 (2011) (noting that 
restitution is “subject to professional misunderstanding on every level”). 
 Brooks and Stremitzer correctly point out that some controversy also exists on 
whether the primary purpose of restitution is to restore the status quo ante or to prevent 
the breaching party’s unjust enrichment.  Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, 
supra note 3, at 719 n.82.  As one court has observed, however, there is no necessary 
inconsistency between these positions.  See First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 
89 Fed. Cl. 765, 799 (2009) (“[T]he task is . . . to return nonbreaching parties to their pre-
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Brooks and Stremitzer further point out that there is criticism that 
rescission should not be available for promisees who abuse the remedy 
as a pretext to avoid an unfavorable contract.35  Some decisions do rely 
on this consideration.36  Along similar lines, the authors are correct that 
some cases emphasize the instability that results from inappropriately 
undoing contracts, because the “public has an interest in the sanctity of 
contract which forms the foundation for economic development and the 
free flow of goods and services.”37  This “sanctity of contract” also 
reflects a moral judgment that contracts should be upheld whenever 
                                                                                                             
contract position and not quibble about the analytical construct.”).  Other authorities 
employ both rationales.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 54 cmt. e (“[T]he justification of rescission as an alternative remedy for 
breach is not the avoidance of unjust enrichment, but a concern with fairness to the injured 
party combined with remedial economy.”); see also S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. East Harlem Pilot 
Block-Bldg. 1 Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 608 F.2d 28, 41 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[R]estitution . . . is not 
designed to put the aggrieved party in the position where he would have been if the 
contract had been performed but to restore him to the status quo ante, regardless of the 
contract price or rate.”). 
35 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 714–15. 
36 See, e.g., Phez Co. v. Salem Fruit Union, 201 P. 222, 231 (Or. 1921) (“This pretext of 
rescission seems to us to have been an afterthought, conjured up to escape the 
consequences of what war conditions had rendered an unprofitable, if not a losing, 
contract.”). 
 The authors assert that the undue availability of rescission “has been a source of great 
anxiety among legal authorities.”  Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra 
note 3, at 693.  However, they fail to cite any case law for this proposition.  Id.  My reading 
of the cases is that courts approach this issue much more matter-of-factly.  See, e.g., Janusz 
v. Gilliam, 947 A.2d 560, 566  (Md. 2008) (“No party has a right to rescind or modify a 
contract merely because he [or she] finds, in the light of changed conditions, that he [or she] 
has made a bad deal.” (quoting Harford Cnty. v. Town of Bel Air, 704 A.2d 421, 431 (Md. 
1998))). 
37 Dillon Real Estate Co. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. CV 08 1508 PHX FJM, 2010 WL 
1688806, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 2010); see, e.g., N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Saranac 
Power Partners, L.P., 117 F. Supp. 2d 211, 253 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Sanctity of contract 
constitutes the most fundamental underpinning of commerce.” (quoting In re Schenck 
Tours, Inc., 69 B.R. 906, 910 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 75 B.R. 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1987))); 
McMullen v. Kutz, 985 A.2d 769, 778 (Pa. 2009) (“[J]udicial non-interference in contractual 
affairs fosters certainty and stability in economic relations.”) (footnote omitted).   
Most of these cases, however, pertain to where the plaintiff alleges a lack of valid 
consent at formation, such as mistake or fraud, and where the promisor could manufacture 
evidence of his original intent.  See, e.g., Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortg. Co., 
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 191, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing mistake as a grounds for 
recession); Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1061–62 (Del. 
Ch. 2006) (explaining that courts should be cautious of allowing parties to escape freely 
negotiated contractual obligations); Kruzich v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 188 P.3d 983, 988 
(Mont. 2008) (discussing mutual mistake as a grounds for recession); Robinson v. Brooks, 
577 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (explaining that rescission of contract is only 
available “under the most demanding circumstances”). 
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possible to preserve the parties’ autonomy and freedom of contract.38  
Undoubtedly, these policies do caution against the overly lenient 
allowance of rescission for breach of contract. 
Beyond the above observations, however, Brooks and Stremitzer’s 
legal analysis regarding the essential nature of rescission and restitution 
is insufficient because they have failed to capture the nuances in the 
decisions.  The authors call restitution both a contract remedy and a 
substantive basis for liability.39  To the contrary, courts are unanimous 
that “[r]estitution . . . is not a cause of action; it is a remedy for various 
causes of action.”40  More importantly, the authors greatly overstate the 
case that it is “unquestioned by observers” and “doctrinal orthodoxy” 
that rescission and restitution is an “off-contract remedy” as compared 
with damages or specific performance being an “on-contract remedy.”41  
While a number of decisions do indeed support their view, other judicial 
opinions observe that “a party seeking rescission and restitution in a 
breach of contract action does not seek to undo the contract from its 
beginning.”42  Courts have observed, “It has long been recognized that 
the right to damages or restitution are both remedial rights based on the 
contract.”43  To the same effect, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
                                                 
38 See Morta v. Kor. Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that courts 
respect the notion of freedom of contract); N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 253 
(citing In re Schenck Tours, Inc., 69 B.R. at 910) (noting the strong public policy in favor of 
upholding freely negotiated contracts); Abry Partners, 891 A.2d at 1059–61 (“[T]here is a 
strong American tradition of freedom of contract . . . .”).  But see infra notes 150–60 (noting 
that rescission is compatible with freedom of contract). 
39 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 697 (“Restitution 
steps in as the new legal basis for the promisor’s obligation to provide relief as soon as the 
prior contractual obligation is disaffirmed.”).  “We emphasize that we are referring to 
restitution as a source of obligation, not as a measure of damages as it is sometimes 
understood.”  Id. at 718 n.77. 
40 Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 926 P.2d 1130, 1143 n.17 (Alaska 1996) (citing 
Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Millet, 735 P.2d 743, 746 n.6 (Alaska 1987)); see also Pilar Servs., 
Inc. v. NCI Info. Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 563, 569 (E.D. Va. 2008) (defining restitution as 
an equitable remedy); Ram Energy, Inc. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 406, 410 (2010) (“[T]he 
court is unaware of any legal doctrine or precedent under which restitution itself can be 
deemed a cause of action.  Rather, in a contract context, it is a potential remedy in the event 
a breach is found.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37 
cmt. a (2011) (“This section describes an alternative remedy for breach of contract that is 
sometimes called ‘restitution’ but is more easily recognized under the name ‘rescission.’”). 
41 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 692. 
42 CBS, Inc. v. Merrick, 716 F.2d 1292, 1297 (9th Cir. 1983) (Nelson, J., concurring).  But 
see Eric G. Andersen, The Restoration Interest and Damages for Breach of Contract, 53 MD. L. 
REV. 1, 15 n.51 (1994) (citing cases using the “on contract/off contract” terminology). 
43 Amber Res. Co. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 738, 749 n.11 (2006) (quoting JOSEPH M. 
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 601 (4th ed. 1998)) (emphasis added).  
Notably, Brooks and Stremitzer contend that restitution is unquestionably an off contract 
remedy, even as they also acknowledge Joseph Perillo’s observation that restitution can be 
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Unjust Enrichment states that rescission and restitution as a remedy for 
breach are equally a remedy “on contract.”44  Along these same lines, 
perhaps the most influential commentators on restitution, Lon Fuller and 
William Perdue, Jr., concluded it was “remarkable that . . . restitution as 
a remedy [for breach should have come to be seen as] entirely distinct 
from the usual suit on a contract.”45  Because the “on/off” test is not very 
helpful, the result is that most courts do not use this paradigm, but more 
precisely recognize that the rescinded contract no longer has a legal 
existence to cap the plaintiff’s recovery at the defunct contract’s price.46 
The most telling objection against the authors’ assertion that the 
on/off contract construct is a part of the legal orthodoxy is that the 
U.C.C. does not follow this model for rescission and revocation.  The 
reason is that the U.C.C. deems all remedies by definition to be contract 
terms.  Thus, under U.C.C. sections 1-201(b)(3), 1-201(b)(11), and 1-205, a 
“contract” incorporates all applicable U.C.C. provisions, which means 
that all such contracts for the sale of goods ordinarily include those 
Article 2 terms covering rejection and revocation.47  As a commentator 
correctly observes, “For all intents and purposes, the availability of 
rescission and suit off the contract is a non-issue for the buyer in any 
                                                                                                             
an “on contract” remedy.  See Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 
3, at 700 n.26 (noting Perillo’s view that restitution is a remedy “that often operates in an 
explicitly contractual setting”) (citing Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 
73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208, 1209 (1973)); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort 
Law, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1221, 1232 (2008) (explaining that breach of contract actions were 
lumped together with tort actions and that the freestanding body of contract law only 
ripened at the turn of the nineteenth century). 
44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §  38 cmt. a.  The 
Reporter’s Note to the Restatement also calls the distinction “obscure” in the selection of a 
remedy.  Id. ch. 4, topic 2, at 638. 
45 L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 
YALE L.J. 52, 72 (1936).  “The conception (or perhaps we should say ‘visualization’) of 
restitution as something entirely different from a suit ‘on the contract’ has had a number of 
unfortunate consequences.”  Id. 
46 See, e.g., Blanton v. Friedberg, 819 F.2d 489, 492 (4th Cir. 1987) (“One who has 
rendered a service or supplied work . . . but who has been wrongfully discharged . . . may 
regard the contract as terminated and get judgment for the reasonable value of all that the 
defendant has received in performance of the contract . . . .” (quoting W.F. Magnum Corp. 
v. Diamond Mfg. Co., 775 F.2d 1202, 1208 (4th Cir. 1985))); Baldwin v. Panetta, 4 So. 3d 555, 
561–62 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (explaining that one who has performed services under a 
contract may rescind the contract and sue for the value of work performed). 
47 U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(3), 1-201(b)(11), 1-205 (2006).  Generally, the parties may vary a 
U.C.C. requirement by agreement, subject to the exception that “[w]here circumstances 
cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as 
provided in this Act.”  U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (2006); see also U.C.C. § 1-302(a) (2006). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2013], Art. 22
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss2/22
2013] A Response to Professors Brooks and Stremitzer 409 
kind of contract governed by the U.C.C.”48  Brooks and Stremitzer do not 
seize on this important aspect of a contract under the U.C.C. 
Lastly, the authors have overlooked the sea change in the case law 
giving greater importance to rescission as a response to breach.  A U.S. 
district court decision properly stated that the law “clearly allows and 
even encourages rescission as a remedy for complaint that sounds in 
‘breach of contract.’”49  Furthermore, the current edition of Williston on 
Contracts observes, “Since at least the Second World War, the courts have 
shown a marked increase in their willingness to grant rescission and, 
most especially, restitution by means of quasi-contract.”50  Indeed, that 
same treatise comments that “[w]hat was certainly a ground-shift in the 
middle of the last century became a virtual landslide during its final 
twenty-five years.”51  These case law trends contradict the authors’ 
contention that the law inappropriately restricts rescission for deserving 
plaintiffs. 
B. The U.C.C. and Rescission 
In their centerpiece legal criticism, Brooks and Stremitzer analyze 
rescission under the U.C.C., and therefore this Article gives this area the 
greatest emphasis as well.52  The authors’ argument can be summarized 
                                                 
48 Elizabeth Hayes Patterson, U.C.C. Section 2-612(3):  Breach of an Installment Contract and 
a Hobson’s Choice for the Aggrieved Party, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 192 n.83 (1987). 
49 Petrucelli v. Palmer, 596 F. Supp. 2d 347, 367 (D. Conn. 2009).  Ironically, Professors 
Brooks and Stremitzer have missed the doctrine most favorable to their position:  where 
damages are an adequate remedy at law, some courts will not invoke their equitable 
powers to rescind the contract.  See, e.g., Kakaes v. George Washington Univ., 790 A.2d 581, 
583 (D.C. 2002) (“[E]quitable relief will not be granted where the plaintiff has a complete 
and adequate remedy at law.”); Collier v. Boney, 525 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1988) (“[A] fundamental requirement necessary for rescission of a contract is that the 
moving party has no adequate remedy at law.”); C3 Media & Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Firstgate 
Internet, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 419, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (construing New York law).  Contra 
Ganaway v. Henderson, 103 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (granting rescission 
without considering the issue of whether damages were an adequate remedy); Lanners v. 
Whitney, 428 P.2d 398, 404 (Or. 1967) (allowing rescission irrespective of whether damages 
were an adequate remedy); Chastain v. Billings, 570 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) 
(“[I]f an adequate remedy of law exists, such as an award of damages, rescission will not be 
granted.”).  See generally Caprice L. Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027 (2011) (criticizing courts’ use of this equitable doctrine). 
50 26 WILLISTON, supra note 26, at vii. 
51 Id. 
52 Brooks and Stremitzer also argue that the CISG suffers from the same defects as the 
U.C.C. in unduly restricting rescission and generously providing restitution.  Brooks & 
Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 701 nn.27–28.  The CISG, a product 
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade, is a self-executing treaty 
between member nations, which includes the United States as a signatory, and has the 
force and effect of law in the United States.  U.N. Convention on Contracts for the 
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as follows.  They claim that parties have restricted rights to avoid a 
contract under the U.C.C.53  Relying upon U.C.C. section 2-608, which 
deals with the buyer’s revocation of acceptance,54 Brooks and Stremitzer 
assert that this section “makes it clear that the term ‘rescission’ was 
avoided in the Code because of concern that the term was ‘capable of 
ambiguous application . . . and susceptible also of confusion with 
cancellation.’”55  In posing this argument, the authors rely heavily on 
U.C.C. section 2-608, comment 1, which states, “The section no longer 
                                                                                                             
International Sale of Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 19 
I.L.M. 671 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5528 (1992)).  The treaty “applies to contracts of sale of 
goods between parties whose places of business are in different States . . . when the States 
are Contracting States.”  CISG art. 1(1)(a), 19 I.L.M. 672.  
The CISG is the “international analogue” to Article 2 of the U.C.C., although the 
latter’s case law is not per se applicable.  See Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food 
Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The CISG does not state expressly whether 
the seller or buyer bears the burden of proof as to the product’s conformity with the 
contract.  Because there is little case law under the CISG, we interpret its provisions by 
looking to its language and to ‘the general principles’ upon which it is based.”); see also 
Michael Kabik, Through the Looking-Glass:  International Trade in the “Wonderland” of the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 9 INT’L TAX & BUS. 
LAW. 408, 428–29 (1992) (“[T]he C.I.S.G. is, for the most part, truly a mirror image of the 
U.C.C . . . .”); Robert S. Rendell, The New U.N. Convention on International Sales Contracts:  An 
Overview, 15 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 23, 42 (1989) (“[O]ne may view the Convention as a triumph 
of the Uniform Commercial Code’s approach to contract law.”). 
53 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 693 (“[The] 
authorities have limited the ease with which rescission may be elected.”). 
54  For the elements of this remedy, see Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 374 A.2d 
144, 148 (Conn. 1976). 
55 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 692, n.2 (quoting 
U.S.C. § 2-608 cmt. 1 (2003)).  The U.C.C. contrasts “rescission,” which refers to a mutual 
agreement to discharge contractual duties, “cancellation,” which occurs when either party 
puts an end to the contract for breach by the other party, and “termination,” which is the 
same “cancellation” except that the cancelling party also retains any remedy for breach of 
the whole contract or any unperformed balance.  U.C.C. §§ 2-106(3)–(4), 2-209 cmt. 3 (2006); 
see JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 21.2 (4th ed. 1998) 
(noting the difference in the U.C.C. definitions of the terms rescission, cancellation, and 
termination).    
Courts in a number of U.C.C. § 2-608 cases, however, have not always obeyed this 
distinction.  E.g., Smith v. Monaco Coach Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1070 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(noting that the purpose of U.C.C. § 2-608 is to “cancel the sale and return the parties to 
status quo ante”); Lenkay Sani Prods. Corp. v. Benitez, 362 N.Y.S.2d 572, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1975) (stating that the plaintiff “rescinds” under U.C.C. § 2-608).  Outside the U.C.C., many 
authorities use “rescission,” “termination,” and “cancellation” interchangeably.  See United 
States v. Scruggs, 356 F.3d 539, 545 (4th Cir. 2004) (mentioning the confusion of vocabulary 
inherent in the term “rescission”); 12A C.J.S. Cancellation of Instruments § 2 (2012) (“The 
terms ‘cancellation’ and ‘rescission’ are frequently regarded as being interchangeable or 
synonymous.”) (footnotes omitted); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 
§ 8.15, at 509–10 n.2 (3d ed. 2004). 
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speaks of ‘rescission.’”56  The authors immediately back away from their 
claim, however, when they state that the U.C.C. “remains confused” on 
this point.57  Thus, Brooks and Stremitzer comment that “the Code itself 
sometimes [uses] the term ‘rescission’ and nowhere [defines] what it 
means by that usage or explaining if it differs in application from 
‘revocation of acceptance.’”58  They further observe that the U.C.C. 
section 2-608 has also “contributed to the concealment of rescission 
through the murky label ‘revocation of acceptance,’” but they make no 
efforts to explain the elements of this revocation remedy. 59 
I disagree with Brooks and Stremitzer’s argument that the U.C.C. is 
opposed to rescission for various reasons, as explained below. 
The first flaw in the authors’ contention is they fail to mention that 
the U.C.C. co-exists with a common law remedy for rescission in 
contracts for the sale of goods.  Relying on U.C.C. section 1-103, which 
states that the U.C.C. is supplemented by the prevailing rules of law and 
equity, the Kansas Court of Appeals ruled that “a party’s right to seek 
the equitable remedy of rescission has not been affected by any provision 
of the UCC.”60  The existence in many jurisdictions of this parallel 
statutory and common law power in contracts for the sale of goods and 
the concomitant expanded remedial choices available to the plaintiff 
undercuts Brooks and Stremitzer’s contention that the U.C.C. is 
restrictive on rescission.61 
The authors also have misconstrued the U.C.C.’s references to 
rescission in various Code sections and commentaries.  Although U.C.C. 
section 2-608, comment 1, does indeed say the section no longer speaks 
of “rescission,” the authors are wrong in claiming “that the term 
‘rescission’ was avoided in the Code.”62  Technically, the quoted 
statement appears in a comment that pertains to only one section, U.C.C. 
section 2-608, but such comments are not part of the U.C.C. itself; 
therefore, they can have only persuasive weight.63   
Otherwise, the Code repeatedly embraces rescission without 
reservation.  U.C.C. section 2-720 explicitly says that parties may use the 
                                                 
56 U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt. 1 (2003). 
57 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 692 n.2. 
58 Id. at 692–93 n.2. 
59 Id. at 697 n.13. 
60 Perry v. Goff Motors, Inc., 736 P.2d 949, 954 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987). 
61 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 715 (stating how the 
law uses various techniques to “restrict rescission rights”). 
62 Id. at 692 n. 2. 
63 Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, 703 P.2d 169, 172 (N.M. 1985) (also stating 
that U.C.C. comments are not binding on the courts). 
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word “rescission” to reserve a right of action for breach of contract.64  
U.C.C. section 2-721 unqualifiedly uses the word “rescission” when it 
states, “Neither rescission or a claim for rescission of the contract for sale 
nor rejection or return of the goods shall bar or be deemed inconsistent 
with a claim for damages or other remedy.”65  U.C.C. section 2-209 (not 
mentioned by the authors) further embraces rescission as a remedy when 
it states that “[a] signed agreement which excludes modification or 
rescission except by a signed writing [generally] cannot be otherwise 
modified or rescinded[.]”66  Therefore, I concur with the current edition 
of Corbin on Contracts when it opines, “The present author does not agree 
that U.C.C. Article 2 was intended to abolish the concept of rescission.”67 
Another important gap in Brooks and Stremitzer’s analysis is that 
they do not address the case law upholding the right of rescission under 
the U.C.C.  My analysis below concentrates on the two most important 
U.C.C. sections in this area, section 2-601 (never mentioned by the 
authors) on the buyer’s right to reject improper delivery and section 2-
608 on buyer revocation of his earlier acceptance. 
Contrary to the impression left by Brooks and Stremitzer, the 
decisions commonly use the rescission terminology in describing the 
U.C.C.’s approach on the buyer’s right to reject the tender or delivery of 
the goods.  Thus, U.C.C. section 2-601 provides that the buyer, upon 
receipt of goods in a single delivery contract which “fail in any respect to 
conform to the contract,” may reject them, accept them, or accept only 
some of a number of commercial units.68  With every court considering 
the matter indicating that rejection under U.C.C. section 2-601 is a 
                                                 
64 U.C.C. § 2-720, official cmt. (2003). 
65 Id. § 2-721. 
66 Id. § 2-209(2). 
67 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1102, at 4 (John E. Murray, Jr. & 
Timothy Murray, Supp. 2012). 
68 U.C.C. § 2-601 (2004).  The rules on rescission of installment contracts are provided in 
another section of the U.C.C.  See id. § 2-612(2)–(3).  The CISG follows a U.C.C. Article 2 
type policy in Chapter II, Section II.  See CISG-AC Opinion no. 5, The Buyer’s Right to 
Avoid the Contract in Case of Non-Conforming Goods or Documents, May 7, 2005, para. 
3.3, 7 [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion no. 5].  As one commentator observes, “Where the 
buyer has not accepted the goods (i.e., the seller has not delivered or the buyer refuses to 
retain the goods) avoidance under the Convention yields results very similar to those 
under U.C.C. Article 2.”  Harry M. Flechtner, Remedies Under the New International Sales 
Convention:  The Perspective from Article 2 of the U.C.C., 8 J.L. & COM. 53, 62 n.36 (1988).  
Some relatively minor differences exist, such as the CISG does not follow a strict version of 
the perfect tender rule.  See CISG-AC Opinion no. 5, supra, at para. 2.2, 3.3 (mentioning that 
CISG through Article 52 follows a limited perfect tender rule).  Thus, Brooks and 
Stremitzer’s contention is unsupported that the CISG represents a demand to restrict the 
availability of rescission.  Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 
701 n.28. 
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remedy similar to (and providing the same relief as) common law 
equitable rescission, the U.C.C. allows a buyer to reject whenever the 
tender of delivery or the goods so delivered were not perfectly in 
conformity with the contract.69  Often called the “perfect tender rule,” 
this principle strongly favors the buyer; many cases have stated that the 
right to reject even applies to insubstantial, trivial, or minor 
nonconformities.70 
The perfect tender rule is based on the proposition that the seller’s 
complete performance is a warranty and a condition precedent to the 
buyer’s obligation to pay, provided the buyer rejects in good faith.71  
Where the buyer rejects non-conforming items, it is the seller who carries 
                                                 
69 See IMA N. Am., Inc. v. Maryln Nutraceuticals, Inc., No. CV-06-344-PHX-LOA, 2008 
WL 4737888, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 2008) (explaining how several states treat the revocation 
of acceptance provision in U.C.C. § 2-608).  See generally Maas v. Scoboda, 195 N.W.2d 491 
(Neb. 1972) (repeatedly using the term “rescission” in describing the U.C.C. § 2-601 
remedy). 
70 See, e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. Am. Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017, 1024 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[T]here 
is no doubt that the perfect tender rule applies to measure the buyer’s right of initial 
rejection of goods under U.C.C. § 2-601.”); Moulton Cavity & Mold, Inc. v. Lyn-Flex Indus., 
Inc., 396 A.2d 1024, 1027 (Me. 1979) (explaining the perfect tender holds that the buyer has 
the right to reject the seller’s tender “if in any way it fails to conform to the specifications of 
the contract”); see also Extrusion Painting, Inc. v. Awnings Unlimited, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 
985, 995 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (“[T]he perfect tender rule . . . requires a very high level of 
conformity . . . [whereby] the buyer may reject” the goods for any trivial defect) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Moulton Cavity & Mold, Inc., 396 A.2d at 1027 (noting that a 
buyer is able to avoid an unfavorable contract based on an insubstantial defect); Ramirez v. 
Autosport, 440 A.2d 1345, 1351 (N.J. 1982) (stating that the Code permits cancellation of a 
contract for minor defects).  See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-3, at 312 (5th ed. 2001) (laying out the three choices under U.C.C. 2-
601 that a buyer has if the goods fail to conform). 
71 See GE Packaged Power, Inc. v. Readiness Mgmt. Support, L.C., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 
1133 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“Buyers are in good faith entitled to reject goods ‘for any 
nonconformity, even one that is trivial); Annecca Inc. v. Lexent, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 999, 
1004 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting that each side’s performance of a contract is often “subject to 
the satisfaction of several conditions precedent by the other [party]”); Moulton Cavity & 
Mold, Inc., 396 A.2d at 1027–28 (expressing that the doctrine of substantial performance 
“has no application to a contract for the sale of goods”); U.C.C. § 2-507(1) (stating that 
“[t]ender of delivery is a condition to the buyer’s duty to accept” and pay for the goods); 
U.C.C. § 2-106 cmt. 2 (explaining that there is a “policy of requiring exact performance by 
the seller of his obligations as a condition to his right to require acceptance”); see also D.P. 
Tech. Corp. v. Sherwood Tool, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (D. Conn. 1990) (stating that a 
rejection of goods must be made in good faith); Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 
272, 275 (Ala. 1979) (explaining the good faith requirement for the rejection of goods); 
Shelley Smith, A New Approach to the Identification and Enforcement of Open Quantity 
Contracts:  Reforming the Law of Exclusivity and Good Faith, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 871, 883 (2009) 
(explaining the good faith requirements in output and requirement contracts).  See generally 
William H. Lawrence, The Prematurely Reported Demise of the Perfect Tender Rule, 35 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 557 (1987) (rebutting an argument questioning whether any life remains in the 
perfect tender rule). 
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the burden of proving that the nonconformity was corrected.72  This 
perfect tender rule also is subject to limited exceptions, such as the 
seller’s right to cure the defects under U.C.C. section 2-508, which allows 
the seller to repair the items or to provide substitute or missing items.73  
Nevertheless, consistent with the injunction of U.C.C. sections 1-102(1) 
and 1-106(1), stating that remedies shall be liberally construed, the 
decisions say that U.C.C. section 2-601 displays a pro-buyer perspective 
in that “courts must give ‘all reasonable leeway’ to the ‘rightfully 
rejecting . . . buyer.’”74 
Next, in denying the existence of rescission under the U.C.C. and by 
giving so much weight to U.C.C. section 2-608, comment 1, the authors 
do not cite the numerous cases equating common law rescission and 
revocation of acceptance under U.C.C. section 2-608. Most decisions have 
found that the U.C.C. section 2-608 “is intended to provide a buyer with 
the same relief as the common law remedy of equitable rescission.”75  
Thus, as with common law rescission, “[t]he remedies associated with 
revocation of acceptance are intended to return the buyer and seller to 
their presale positions.”76  Further, U.C.C. section 2-608(3) grants that 
“[a] buyer who so revokes [his acceptance] has the same rights and 
                                                 
72 See Ramirez, 440 A.2d at 1351 (citing Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc. 400 F.2d 112, 119 
(2d. Cir. 1968)). 
73 See Lawrence, supra note 71, at 590–91 (“Despite an overall consensus to the contrary 
by most commentators who have addressed the buyer’s right to reject under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the perfect tender rule codified in Article 2 is not so undercut by other 
Code provisions that it is a mere shadow of its former self.”); see also Jeffrey M. Dressler, 
Note, Good Faith Rejection of Goods in a Falling Market, 42 CONN. L. REV. 611, 617–18 (2009) 
(“Courts . . . have shown a willingness to enforce the perfect tender rule . . . and allow 
buyers to reject even for minor or trivial defects.”). 
74 Novacore Techs., Inc. v. GST Commc’ns Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 169, 184 (D. Mass. 1998) 
(quoting Bevel-Fold, Inc. v. Bose Corp., 402 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980)). 
75 IMA N. Am., Inc. v. Maryln Nutraceuticals, Inc., No. CV-06-344-PHX-LOA, 2008 WL 
4737888, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 2008); see also Jones v. Fleetwood Motor Homes, 127 F. 
Supp. 2d 958, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (referencing equitable relief of rescission under the Illinois 
Commercial Code); Peckham v. Larsen Chevrolet-Buick-Oldsmobile, Inc., 587 P.2d 816, 818 
(Idaho 1978) (“[I]t has been held, and the commentators agree, that rescission and 
revocation of acceptance amount to the same thing under the Uniform Commercial 
Code . . . .”); Ramirez, 440 A.2d at 1351 (“[I]n brief, revocation is tantamount to rescission.”); 
Aubrey’s R.V. Ctr., Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 731 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) 
(explaining that U.C.C. § 2-608 is the Code’s version of the common law remedy of 
rescission).  But see McGinnis v. Wentworth Chevrolet Co., 668 P.2d 365, 367 n.4 (Or. 1983) 
(“Some of the participants in this case have used the word ‘rescission’ as a synonym for 
‘revocation of acceptance’.  This is an incorrect usage.”). 
76 Chaurasia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 126 P.3d 165, 172 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); IMA N. Am., 
Inc., 2008 WL 4737888, at *2; see also Beer v. Bennett, 993 A.2d 765, 771 (N.H. 2010) 
(“Rescission is an equitable remedy, . . . which restores the injured party to the position 
occupied before the transaction.” (quoting Mooney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 822 A.2d 
567, 569 (N.H. 2003); Patch v. Arsenault, 653 A.2d 1079, 1082 (N.H. 1995))). 
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duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.”77  
For all these reasons, most courts either give lip service to the brief aside 
in comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-608 so heavily stressed by Brooks and 
Stremitzer or omit the comment altogether.78  Indeed, at least one court 
contends that comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-608 supports, rather than 
abolishes, rescission under the Code.79 
The authors further overlook that U.C.C. section 2-608 is a 
“liberalization” of this relief as compared with the common law.80  One 
example of this expansion is that under the U.C.C., unlike the common 
law, no requirement exists for the buyer to tender the goods to the 
seller.81  Also, the test for revocation under U.C.C. section 2-608(1) is 
whether the value of the goods was “substantially impaired,” with buyer 
subjectivity being an important element for this remedy.82  Accordingly, 
if the defect “shakes the buyer’s faith or undermines his confidence in 
the reliability and integrity of the purchased item,” even where the 
defect is curable, that circumstance can support revocation.83  Thus, the 
                                                 
77 U.C.C. § 2-608(3) (2003). 
78 See, e.g., Peckham, 587 P.2d at 818 (providing a citation to comment 1 and observing 
that “rescission and revocation . . . amount to the same thing”); Ramirez, 440 A.2d at 1351 
(citing comment 1 and stating that “revocation is tantamount to rescission”). 
79 Aubrey’s, 731 P.2d at 1127 (“That [U.C.C. 2-608] encompasses the concept of rescission 
is supported by Official Comment 1 to [U.C.C. 2-608] as well as past Washington 
decisions.”) (footnote omitted). 
80 Id. at 1128; see also Peppler v. Kasual Kreations, Inc., 416 So. 2d 864, 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1982) (“[U.C.C. § 2-608] has merely codified the remedy formerly available in 
equity.”); Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 313 S.E.2d 384, 389 (Va. 1984) (“The Uniform 
Commercial Code has substituted a standard of commercial reasonableness for the stricter 
standards which formerly prevailed . . . .”); Francis A. Miniter, Buyer’s Right of Rejection:  A 
Quarter Century Under the Uniform Commercial Code, and Recent International Developments, 13 
GA. L. REV. 805, 810 (1979) (explaining that U.C.C. section 2-608 is an expanded right of 
rescission).   
“The buyer’s power under the [CISG] to avoid after the goods have been delivered is 
strikingly similar to the buyer’s power to reject or revoke acceptance under Article 2 of the 
U.C.C.”  Flechtner, supra note 68, at 63.  See generally THE CONVENTION FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS:  A HANDBOOK OF BASIC MATERIALS ch. 1, art. 26, at 87, 115 
(Reed R. Kathrein & Daniel Barstow Magraw eds., 2d ed. 1990) (explaining that CISG takes 
a very similar approach to U.C.C. 2-608 but in a much more direct fashion). 
81 See, e.g., Snow v. C.I.T. Corp. of the S., Inc., 647 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Ark. 1983) (“A tender 
of goods purchased was a condition to the right of rescission under our earlier law, but the 
Uniform Commercial Code dropped that requirement.”). 
82 See McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 449 N.E.2d 1289, 1294 (Ohio 
1983) (stating that substantial impairment is a factor that should be determined by the 
court); see also Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. 1977) (“[T]he 
nonconformity must substantially impair the value of the goods to the buyer.”). 
83 McCullough, 449 N.E.2d at 1294.  See Inniss v. Methot Buick-Opel, Inc., 506 A.2d 212, 
219 (Me. 1986) (quoting McCullough, 449 N.E.2d at 1294); see also Lathrop v. Tyrrell, 471 
N.E.2d 1049, 1051 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“Once a person’s faith is shaken in a major 
investment, the item not only loses its real value in the buyer’s eyes, but also becomes an 
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U.C.C. test for substantial impairment is not the reduced value of the 
goods on the open market or their value to the average buyer, but rather 
the detriment to the “particular buyer involved.”84   
Perhaps the leading case illustrating the leniency of the U.C.C.’s 
substantial impairment standard in favor of the buyer is Colonial Dodge, 
Inc. v. Miller.85  In this decision, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld a 
very safety-conscious buyer’s decision to revoke acceptance of a new car 
the day after its delivery, because the car was missing a spare tire, the 
absence of which was not sufficiently detectable at the time of sale and 
not readily available from the seller.86  The authors fail to discuss any of 
these liberal elements of U.C.C. section 2-608.87   
The above analysis has shown that numerous principles mark clear 
boundaries for this generous remedy, contrary to Brooks and 
Stremitzer’s characterization of U.C.C. section 2-608 as “conceal[ing] 
rescission” and being “murky.”88  In all respects, consistent with the 
injunction of U.C.C. sections 1-102(1) and 1-106(1) that remedies shall be 
liberally construed, the U.C.C. displays a pro-buyer revocation policy in 
                                                                                                             
article whose integrity has been substantially impaired and whose operation is fraught 
with apprehension.” (citing Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 292 N.E.2d 168 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1972))); Mercury Marine v. Clear River Constr. Co., 839 So. 2d 508, 524 (Miss. 
2003) (explaining generally the doctrine of “shaken faith”); Haverlah v. Memphis Aviation, 
Inc., 674 S.W.2d 297, 304 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (“Cases in other jurisdictions have held that 
substantial impairment of value within the meaning of UCC § 2-608(1) exists when the 
nonconformities in the goods are such that they shake the buyer’s faith in the ability of the 
goods to perform the function for which they were purchased.”). 
84 Gasque, 313 S.E.2d at 388 (citing Champion Ford Sales, Inc. v. Levine, 433 A.2d 1218, 
1226 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)); see also Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 545 P.2d 1382, 1384–85 (Or. 
1976) (explaining that the substantial impairment test is subjective regarding the plaintiff’s 
needs, circumstances, and objective regarding the need for evidence beyond plaintiff’s 
assertions of non-conformity). 
85 362 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Mich. 1984). 
86 Id. at 705–07. 
87 In a sharp contrast to rejection under U.C.C. section 2-601, another important pro-
buyer principle exists under U.C.C. section 2-608.  Except where a buyer knew about the 
nonconformity before acceptance and reasonably assumed that the nonconformity would 
be cured, most courts have concluded that, unlike where the buyer rejects a nonconforming 
tender, “a seller has no right to cure [such defects] after a buyer revokes his acceptance.”  
Head v. Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc., 593 N.W.2d 595, 600 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); see 
also Car Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Blue Bird Body Co., 322 F. App’x 891, 895 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(“[W]here a buyer’s acceptance is as described in UCC § 2-608(1)(b), the majority rule is 
that he may revoke the acceptance without waiting for a cure, seasonable or otherwise, by 
the seller.”).  This pro-buyer principle is so strong that revocation of acceptance is available 
“even where the seller has attempted to limit its warranties.”  Esquire Mobile Homes, Inc. 
v. Arrendale, 356 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Hub Motor Co. v. Zurawski, 
278 S.E.2d 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)). 
88 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 697 n.13. 
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that “courts must give ‘all reasonable leeway’ to the ‘rightfully rejecting 
or revoking buyer.’”89 
C. Special Domestic Statutes and Regulations 
Brooks and Stremitzer further fail to mention that, besides the 
U.C.C., a number of federal statutes and regulations in the United States 
generally aimed at consumers support a broad right of rescission.  These 
rights comprise a significant part of the U.S. economy.  In the federal 
system, examples of these tools are the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) 
and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Door-to-Door Sales Cooling 
Off Rule.  In addition, state statutes provide rights of avoidance in 
multitudinous contracts for services.  A flavor of these broad rights may 
be shown by consulting the laws of California and New York, two 
bellwether states for commercial transactions in the United States. 
1. Truth in Lending Act 
TILA and its implementing regulations assure the meaningful 
disclosure in relation to credit so that consumers can readily compare 
various terms and avoid the uninformed use of credit.90  To accomplish 
this purpose, TILA generally requires disclosure of credit terms in an 
understandable manner for the consumer.91 
                                                 
89 Novacore Techs., Inc. v. GST Commc’ns Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 169, 184 (D. Mass. 1998) 
(quoting Bevel-Fold, Inc. v. Bose Corp., 402 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (Mass. Ct. App. 1980)).  
“Commentators who have looked closely at the cases have found that courts are very 
protective of buyers’ rights in applying this seemingly seller-friendly standard, so long as a 
buyer revokes promptly upon discovering a defect.”  Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help 
Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1413–14 (2009) (footnote omitted); see also Donald 
W. Garland, Determining Whether a Nonconformity Substantially Impairs the Value of Goods:  
Some Guidelines, 26 U.C.C. L.J. 129, 143 (1993) (explaining that if a seller does not cure all 
minor nonconformities on a “timely basis, a buyer will be able to successfully revoke its 
acceptance of the good”); John A. Sebert, Jr., Rejection, Revocation, and Cure Under Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code:  Some Modest Proposals, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 375, 394–95 (1990) 
(noting that the seller merely repairing every defect promptly and effectively does not 
necessarily constitute an effective cure to the buyer). 
90 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006) (explaining the purpose of the Consumer Credit Cost 
Disclosure subchapter is to “assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the 
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him 
and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and 
unfair credit billing and credit card practices”); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (2012) (“The 
purpose of this regulation is to promote the informed use of consumer credit by requiring 
disclosures about its terms and cost.”). 
91 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006) (“The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously disclose, in 
accordance with regulations of the Board, to any obligor in a transaction subject to this 
section the rights of the obligor under this section.”). 
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When the transaction, other than for the purchase of a home, 
involves the taking of the consumer’s principal dwelling as collateral, 
TILA grants consumers the right to rescind the transaction.92  The 
consumer has this unimpaired right for three days, but it may last for up 
to three years if the homeowner does not sell the home and if the seller 
fails to provide important TILA disclosures at the time of the original 
credit transaction.93  Two types of trigger events will extend the period 
for rescission:  (1) a failure to provide the consumer having an interest in 
the property with one copy of the TILA disclosure form that has all the 
material information correctly disclosed; and (2) failure to give the 
consumer two copies of the notification of the consumer’s right to cancel, 
one copy to keep, and one to use if the consumer exercises the option to 
rescind.94 
TILA is a remedial statute with a strong pro-buyer perspective 
liberally construed in favor of the rescinding consumer and strictly 
enforced against the creditor.95  “[L]enders are generally strictly liable 
under TILA for inaccuracies, even absent a showing that the inaccuracies 
are misleading . . . . ”96  Accordingly, a court has no discretion to decline 
TILA rescission, notwithstanding any equities in favor of the seller.97 
2. Federal Trade Commission’s Rule Concerning Door-to-Door Sales 
Cooling Off Period 
The FTC Rule, 16 Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) Part 429, 
provides that in connection with door-to-door sales, it constitutes an 
unfair and deceptive act or practice for any seller to fail to furnish the 
buyer with a fully completed copy of the contract, which must contain a 
statement in substantially the following form in ten point, bold face type: 
You, the buyer, may cancel this transaction at any time 
prior to midnight of the third business day after the date 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (laying out the time limit for an obligor’s right of rescission 
under TILA). 
94 Id. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5(b), 226.15(b), 226.23(b)(1) (2012) (cited in In re Regan, 
439 B.R. 522, 527 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2010)). 
95 17 AM. JUR. 2D Consumer Protection § 3 (2012).  “Congress passed the Truth in Lending 
Act (TILA) to promote consumers’ informed use of credit by requiring meaningful 
disclosure of credit terms.”  Id. (citing Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 874 
(2011)). 
96 Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt., Inc., 195 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1999). 
97 See In re Regan, 439 B.R. at 527 (explaining that when a lender has violated TILA 
provisions, courts impose strict liability and have “no discretion to decline rescission 
because of the equities of the case”). 
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of this transaction.  See the attached notice of 
cancellation form for an explanation of this right.98 
In broad pro-buyer coverage, the rule defines a “door-to-door sale” 
as “[a] sale, lease, or rental of consumer goods or services with a 
purchase price of $25 or more, whether under single or multiple 
contracts.”99  For the consumer to invoke the rule, he must show that 
“the seller or his representative personally solicit[ed] the sale, including 
those [sales] in response to or following an invitation by the buyer.”100  
Lastly, the regulation applies where “the buyer’s agreement or offer to 
purchase is made at a place other than” the seller’s place of business.101  
The regulation has limited exemptions, such as “for sellers of arts or 
crafts sold at fairs or similar places.”102 
The above form must contain all pertinent details of the right to 
cancel, and the seller must further explain this right to the purchaser, 
except in emergencies.103  Subject to giving the seller written notice, the 
buyer may cancel for any reason within three business days of the 
agreement.104  The pro-buyer policy is that consumers are entitled to 
protection from unscrupulous or high pressure sales practices.  
Therefore, the law allows an extended time for buyers to contemplate the 
possible consequences of the transaction and to reverse their 
commitment without penalty.105 
3. State Policies 
Every state has a cooling-off statute similar to the FTC rule, and 
some jurisdictions have even broader coverage, such as for telemarketing 
transactions.106  Further, almost all states have adopted many other 
consumer protection statutes that allow rescission as a corrective 
remedy.  This section focuses on two jurisdictions:  California and New 
York. 
                                                 
98 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(a) (2012). 
99 Id. § 429.0(a). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. § 429.3(b). 
103 Id. §§ 429.0(a)(3), 429.1(e). 
104 Id. § 429.1(b). 
105 See Byron D. Sher, The “Cooling Off” Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 UCLA L. REV. 717, 
718–19 (1968) (explaining the extended time period that a buyer receives in this type of 
situation). 
106 See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 14:8, 
Appendix 14A (2011) (explaining how every state has a cooling off statute); see also, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 8-19A-14(e) (1975) (describing a fourteen-day cancellation period). 
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California permits purchaser avoidance for the following contracts:  
credit repair services, dance studio services, dating services, dental 
services, discount buying services, door-to-door sales, electric services, 
employment counseling services, endless chain scheme, franchise sales, 
funeral agreements (pre-need), health studio services, home equity sale 
during foreclosure, home improvement agreements, home loans, home 
repair or restoration agreements following a disaster, home-secured 
transactions, home solicitation sales, immigration consultant services, life 
insurance under $10,000, insurance (disability, seniors, and life), 
property insurance, unfulfilled internet sales, job listing services, legal 
document assistance, manufactured or mobile home transfers, 
unfulfilled mail and telephone sales, membership camping agreements, 
mortgage foreclosure consultant services, personal emergency response 
unit agreements, private child support collectors, real estate transfers 
(delayed or materially amended transfer disclosure statement), retail 
installment agreements, seller assisted marketing plans, seminar sales, 
short-term time shares, undivided interest subdivisions, unlawful 
detainer assistants, water treatment devices, weight-loss services, and 
service contracts for:  (a) used cars, home appliances, and home 
electronic products; (b) new motor vehicles; (c) any type of goods, pro-
rata refund less cancellation fee; and (d) unfulfilled telephone sales.107 
New York similarly authorizes purchaser avoidance of numerous 
transactions:  automobile broker business contracts, charitable 
organization contracts with a professional fund-raiser, credit services 
business contracts, door-to-door sales contracts, health club contracts, 
home food service plan sales, home improvement contracts, 
campground memberships, personal emergency service response 
agreements, prize award schemes, sale of urea-formaldehyde foam 
insulation, sale or lease contracts for subdivided lands, social referral 
(dating) services, and telephone sales contracts.108 
These federal and state statutory schemes have the same objective—
to protect the gullible individual from wily sellers so that consumers 
have a window to cancel contracts they may have signed while under 
pressure or when they lacked adequate information.  These statutes do 
not undermine the stability of contracting, but accomplish the opposite 
effect by encouraging higher standards of good faith and fair dealing in 
                                                 
107 See Consumer Transactions with Statutory Contract Cancellation Rights, CAL. DEP’T OF 
CONSUMER AFFAIRS (Jan. 2010), http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/legal_guides/k-
6.shtml (listing the types of contracts California permits purchaser avoidance and their 
respective time limitations). 
108 See Contracts, ORANGECOUNTYGOV.COM, 118–20, 
http://www.orangecountygov.com/filestorage/124/826/1278/Consumer_Law_Help_Ma
nual_-_Contracts.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2013). 
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the marketplace.  Once again, Brooks and Stremitzer have overlooked 
key federal and state laws and regulations, which follow sound public 
policy in recognizing the buyer’s broad rights of rescission in targeted 
transactions. 
D. The Material Breach Doctrine:  A Porous Barrier to Rescission  
Courts often mention the material breach doctrine as an element for 
common law rescission and Brooks and Stremitzer do so as well.  In 
defining “material breach,” the authors cite the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, section 344, “[A] breach by non-performance that gives rise to 
a claim for damages for total breach or on a repudiation.”109  Thus, they 
say that “when [the] breach is not material [i.e., partial], the right to 
rescind is not triggered” and the promisee must resort to damages, but 
“when breach is material, rescission rights are triggered.”110  They also 
praise the material breach element as a device that regulates “[m]uch of 
the mischief” caused by “strategic and opportunistic parties.”111 
The authors err with their uncritical acceptance of this pre-requisite 
and their confidence in its ability to cabin undue rescission and to deter 
promisee opportunism.  As the following analysis will show, Brooks and 
Stremitzer’s treatment is deficient, because the material breach pre-
requisite has always been a porous barrier against the buyer’s right of 
relief. 
Many courts have recited the black letter principles of the material 
breach doctrine.112  Generally, unless the contract states a different 
standard (which is a rarity), these cases commonly indicate that 
“[r]escission is not generally permitted for casual, technical, or 
unimportant breaches, or where the breach is incidental or subordinate 
to the main purpose of the contract.”113  With such a partial breach, 
courts will confine the promisee to its damages remedy.114  By contrast, 
with a material breach, the default “must be of a relatively high degree of 
                                                 
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(1) (1981). 
110 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 696. 
111 Id. at 717. 
112 See, e.g., McGee Constr. Co. v. Neshobe Dev., Inc., 594 A.2d 415, 417 (Vt. 1991) 
(“Contracting parties can define what will constitute a material breach of their contract.”). 
113 26 WILLISTON, supra note 26, § 68:2, at 40–41 (footnotes omitted). 
114 See Vidalia Outdoor Prods., Inc. v. Higgins, 701 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (“If 
the breach is not material, the party is limited to a claim for damages and cannot rescind 
the contract.”); RW Power Partners, L.P. v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 899 F. Supp. 1490, 1496 
(E.D. Va. 1995) (explaining that a party’s only remedy for a partial breach is damages). 
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importance.”115  Whether a breach of contract is material is an issue of 
fact.116  
While these black letter principles seem reasonable on their surface, 
other commentators properly recognize the problems with the case law 
notions of material breach.  It can be argued in the defense of the 
doctrine that the law commonly adopts a flexible, multi-factor test in the 
administration of remedies, but the material breach test is a different 
type of multi-factor doctrine because it is deeply flawed.  The difficulty is 
that it provides little substantive guidance and leaves fact-finders adrift 
to decide material breach on vague notions of equity.   Accordingly, the 
following discussion establishes that the cases are all over the map, 
which further destabilizes the vitality of the material breach pre-
requisite. 
First, the material breach doctrine is confused, because courts use 
numerous formulations of the test with different shadings on the 
requisite magnitude of the breach.117  For example, some decisions say 
that the breach must be “so fundamental to a contract that the failure to 
perform defeats the essential purpose of the contract or makes it 
impossible for the other party to perform.”118  Other versions are the 
more malleable standards that the breach must go to the root, the heart, 
or the essence of the contract.119  A number of jurisdictions, such as 
Oklahoma and Iowa, employ a misleading formulation, “failure of 
consideration,” to describe the requirement.120  Still other courts say a 
                                                 
115 Hansen Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1297, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting 
PALMER, supra note 31, § 4.5); First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 765, 
800 (2009) (quoting PALMER, supra note 31, § 4.5). 
116 See Malik Corp. v. Tenacity Grp., LLC, 961 A.2d 1057, 1061 (D.C. 2008) 
(acknowledging that the materiality of a breach of contract is an issue of fact); Borah v. 
McCandless, 205 P.3d 1209, 1215  (Idaho 2009) (“Generally, unless the facts presented are 
undisputed, whether there was a breach of the terms of a contract is a question of fact.”). 
117 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37 cmt. a (2011) 
(explaining that rules governing rescission and restitution were not subject to any uniform 
test in the development of their case law); 26 WILLISTON, supra note 26, §§ 63.3, 68:2, 68:21. 
118 E.g., Marion Family YMCA v. Hensel, 897 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 
119 See Falls v. State Farm Ins. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (M.D. Pa. 
2011) (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently decided that a breach is 
material if it goes to the “heart and essence of the contract”); 23 WILLISTON, supra note 26, 
§ 63:3 (stating that for a breach to be material, it “must ‘go to the root’ or ‘essence’ of the 
agreement”). 
120 See, e.g., Maytag Co. v. Alward, 112 N.W.2d 654, 659 (Iowa 1962) (describing how the 
failure of consideration formulation is used in Iowa); Bonner v. Okla. Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 
1176, 1186 (Okla. 1993) (providing an example and describing the failure of consideration 
formulation used in Oklahoma); see also Andersen, supra note 42, at 16–17 n.56 (noting that 
the phrase failure of consideration can be troublesome and misleading).  A more accurate 
definition of failure of consideration is the absence of consideration as a defense to contract 
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breach is material if the promisee receives something “substantially less 
or different” from that for which he or she bargained.121  Compounding 
these varying standards, “[c]ourts frequently use ‘material breach’ in a 
conclusory fashion without indicating how or why they reached the 
conclusion.”122  In fact, “[c]ontracting parties can define what will 
constitute a material breach of their contract.”123 
In other facets of these competing perspectives, courts give varying 
emphasis to the elements of the doctrine.  Thus, a significant number of 
decisions emphasize causation and that the test examines whether “the 
matter, in respect to which the failure of performance occurs, is of such a 
nature and of such importance that the contract would not have been 
made without it.”124  Other courts emphasize relational issues as between 
the parties, requiring proof of an irreparable loss of trust.125  Under many 
cases, the amount of money damages will prove materiality, but other 
courts hold that proof of damages is not essential on this point where the 
breach was central to the parties’ agreement.126  Conversely, where a 
breach causes no damage or prejudice to the other party, it may be 
deemed not to be material.127  Last, some cases equate a material breach 
with a “total breach,” but this usage is easily misconstrued, because it 
incorrectly implies that the promisor must have failed to provide any 
performance under the contract.128  The above proliferation of 
                                                                                                             
enforcement.  See Farrell v. Third Nat’l Bank, 101 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936) 
(“Failure of consideration is in fact simply a want of consideration . . . .”). 
121 E.g., Fowler v. A & A Co., 262 A.2d 344, 347 (D.C. 1970); Schnepf v. Thomas L. 
McNamara, Inc., 93 N.W.2d 230, 232 ( Mich. 1958); 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 447 (1964)). 
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 241, Reporter’s Note, cmt. a. 
123 McGee Constr. Co. v. Neshobe Dev., Inc., 594 A.2d 415, 417 (Vt. 1991) (citing Carter v. 
Sherburne Corp., 315 A.2d 870, 873–74 (Vt. 1974)). 
124 Arrow Master, Inc. v. Unique Forming Ltd., 12 F.3d 709, 715 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation 
omitted). 
125 See LJL Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 962 A.2d 639, 652 (Pa. 2009) (explaining 
that when there is a breach of contract that causes irreparable damage to the trust between 
the contracting parties, the non-breaching party may terminate the contract without notice). 
126 See Horton v. Horton, 487 S.E.2d 200, 204 (Va. 1997) (“However, proof of a specific 
amount of monetary damages is not required when the evidence establishes that the breach 
was so central to the parties’ agreement that it defeated an essential purpose of the 
contract.”). 
127 Rolscreen Co. v. Pella Prods. of St. Louis, Inc., 64 F.3d 1202, 1212 n.8 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the breach was not material and caused no damage to the non-breaching 
party). 
128 See Admiral Fin. Corp. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“A 
‘total breach’ is a breach that ‘so substantially impairs the value of the contract to the 
injured party at the time of the breach that it is just in the circumstances to allow him to 
recover damages based on all his remaining rights to performance.” (quoting Mobile Oil 
Exploration & Producing S.E., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 608 (2000))); Hyman v. 
Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393, 397 (Fla. 1954) (stating that many courts have equated material and 
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substantive standards, sometimes contained in the same case,129 only 
complicates the courts’ task in determining this element for rescission. 
As just indicated, a basic flaw in the materiality standard in the case 
law is the speculative “but for” causation element.  The problem here is 
that when courts require the failure of performance to have been “of 
such a nature and of such importance that the contract would not have 
been made without it,” fact-finders must make an ex post analysis of the 
parties’ intentions when they originally entered the contract.130  In this 
respect, the materiality of the breach will depend on “the nature and 
effect of the violation in light of how the particular contract was viewed, 
bargained for, entered into, and performed by the parties.”131  The 
upshot is that the parties in the heat of litigation will often battle with 
self-serving evidence of the prior original intent and over the extent of 
materiality the parties would have assigned to a future, hypothetical 
breach.  This speculation is inherently unreliable for fact-finders as a 
means to divine the parties’ initial understandings.  As one commentator 
notes: 
Although fact-specific judgments have been made for 
centuries by judges and jurors in adjudicating the 
propriety of contract termination decisions, the risk is 
obvious that those termination decisions will be 
challenged subjectively in “20/20 hindsight,” even 
though the finders of fact were instructed to view the 
                                                                                                             
total breaches to mean the same thing); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37 cmt. c (2011) (explaining that the terminology of “total breach” is 
often “easily misconstrued”). 
129 See, e.g., Estate of Luster v. Allstate Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The 
Indiana cases limit rescission to breaches that go ‘to the heart of the contract, or that result 
in a ‘complete failure of consideration.’”) (citations omitted); see also Gilbert v. Dep’t of 
Justice, 334 F.3d 1065, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] breach is material when it relates to a 
matter of vital importance, or goes to the essence of the contract.” (quoting Thomas v. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 124 F.3d 1439, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1997))); RW Power Partners, L.P. 
v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 899 F. Supp. 1490, 1496 (E.D. Va. 1995) (“Rescission should be 
permitted only when the complaining party has suffered a breach so material and 
substantial in nature that it affects the very essence of the contract and serves to defeat the 
object of the parties.”) (citation omitted). 
130 Ahern v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
131 Stone Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1548, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 cmts. a–b (1981)); see also Creative Waste 
Mgmt., Inc. v. Capitol Envtl. Servs., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 582, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Under 
New York Law, ‘[t]here is no hard and fast rule on the subject of rescission, for the right 
usually depends on the circumstances of the particular case.’” (quoting Callanan v. Powers, 
92 N.E. 747, 752 (N.Y. 1910))). 
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decision to terminate as of the time and in the factual 
context in which it was made.132 
Perhaps the best effort to correlate these disparate strands of the 
common law material breach doctrine appears in the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, section 241.133  Many courts cite with approval section 241’s 
five factors, which will assist in this determination: 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived 
of the benefit which he reasonably expected; 
 
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be 
adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of 
which he will be deprived; 
 
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to 
offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; 
 
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to 
offer to perform will cure his failure, taking account of 
all the circumstances including any reasonable 
assurances; 
 
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing 
to perform or to offer to perform comports with 
standards of good faith and fair dealing.134 
Several commentators persuasively argue that the Restatement test 
“fails in its essential purpose.”135  As one writer analyzing numerous 
                                                 
132 5 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 18:4 (2011); see also John Honnold, 
Buyer’s Right of Rejection:  A Study in the Impact of Codification upon a Commercial Problem, 97 
U. PA. L. REV. 457, 462 (1949) (“[T]he court has neither the means, nor the right” to 
determine why the parties to a contract inserted a certain provision into the contract. 
(quoting Filley v. Pope, 115 U.S. 213, 220 (1885))). 
133 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (providing five factors to help clarify 
the common law material breach doctrine). 
134 Id.; see In re Old Carco LLC, 452 B.R. 100, 127–28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also 
Hansen Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1297, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Kersh v. 
Montgomery Developmental Ctr., 519 N.E.2d 665, 668 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Adams TV of 
Memphis, Inc. v. ComCorp of Tenn., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).  These 
are just  examples of cases that cite section 241 with approval. 
135 5 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 18:4 (citing the amorphous 
standard of material breach); see also Eric G. Andersen, A New Look at Material Breach in the 
Law of Contracts, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1084 (1988) (“When the Restatement factors are 
considered individually, their contribution to a workable materiality standard is marginal 
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decisions has observed, “Despite their distinguished pedigree, the 
Restatement factors fall seriously short of providing a workable definition 
of materiality.  Their most obvious failing is the absence of any guidance 
on their relative priorities or on how to combine them.”136  A second 
writer analyzing the cases approving the Restatement has concluded, 
“Determining whether a material breach has occurred under current law 
involves a weighing of several factors, a determination that often seems 
either completely without logic or precision, or self-evident and 
conclusory.  Thus, parties are left not knowing what to do and what risks 
they may be assuming.”137  A third writer asserts that “trial courts 
merely pay ‘lip service’ to the restatement and then slide the factual issue 
of ‘material breach’ to the jury with little analysis.”138  Thus, under the 
Restatement test, the standard inevitably devolves to vague notions of 
fairness and justice in the eyes of the fact-finder.139  Even the Restatement 
concedes that its test is “necessarily imprecise.”140  Until it is reformed to 
meet all the above objections, the common law material breach doctrine 
remains an uncertain bulwark against excessive rescission, contrary to 
Brooks and Stremitzer’s unqualified endorsement of this concept. 
E. Common Commercial Practices and Rescission 
Common mercantile practices further support the widespread 
availability of rescission to consumers.  Brooks and Stremitzer neglect to 
mention that many merchants in prescribed circumstances demur from 
enforcing their rights against customers seeking rescission, because they 
are more interested in maintaining good customer relations for future 
purchases.  This omission is important because the law on the books 
                                                                                                             
at best.”); Amy B. Cohen, Reviving Jacob and Youngs, Inc. v. Kent:  Material Breach Doctrine 
Reconsidered, 42 VILL. L. REV. 65, 90 (1997) (explaining that the material breach doctrine 
leaves parties without “predictable guidelines”) 
136 Andersen, supra note 135, at 1076, 1083 (“A close look at the relevant Restatement 
provisions makes it difficult to blame the courts for falling into confusion or completely 
bypassing them.”). 
137 Cohen, supra note 135, at 67. 
138 5 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 18:4 n.13.10 (citing Mustang 
Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Tex. 2004)). 
139 See Cohen, supra note 135, at 83 (explaining that the Second Restatement provides no 
unifying principle other than fairness or justice in determining how to balance the factors); 
see also Kel-Keef Enters. v. Quality Components Corp., 738 N.E.2d 524, 537 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2000) (“The issue of whether or not a breach of contract is ‘material,’ thereby discharging 
the other’s duty to perform, is a question to be decided on the inherent justice of the 
matter.” (quoting Susman v. Cypress Venture, 543 N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ill. 1989))); Rogers v. 
Balsley, 608 N.E.2d 1288, 1292 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (explaining that the determination of a 
material breach will be based on the “inherent justice of the matter” (citing Hickox v.Bell, 
552 N.E.2d 1133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990))); Andersen, supra note 135, at 1083–84. 
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 cmt. a (1981). 
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does not match many contracts in action.  As several commentators have 
noted, while the details can differ, many retailers in the United States 
and Europe allow purchasers a “core right to withdraw” from the 
transaction.141 
Regarding the United States, Omri Ben-Shahar and Eric A. Posner 
have noted the “nearly universal” practice in retail stores accepting a 
“core right to withdraw” from sales of new merchandise.142  These two 
commentators have examined in detail the return policies of two major 
retailers, Wal-Mart and Target, for both in-store and on-line sales.143  In 
these establishments, the customer can return without question and 
without receipts almost all items for cash or store credit.144  Some 
qualifications exist; for example, apparel must be returned unworn with 
tickets attached and books must be unused and unmarked.145  Another 
restriction is that the purchaser must return the item within a prescribed 
period, ordinarily 90 days.146  Apart from these qualifications, these 
merchants expect and even invite these returns as part of good customer 
relations if the buyer is dissatisfied with the product for any reason.147  
Notably, Ben-Shahar and Posner did not report that many merchants in 
the United States stand upon their U.C.C. rights in resisting rescission. 
Other researchers have reached the same conclusion about common 
commercial practice in the United States and overseas.  Performing a 
survey of the general conditions of thirty-two shops in the United States 
and various European nations that consumers visit regularly, Jan M. 
Smits writes: 
Many retail shops throughout the world have adopted 
the policy that customers can [withdraw] at will and 
receive back the contract price or at least a credit note 
with which they can buy a different product in the same 
shop.  This return policy is often laid down in the 
general conditions of the retailer.  These contractual 
rights are even so common that the general public in 
                                                 
141 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Eric A. Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law, 40 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 115, 120 (2011). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 120–21. 
144 Id. at 120. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 121. 
147 See id. at 142–43 (explaining that some jurisdictions hold that buyers can escape 
contracts that involve “fancy, taste, sensibility, or judgment” simply because they are 
dissatisfied with the product). 
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some countries seems to think that there is a “general 
right to return goods.”148 
It can be argued that these common mercantile practices are 
irrelevant to Brooks and Stremitzer’s argument because they are 
discussing rescission in the adversarial legal setting, whereas these 
common practices occur non-adversarially.  The answer is that no fine 
line exists between adversarial and non-adversarial rescission, and these 
settings are further related because merchants liberally allow rescission 
for the very purpose of avoiding adversarial relations with customers in 
the hope of gaining future business.  Aside from their incomplete legal 
analysis, Brooks and Stremitzer’s thesis that sellers naturally seek to 
reduce the possibility of rescission overlooks that many sellers willingly 
embrace liberal rescissionary practices at the ground level in the 
American and European marketplace.149 
F. Rescission and the Principle of “Fair Redress” 
As demonstrated above, Brooks and Stremitzer are incorrect that 
buyers have restricted statutory and common law rights to rescind for 
breach of contract or that a trend exists for further retrenchment.  Indeed, 
the law addressing broad powers of rescission is so pervasive that 
several commentators have noted a right to withdraw in the general law 
of contracts.150 
                                                 
148 Jan M. Smits, Rethinking the Usefulness of Mandatory Rights of Withdrawal in Consumer 
Contract Law:  The Right to Change Your Mind?, 29 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 671, 677 (2011).  
Smits also comments, 
Even in areas where mandatory withdrawal rights exist, retailers 
usually allow their customers to withdraw from the contract for a 
longer period than necessary.  The most plausible reason why they do 
so is to attract customers, and the only way to do this is to go further 
than the statutory rule prescribes. 
Id. at 682. 
149 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.  An excellent recent example of a major 
manufacturer adopting a liberal rescissionary policy to obtain new business is Chevrolet’s 
“Love It or Return It” guarantee.  The policy states that if an eligible retail customer 
purchases an eligible 2012 or 2013 Chevrolet model between July 10, 2012, and September 
4, 2012, the customer may return his/her vehicle to the original selling/participating dealer 
after thirty days, but no longer than sixty days after the delivery date.  See Jerry Hirsch, 
General Motors’ Chevrolet Brand Offers Refund to New-Car Buyers, L.A. TIMES, July, 11, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/11/business/la-fi-autos-chevy-buyback-20120711 
(explaining Chevrolet’s return policy generally and comparing it to a recent policy of 
Hyundai’s). 
150 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 141, at 116 (“European law in this way 
recognizes the consumer’s ‘right to withdraw.’  There is no such generic right in the 
common law of contract or in the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States.”); see also 
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On a more fundamental level, Brooks and Stremitzer have missed 
that, with few exceptions, the law welcomes rescission for breach when 
doing so enables the legal system to promote a fair redress and the 
parties’ good faith.  Courts have observed, “[R]escission is an equitable 
remedy.”151  Thus, as stated by the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment, “[T]he justification of rescission as an alternative 
remedy for breach is . . . a concern with fairness to the injured party 
combined with remedial economy.”152  The Restatement further observes, 
“The effect of rescission in shifting losses can be tolerated as an 
incidental consequence of a remedy whose principal function is to 
release the claimant from an involuntary exchange . . . .”153 
These policies are longstanding.  In discussing rescission, Williston 
observed in 1903: 
The remedy of rescission, if allowed at all, is allowed on 
broad principles of justice.  The basis of the remedy is 
that the buyer has not bought what he bargained 
for. . . . [W]hen a buyer buys a horse, warranted sound, 
the real thing he is after is a sound horse.  It is the 
performance of the warranty, not damages for the 
breach of it, which is in his mind.  He does not want an 
unsound horse, worth half the money, and the 
difference in damages. . . . [I]f the one transferred to him 
is not sound, he is as truly forced to perform a bargain 
which he never intended to make, as is any defendant, if 
compelled to perform his part of a contract when the 
plaintiff is materially in default.154 
Williston’s reasoning remains valid to this day and is rooted in the 
nature of contract.  As modern authorities have concluded, unless 
mandated by law, a contract is a private “ordering” where the parties 
freely select their partners, trust the other’s willingness to honor his 
                                                                                                             
Smits, supra note 148, at 679 (noting that there are concerns for the effectiveness of 
withdrawal rights). 
151 Atkins v. Beasley, 544 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); see also Newton v. Aitken, 
633 N.E.2d 213, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (explaining that the application of rescission as an 
equitable remedy is left up to the discretion of the trial court); Busch v. Model Corp., 708 
N.W.2d 546, 551 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that rescission is an equitable remedy which 
tries to put the parties in the position as if the contract had never existed). 
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 54 cmt. e (2011); see 
also id. § 37 cmt. a (“The justification for the rescission remedy combines remedial economy 
and elementary fairness to the plaintiff.”). 
153 Id. § 54 cmt. k. 
154 Samuel Williston, Rescission for Breach of Warranty, 16 HARV. L. REV. 465, 472 (1903). 
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commitments, and define their respective obligations, rewards, and 
risks.155  The remedy of rescission, therefore, furthers the general policy 
of permitting the parties to a contractual relationship to determine the 
allocation of risk.156  Rescission is also part of freedom of contract, a 
fundamental constitutional and statutory right.157  Freedom of contract is 
“no right at all if it is not accompanied by freedom not to contract.”158  
The policy here would be that “courts have hesitated to compel persons 
to work together or to enforce other ongoing human relationships, 
including partnerships.”159  “Accordingly, parties today can agree to 
rescind for any reason and are essentially afforded the same freedom of 
contract to rescind an agreement as they have to enter into an 
agreement.”160  With respect to rescission, Brooks and Stremitzer have 
ignored the principle of fair redress established in the cases. 
                                                 
155 Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. 1981) 
(“[A] contract is a private ‘ordering’ in which a party binds himself to do, or not to do, a 
particular thing.”) (citation omitted); see also Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 
P.3d 268, 275 (Cal. 2004) (explaining that the parties to a contract create a “mini-universe” 
for themselves in which they voluntarily assume certain responsibilities). 
156 See Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Powersports, Inc., 319 F.3d 973, 986 (7th  Cir. 2003) 
(“[R]escission . . . is not incompatible with the general policy of permitting the parties to a 
contractual relationship to determine allocation of risk.”). 
157 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (explaining that the freedom of 
contract is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that the freedom of contract is a right protected 
as a “liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Grabill Cabinet Co. v. Sullivan, 
919 N.E.2d 1162, 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“In Indiana, the freedom of parties to contract is 
favored to the extent that it has been held to be among those freedoms protected by Article 
1, section 1, of the Indiana Constitution.”).  Freedom of contract is also recognized in the 
Uniform Commercial Code.  See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 2 (2003) (“[F]reedom of contract is a 
principle of the [Uniform Commercial] Code.”); see also Caroline Edwards, Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer Protection:  The Refusal to Experiment, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 663, 691 (2004) (“Freedom of contract provides the fundamental component of Article 
2’s structure.”) (footnote omitted). 
158 Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc.,  417 N.E.2d at 543; see also Elda Arnhold & 
Byzantio, L.L.C. v. Ocean Atl. Woodland Corp., 284 F.3d 693, 705 (7th  Cir. 2002) (“Freedom 
not to contract should be protected as stringently as freedom to contract.” (quoting Venture 
Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 281 (7th Cir. 1996) (Cudahy, J., 
concurring))). 
159 Cf. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
160 John Prebble & Chye-Ching Huang, The Fabricated Unwind Doctrine:  The True Meaning 
of Penn v. Robertson, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 117, 143 (2011) (quoting David H. Schnabel, 
Revisionist History:  Retroactive Federal Tax Planning, 60 TAX LAW. 685, 699 (2007)); see also 
Ganaway v. Henderson, 103 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (“[P]arties themselves 
can rescind a contract by mutual consent when such rescission violates no established rule 
of law.”) (footnote omitted). 
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III.  THE RIGHT OF FAIR REDRESS:  THE PARAMETERS OF RESTITUTION AFTER 
RESCISSION 
Brooks and Stremitzer argue that the existing law of restitution after 
rescission is too generous.  They posit that “a number of jurisdictions are 
moving toward combining [rescission] with expectation damages.”161  
Citing various sections of the U.C.C., as well as several books and 
articles, the authors claim that U.S. statutory law allows for combined 
remedies with no requirement for the plaintiff to elect remedies as 
between revocation of acceptance and a suit for breach.162 
The authors also reject current case law on the scope of restitution.  
The authors express concern with the established view that the 
rescinding buyer can be entitled to reliance damages, for example, the 
buyer’s expenses in transporting defective goods back to the seller or for 
repairing the buyer’s other property injured by the seller’s defective 
goods.163  Brooks and Stremitzer further disagree with allowing the 
buyer’s disgorgement of the seller’s ill-gotten gain, such as where the 
seller has taken the buyer’s payment, invested it, and earned additional 
profits.164  To counter the courts’ asserted tendency to grant excessive 
restitutionary recovery, Brooks and Stremitzer propose that restitution 
after rescission should be limited to restoration of the price, or the 
promisee’s other conferred benefits, to the promisor.165 
A. Election of Remedies:  The Common Law and U.C.C. Compared 
Brooks and Stremitzer appear to argue that U.S. law completely 
abolishes the election of remedies doctrine when they state that “[t]he 
United States allows for combined remedies.”166  Their support for this 
statement is comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-608, which states, “[T]he 
buyer is no longer required to elect between revocation of acceptance 
and recovery of damages for breach.  Both are now available to him.”167  
Comparing the U.C.C. practice to the U.C.C.’s predecessor, the Uniform 
Sales Act, the authors conclude, “It is one of many ironies in this area 
                                                 
161 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 701.  Brooks and 
Stremitzer here rely upon the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 344, formulation of 
expectation damages, which they describe as the value that would have been received had 
the breach not occurred.  Id. at 698 n.16. 
162 Id. at 701 n.28. 
163 Id. at 720, 726; see also PALMER, supra note 31, § 3.9, at 276 (explaining the theory 
behind allowing the injured party to recover reliance damages). 
164 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 693, 719. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 701–02 n.28. 
167 Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt. 1 (2003)). 
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that the UCC would so expressly abandon the mutual exclusivity of 
these remedies.”168   
In making the above claims about rescission and breach damages 
and putting to the side for the moment their discussion of the U.C.C., 
Brooks and Stremitzer leave out that the common law election of 
remedies doctrine is alive and well in contracts, other than those in 
goods, which means that, in part, the law does disallow rescission 
combined with breach damages.169  This omission severely undermines 
the authors’ unqualified claim that “[t]he United States allows for 
combined remedies.”170  In particular, as will be shown, this common 
law rule blocks any attempt by a plaintiff to obtain a windfall by 
recovering, on the same set of facts, a judgment using two or more 
theories based simultaneously on contract rescission and contract 
enforcement.171  Indeed, as also will be shown, the U.C.C. itself follows a 
nuanced view on election of remedies.172 
1. Common Law Election of Remedies 
As a form of estoppel, and sensitive to equitable principles, the 
common law doctrine of election of remedies requires a party to select 
“one of two or more coexisting and inconsistent remedies which the law 
affords the same set of facts.”173  According to most courts, although the 
                                                 
168 Id. 
169 See id. (noting that there is a risk of cumulative liability in cases because people can 
obtain expectation and breach damages).  Because the American economy is increasingly 
oriented to services and not the manufacture of goods, common law rescission is far more 
important than U.C.C. rescission.  Reihan Salam, U.S. Economy Weakened Years Before the 
Crash, CNN OPINION (July 23, 2012, 7:38 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/23/ 
opinion/salam-economy-woe/index.html. 
170 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 702 n.28. 
171 See Wynfield Inns v. Edward LeRoux Grp., Inc., 896 F.2d 483, 488 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(indicating that elections of remedies can be made before judgment but after a verdict has 
been returned); Andover Air Ltd. P’ship v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
1497, 1498 (D. Mass. 1989) (noting that a party can pursue inconsistent theories but cannot 
use inconsistent theories to support a damages judgment); Genetti v. Caterpillar, Inc., 621 
N.W.2d 529, 545–46 (Neb. 2001) (stating that when a party pursues alternate theories of 
recovery, the party will have to elect between them); Hayes v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of 
Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 907 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that 
the plaintiff could not pursue inconsistent remedies through to final judgment). 
172 See infra notes 186–213 and accompanying text (describing the U.C.C. approach). 
173 Christensen v. Eggen, 577 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Minn. 1998); see also Estate Counseling 
Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1962) 
(“The whole doctrine of election of remedies is equitable and in applying the doctrine the 
court should be sensitive to equitable principles.”).  The election of remedies doctrine also 
has roots in the law of waiver.  See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Election of Remedies § 4 (2004) (explaining 
that the doctrine of election of remedies has historically been viewed as a part of the law of 
waiver); see also Duksa v. Middletown, 472 A.2d 1, 4 (Conn. 1984) (determining that to seek 
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party may plead in the alternative and pursue all remedies, regardless of 
consistency, the plaintiff generally must decide between inconsistent 
remedies before receiving a final judgment.174  The election principle can 
apply in the same case or in successive actions.175 
In one application of this election theory, a party claiming breach of 
contract under the common law must decide whether to obtain 
expectation damages or rescission.176  As a 2006 California Court of 
Appeals case stated, “An action for rescission and an action for breach of 
contract are alternative remedies.  The election of one bars recovery 
under the other.”177  Another important point is the aggrieved party has 
the choice of rescission versus damages just for a material breach; a 
lesser partial breach can support only a damages remedy.178  
Accordingly, the election doctrine is based on the logical notion that 
“prevents a plaintiff from ‘both repudiating [a] contract and then suing 
                                                                                                             
rescission is to waive “any claim for damages for any breach of the contract”).  But see 
ESPN, Inc. v. Office of Comm’r of Baseball, 76 F. Supp. 2d 383, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(“[W]aiver and election are distinct principles that do not overlap but rather control 
different phases of the contractual relationship.”). 
174 See Wynfield Inns, 896 F.2d at 488 (“Generally, an election between inconsistent 
remedies is made after a verdict is entered but prior to the entry of judgment.”); Andover, 7 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1498 (noting that a party can pursue inconsistent theories but 
cannot use inconsistent theories to support the judgment); Genetti, 621 N.W.2d at 545–46 
(indicating that when a party pursues alternate theories of recovery, the party will have to 
elect between them); Hayes, 907 S.W.2d at 828 (ruling that a plaintiff may not pursue 
inconsistent remedies to final judgment); see also Kline Hotel Partners v. Aircoa Equity 
Interests, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 740, 743 (D. Colo. 1990) (noting that several jurisdictions leave 
the time of choice between inconsistent theories to the trial court’s discretion). 
175 See Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363, 1371–72 (7th Cir. 
1990) (explaining that election of remedies allows plaintiff to proceed under different 
theories because following the verdict on one theory precludes the other theory); Raw v. 
Lehnert, 357 A.2d 574, 576 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (holding that multiple theories for damages 
under the same contract can be pursued in successive actions so long as the damage types 
are different). 
176 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.4, at 713 (2d ed. 1993) (“[T]he plaintiff who 
has sued for damages cannot change his mind and ask for replevin instead . . . .”) (footnote 
omitted); see also Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 210, 215 n.2 (Ariz. 1981) 
(“We observe that a plaintiff suing outside the U.C.C. for common law rescission and 
damages for breach of contract or warranty can be forced to choose either rescission or 
damages as a remedy.”). 
177 Akin v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 284, 296 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006) (citations omitted). 
178 See Old Stone Corp. v. United States, 450 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Restitution 
is ‘available only if the breach gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach and not 
merely to a claim for damages for partial breach.’” (quoting Hansen Bancorp, Inc. v. United 
States, 367 F.3d 1297, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2004))); 13 WILLISTON, supra note 26, § 39:32, at 645 
(explaining that a party can bring an action either for total breach or a partial breach when 
pursuing damages). 
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on it to gain the benefit of the [same] bargain.’”179  Another policy for the 
election of remedies rule is to preserve fairness to defendants, because 
the plaintiff is entitled only to complete relief to make it whole, and not 
double recovery, for a single wrong.180  Corbin on Contracts provides a 
hypothetical to help illustrate this principle: 
Suppose that a buyer pays $100 in advance for goods 
that when delivered are so defective that he rightly 
rejects or returns them.  His restitutionary remedy is a 
judgment for the return of the price ($100) paid; his 
remedy in damages is a judgment for the full market 
value of the goods that the seller promised to deliver 
with incidental outlays and consequential injuries that 
the seller had reason to foresee.  But he should not be 
given judgment for both of these amounts at once.  He 
would then both eat his cake and still have it; he would 
have the benefits of full performance at no cost.181 
Accordingly, courts in non-U.C.C. transactions have said that lost 
profits damages, as distinguished from restitutionary recovery,182 “are 
                                                 
179 Landin v. Ford, 727 P.2d 331, 332 (Ariz. 1986) (quoting Jennings v. Lee, 461 P.2d 161, 
167 (Ariz. 1969)); accord Far West Fed. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision Dir., 119 F.3d 
1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that a party cannot pursue a remedy that affirms the 
contract while also bringing one based on disaffirmance); Genetti, 621 N.W.2d at 545–46 
(determining that a party cannot pursue a claim on a theory of recovery premised on 
existence of a contract while at the same time proceeding on a theory premised upon the 
lack of a contract); James v. Hogan, 47 N.W.2d 847, 851 (Neb. 1951) (explaining that 
damages and restitution as remedies are inconsistent as one affirms the contract and the 
other disaffirms it). 
180 See Walraven v. Martin, 333 N.W.2d 569, 572, 574 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining 
that a plaintiff may pursue multiple remedies against a seller as long as he is not awarded 
double recovery); Vowers & Sons, Inc. v. Strasheim, 576 N.W.2d 817, 825 (Neb. 1998) 
(holding that the plaintiff could not recover for the same injury twice through a different 
form of remedy); Adams v. Grant, 358 S.E.2d 142, 144 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (“The basic 
purpose of election of remedies is to prevent double recovery for a single wrong.”) (citation 
omitted); Purcell Enters., Inc. v. Tennessee, 631 S.W.2d 401, 409 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) 
(noting that the reason for having the election of remedies doctrine is to ensure against 
double recovery).  
181 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 1223, at 515–17. 
182 Compare Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. PowerSports, Inc., 319 F.3d 973, 988 (7th Cir. 
2003) (“[R]escission and restorative damages [are] entirely consistent with each other and 
therefore not subject to election.” (quoting Head & Seemann, Inc. v. Gregg, 311 N.W.2d 667, 
667, 672 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981))), and Boyle v. Odell, 605 A.2d 1260, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) 
(“Restitution, unlike damages, is a remedy not inconsistent with rescission.”) (citations 
omitted), with Landin, 727 P.2d at 332 (explaining that the election of remedies doctrine only 
prevents a party from receiving damages that presuppose a valid contract, but does not 
preclude other types of damages combined with rescission). 
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contractual, not consequential, and are therefore not recoverable in 
rescission.”183  Furthermore, as many courts observe, “Because a 
rescinded contract is void ab initio, following a lawful rescission the 
‘injured’ party is precluded from recovering damages for breach just as 
though the contract had never been entered into by the parties.”184  These 
holdings exemplify the courts’ strong reliance on the logic of the 
common law election of remedies doctrine to preclude the buyer’s 
overcompensation with expectation damages when it pursues an action 
for rescission based on breach of contract.185 
2. U.C.C. Election of Remedies 
Undoubtedly, as Brooks and Stremitzer indicate, when it comes to 
the buyer’s remedy for a defective tender of goods, some decisions do 
rely upon U.C.C. section 2-608, comment 1, for the proposition that the 
U.C.C. rejects altogether the election of remedies doctrine.186  For 
example, the California Court of Appeals, relying on U.C.C. section 2-
608, comment 1, observed that the award of lost profits and the 
restitution of sums the plaintiff paid “are not per se inconsistent.”187  
                                                 
183 Flagship West, LLC v. Excel Realty Partners L.P., No. 1:02-CV-05200 OWW DLB, 2006 
WL 3300395, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2006), vacated on other grounds, 337 F. App’x 679 (9th 
Cir. 2009); accord James v. Hogan, 47 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Neb. 1951) (noting that a party 
cannot recover lost profits when pursuing rescission of a contract), cited with approval in 
Olson v. Pedersen, 231 N.W.2d 310, 316 (Neb. 1975) (holding that a party cannot get both 
rescission and damages); Rennie v. Pierce Cards, Ltd., 409 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1978) (“[The] plaintiff, having elected to rescind, cannot recover lost profits.”). 
184 Bergstrom v. Estate of DeVoe, 854 P.2d 860, 862 (Nev. 1993) (citations omitted); see also 
Sharp Structural, Inc. v. Franklin Mfg., Inc., 283 F. App’x 585, 589 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating it 
would be “clear error” for a jury to award both rescission and breach of contract damages); 
Hassan v. Yusuf, 944 N.E.2d 895, 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“[I]t is well established that a 
remedy based on rescission is inconsistent with a remedy of damages . . . .”). 
185 See Sharp Structural, Inc., 283 F. App’x at 589 (holding that allowing a jury to grant 
both damages and rescission was an error); Landin, 727 P.2d at 332 (noting that the 
rescission doctrine prevents a party from requesting rescission damages only when they 
presuppose a valid contract); Hassan, 944 N.E.2d at 920 (noting that a remedy based on 
damages is inconsistent with that of rescission); James, 47 N.W.2d at 852 (noting that a party 
rescinding a contract cannot recover damages beyond restitution); Olson, 231 N.W.2d at 316 
(indicating that remedies of rescission and damages are inconsistent with each other); Boyle, 
605 A.2d at 1265 (holding that restitution is consistent with rescission, but damages are 
not). 
186 U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt. 1 (2003); Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra 
note 3, at 692 n.2; see also Berge v. Int’l Harvester Co., 190 Cal. Rptr. 815, 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983) (explaining that, in California, the Uniform Commercial Code has not adopted an 
election of remedies doctrine). 
187 Berge, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 823; see also Barry & Sewall Indus. Supply Co. v. Metal-Prep of 
Hous., Inc., 912 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Pursuant to the U.C.C., revocation and a suit 
for damages are distinct remedies, and a buyer may pursue either or both options.” (citing 
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Other courts adopt similar language.188  On the other hand, the status of 
the U.C.C. and the election of remedies doctrine is more nuanced than 
Brooks and Stremitzer have described.  Four points about the U.C.C. and 
the decisions support this argument. 
First, read in context, comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-608 does not 
totally abolish the election of remedies doctrine.189  As the Utah Supreme 
Court has commented, “The Uniform Commercial Code makes damages 
available in an action for rescission, but it does not otherwise change the 
traditional theory of election of remedies.”190  What the Utah court was 
referencing is the basic purpose of the election of remedies doctrine (i.e., 
avoiding excessive compensation to the plaintiff), which remains in force 
in the U.C.C.191  However, Brooks and Stremitzer never mention this line 
of authority.192  Moreover, the authors leave out a key portion of the 
same U.C.C. section 2-608 comment regarding the election of remedies, 
which notes, “[T]he prior basic policy is continued . . . .”193  Additionally, 
                                                                                                             
Solar Kinetics v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 1237, 1242 (D. Conn. 1980))); 
Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 210, 215 n.2 (Ariz. 1981) (indicating that 
U.C.C. § 2-608 “involves no suggestion of ‘election’ of any sort”); Robertson Cos. v. Kenner, 
311 N.W.2d 194, 196 (N.D. 1981) (“[R]escission and damages are not mutually exclusive 
remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code.”). 
188 See, e.g., Barry & Sewall Indus. Supply Co., 912 F.2d at 257 n.2 (“Pursuant to the U.C.C., 
revocation and a suit for damages are distinct remedies, and a buyer may pursue either or 
both options.”); Seekings, 638 P.2d at 215 (indicating that the U.C.C. §  2-608 “[i]nvolves no 
suggestion of ‘election’ of any sort”); Robertson Cos. Inc., 311 N.W.2d at 199 (“[R]escission 
and damages are not mutually exclusive remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code.”).  
189 U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt. 1. 
190 Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1979) (footnotes omitted) (citations 
omitted). 
191 See U.C.C. § 1-103 (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act [the 
Uniform Commercial Code], the [usual] principles of law and equity” are applicable). 
192 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 701 n.28 (providing 
only a partial quote from U.C.C. section 2-608, comment 1, which leaves out the main 
purpose of the election of remedies doctrine).  Some courts also leave out this key language 
in their analysis.  See Lightcap v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 904, 906 n.4 (Wis. 
1991) (noting that the U.C.C. rejects the election of remedies doctrine when involving 
damages for breach and revocation, as found in U.C.C. section2-608, comment 1); see also 
Adams v. Grant, 358 S.E.2d 142, 144 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that the buyer does not 
have to elect between damages anymore and using an incomplete summary of U.C.C. 
section 2-608, comment 1). 
193 U.C.C § 2-608 cmt. 1.  The section notes, in pertinent part, “Although the prior basic 
policy is continued, the buyer is no longer required to elect between revocation of 
acceptance and recovery of damages for breach.  Both are now available to him.  The non-
alternative character of the two remedies is stressed by the terms used in the present 
section.”  Id.   
 Brooks and Stremitzer have overlooked another U.C.C. reference that could have 
supported more strongly their position on the U.C.C. and the election of remedies.  See 
generally Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3.  Regarding the 
seller’s remedies in general for the buyer’s breach, U.C.C. section 2-703, comment 1 broadly 
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comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-608 must be read in the context of the 
commentary to U.C.C. section 2-721, entitled Remedies for Fraud.194  The 
latter comment states explicitly that (1) the “remedies for fraud are 
extended by this section to coincide in scope with those for non-
fraudulent breach[,]” and (2) rescission for breach of contract can bar 
other remedies when “the circumstances of the case makes the remedies 
incompatible.”195  For these reasons, case law properly identifies the 
“Uniform Commercial Code approach” to election of remedies as 
turning on the “facts of the individual case.”196  Therefore, 
notwithstanding any possible confusion in the comment to U.C.C. 
section 2-608, both U.C.C. sections 2-608 and 2-721 show that the U.C.C. 
captures the basic policy of the election of remedies doctrine in breach of 
contract cases to avoid excessive recovery for the plaintiff.197 
Second, a number of cases have given little, if any, weight to this 
comment of U.C.C. section 2-608, recalling that comments are not part of 
the official U.C.C. and have only persuasive weight.198  For example, in 
Parsons v. Motor Homes of America, Inc., the Florida District Court of 
Appeals referenced the U.C.C. comment but still required a U.C.C. 
plaintiff to elect between revocation of acceptance and breach of contract 
damages before entry of judgment.199  In Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker 
Machine & Foundry Co., a New Jersey appellate decision evaluating a 
U.C.C. case, the court employed a traditional election of remedies 
methodology without mentioning the U.C.C. comment.200  Specifically, 
                                                                                                             
states, “This Article rejects any doctrine of election of remedy as a fundamental policy and 
thus the remedies are essentially cumulative in nature and include all of the available 
remedies for breach.  Whether the pursuit of one remedy bars another depends entirely on 
the facts of the individual case.”  U.C.C. § 2-703 cmt. 1.   Although U.C.C. section 2-703, 
strictly speaking, governs only the seller’s remedies for breach, comment 1 covers the entire 
Article 2 in stating, “This Article rejects any doctrine of election remedy . . . .”  Id.  This 
U.C.C. comment about the relationship between the U.C.C. and the election of remedies, 
however, is confusing.  Id.  The first sentence rejects the doctrine as a fundamental policy 
and states that remedies are always cumulative.  Id.  The second sentence reverses course 
and states that a remedy can be barred as inconsistent based on the facts of the case.  Id.  
Ironically, this second sentence in comment 1 endorses the fundamental policy of the 
election doctrine that the first sentence purports to reject.  Id.  See also supra notes 173–75 
and accompanying text (explaining generally the election of remedies doctrine). 
194 U.C.C § 2-721. 
195 Id. cmt. 
196 Coast-to-Coast Fin. Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 352, 363 (2002). 
197 U.C.C § 2-721 cmt.; U.C.C § 2-608 cmt. 1. 
198 See Rutherford v. Darwin, 622 P.2d 245, 248 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that U.C.C. 
comments are “not binding on this Court”). 
199 465 So. 2d 1285, 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (“[A]n election between inconsistent 
remedies need only occur before judgment is entered.” (quoting Monoco of Orlando, Inc. v. 
ITT Indus. Credit Corp., 458 So. 2d 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984))). 
200 310 A.2d 491, 496 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). 
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the Fablok Mills court noted that “once recovery is permitted either 
through rescission or by way of damages, the alternative remedy must 
be dropped.”201  In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico acknowledged comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-608, 
but also observed that “the nonalternative nature of the remedies does 
not entitle the buyer to inconsistent or double recoveries.”202  These cases 
all conflict with other decisions relying on U.C.C. section 2-608, comment 
1, for the interpretation that the U.C.C. categorically rejects the election 
of remedies principle.203 
Third, the U.C.C. does indeed apply the usual election of remedies 
doctrine in distinct factual settings.  First, several courts have ruled that 
the promisee may not obtain monetary redress on the same facts for both 
breach of warranty, which affirms the contract, and revocation of 
acceptance, which disaffirms the contract.204  Another election doctrine is 
found in U.C.C. section 2-608 itself.205  As Professor Allan Farnsworth 
indicates, a “binding” election occurs under U.C.C. section 2-608(a) when 
“a buyer . . . has chosen to treat a breach as partial and has accepted the 
goods with knowledge of their nonconformity.”206  Consistent with that 
concept, courts have admonished, “[A]cceptance damages are not 
applicable where acceptance has been revoked.”207  However, in the 
                                                 
201 Id. 
202 703 P.2d 169, 171 (N.M. 1985). 
203 See Parsons, 465 So. 2d at 1289 (requiring that a party had to elect between revocation 
of acceptance and breach of contract damages before entering a judgment); Fablok Mills, 
Inc., 310 A.2d at 496 (noting that any alternative remedies must be dropped once recovery 
is allowed under either rescission or by damages); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 703 P.2d at 
172 (noting that the U.C.C. comment is only persuasive; thus, the court required that the 
plaintiff choose either to proceed under rescission or damages).  But see Seekings v. Jimmy 
GMC of Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 210, 215 n.2 (Ariz. 1981) (noting that plaintiffs bringing 
actions under the U.C.C. no longer have to choose between rescission or damages as 
remedies). 
204 See, e.g., Genetti v. Caterpillar, Inc., 621 N.W.2d 529, 545–46 (Neb. 2001) (disallowing 
proceeding under a theory of recovery premised on existence of the contract and under a 
theory based on the lack of a contract (citing Vowers and Sons, Inc. v. Strasheim, 576 
N.W.2d 817 (Neb. 1998))); Kelly v. Olinger Travel Homes, Inc., 117 P.3d 282, 287–88 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2005) (noting that a party cannot revoke acceptance of the product and still recover 
damages for breach of warranty); see also Herring v. Home Depot, Inc., 565 S.E.2d 773, 776 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (“Breach of warranty is an action affirming the contract.  In an action 
for breach of warranty, the buyer retains the goods.  Revocation of acceptance, on the other 
hand, requires the return of the goods and cancellation of the terms of a contract.”) 
(footnotes omitted).  But see Page v. Dobbs Mobile Bay, Inc., 599 So. 2d 38, 42 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1992) (allowing revocation even with a disclaimer of all warranties). 
205 U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt. 1 (2003). 
206 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 8.19, at 536 n.9 (3d ed. 2004). 
207 Costa v. Volkswagen of Am., 551 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Vt. 1988), overruled on other grounds 
by Gochey v. Bombardier, Inc., 572 A.2d 921 (Vt. 1990). 
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general sense, the election of remedies under the Code still exists;208 
namely, the buyer’s alternative remedies under U.C.C. section 2-712, 
“Cover”; “Buyer’s Procurement of Substitute Goods”; U.C.C. section 2-
713, “Buyer’s Damages for Non-Delivery or Repudiation”; and U.C.C. 
section 2-714, “Buyer’s Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted 
Goods.”  Brooks and Stremitzer do not mention any of these contrary 
authorities in their discussion of U.C.C. election of remedies. 
For the purpose of the election of remedies doctrine, it should be 
conceded that the U.C.C. is more generous than the common law on its 
idea of what makes the injured party whole.  As will be discussed in 
subsection III.B below, the U.C.C., in delineating the revoking buyer’s 
remedies for breach, allows recovery for damages based on the buyer’s 
covering on the market along with consequential and incidental 
damages.209  To this extent, election of remedies is less of a bar to 
damages than when combined with rescission.  The U.C.C. is also 
necessarily more generous in granting both rescission and damages, 
because all U.C.C. remedies are remedies “on the contract” unless 
disclaimed.210  Nevertheless, the fundamental principle of the election of 
remedies doctrine—to preclude double recovery for a single wrong—is 
still “basic policy” under the U.C.C.211   
Further, the U.C.C. approach closely aligns with the overall objective 
of the U.C.C.’s remedial system.  As stated in U.C.C. section 1-106(1), 
remedies are to be “liberally administered,” but only so that “the 
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party 
had fully performed.”212  Therefore, awarding the revoking plaintiff 
relief for his actual losses to make him whole, consistent with U.C.C. 
section 1-106(1), comports with both the election of remedies doctrine 
and the U.C.C. system of relief.213 
                                                 
208 See Patterson, supra note 48, at 191 n.70 (“There is still, in the general sense, some 
election of remedy under the Code.”); see also Gawlick v. Am. Builders Supply, Inc., 519 
P.2d 313, 314–15 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (noting that U.C.C. section 2-714 is not available to a 
buyer who has effectively revoked acceptance). 
209 See U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt. 1 (providing that a buyer’s remedy is not limited to electing 
between revocation and damages). 
210 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (discussing the equitable reasoning 
behind courts awarding rescission in a contract dispute). 
211 U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt. 1; see also Head & Seemann, Inc. v. Gregg, 311 N.W.2d 667, 669 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1981), aff’d, 318 N.W.2d 381 (Wis. 1982) (indicating that the main purpose of 
the election of remedies doctrine is to prevent double recovery for the same wrong (citing 
Bank of Commerce v. Paine, Weber, Jackson & Curtis, 158 N.W.2d 350, 352–53 (Wis. 
1968))). 
212 U.C.C. § 1-106(1); U.C.C. § 1-305(a). 
213 U.C.C. § 1-106(1); see also supra Part III.A (explaining generally the common law 
election of remedies doctrine).  Commentators have noted that the CISG also has a place for 
election of remedies, because the plaintiff “has the option to choose either avoidance or 
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B. The U.C.C., Revocation of Acceptance, and Expectation Damages 
In discussing the U.C.C.’s treatment of revocation of acceptance and 
monetary redress, the authors strongly object to the combined allowance 
of expectation damages.214  Brooks and Stremitzer rely on U.C.C. section 
2-711(2), which deals with the buyer’s remedies where the seller either 
fails to deliver or repudiates the contract.215  Next, they point to a 
casebook commentary, which observes that U.C.C. section 2-721 allows 
both damages and lost profits when the buyer revokes.216  The authors 
further cite several treatises and law review articles that they believe 
confirm the U.C.C.’s allowance for revocation of acceptance, as well as 
full expectation damages.217 
This section shows that the authors’ treatment of the U.C.C. on 
revocation and damages is incomplete.  It further establishes that the 
U.C.C.’s approach with regard to these combined remedies under its 
salutary policy in section 1-106 provides a remedy to make the buyer 
whole, but not to compensate him any further, even when the seller’s 
breach is unjustified. 
1. The “Cover” Requirement 
The U.C.C. in section 2-711(1) addresses the rejecting or revoking 
buyer’s remedies for money damages.218  U.C.C. section 2-711(1) 
provides that a buyer may cancel the contract and recover the portion of 
the purchase price already paid.219  Additionally, the buyer, under 
U.C.C. section 2-711(1)(a), may either “cover” and obtain damages 
pursuant to U.C.C. section 2-712 or recover damages for non-delivery as 
provided in U.C.C. section 2-713.220  Either combination of remedies 
                                                                                                             
nonavoidance and thus the power to elect between the two distinct remedial schemes 
available under the Convention.”  Flechtner, supra note 68, at 68.  Brooks and Stremitzer do 
not mention this observation.  See Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra 
note 3, at 701 n.28 (“The trend may be observed internationally in the CISG.”) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
214 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 701–02. 
215 Id. at 701–02 n.28. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 See also U.C.C. §  2-711(1) cmt. 1 (explaining the purpose of this code provision).   
219 U.C.C. § 2-711(1).  In a related section, under U.C.C. section 2-720, unless a contrary 
intention appears, an action for rescission may not be construed as a renunciation of any 
claim for damages.  See U.C.C. § 2-720 (providing the effect of cancellation or rescission on 
claims for antecedent breach under the U.C.C.).  
220 See Kashi v. Gratsos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1056 (2d Cir. 1986) (ruling that allowing damages 
from cover and for non-delivery are cumulative); Martella v. Woods, 715 F.2d 410, 414 (8th 
Cir. 1983) (noting that a breach of contract only entitles the party to the difference between 
the higher market price and the lower contract price); see also JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. 
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entitles the buyer to both restitution and damages.221  By contrast, the 
buyer’s alternative under U.C.C. sections 2-714 and 2-715 is to accept the 
goods despite the non-conformity and to recover damages therefor, 
including for breach of warranty (U.C.C. section 2-714) and for incidental 
and consequential damages (U.C.C. section 2-715).222   
Accordingly, case law is clear that “[a]cceptance damages are not 
applicable where acceptance has been revoked,” which means that a 
revoking buyer will not be entitled to the difference in value between 
what the buyer received and what had been warranted.223  Similarly, 
U.C.C. section 2-712 does not follow the benefit of the bargain 
compensation standard of U.C.C. section 2-713, which allows the buyer 
to recover the difference between the market price at the time when the 
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price.224  U.C.C. section 2-
713 also provides incidental and consequential damages minus the 
expenses the buyer saved as a result of the seller’s breach.225  Put another 
way, the remedies of U.C.C. sections 2-711 and 2-712 prevent the 
revoking buyer from being overcompensated for his loss.226  This policy 
                                                                                                             
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-3, at 284 (6th ed. 2010) (noting that cover is not 
a mandatory remedy for the buyer).  If the buyer fails to meet the pre-requisites for cover 
under U.C.C. section 2-712, he is not barred from recovery from any other remedy.  Id. 
221 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 55.6. 
222 See Selectouch Corp. v. Perfect Starch, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) 
(explaining a buyer’s options when he or she receives non-conforming goods). 
223 Costa v. Volkswagen of Am., 551 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Vt. 1988), overruled on other grounds 
by Gochey v. Bombardier, Inc., 572 A.2d 921 (Vt. 1990); see also Felde v. Chrysler Credit 
Corp., 580 N.E.2d 191, 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (“[U.C.C.] section 2-714 contains no language 
precluding buyers from seeking the remedy of rescission in appropriate instances due to 
breaches of warranty . . . .”); Jaramillo v. Gonzales, 50 P.3d 554, 559 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) 
(indicating that a buyer revoking acceptance may not receive damages for breach of 
warranty).  See generally Timothy Davis, UCC Breach of Warranty and Contract Claims:  
Clarifying the Distinction, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 783 (2009) (discussing the circumstances 
supporting a buyer’s breach of contract action under U.C.C. section 2-711 and the buyer’s 
breach of warranty under U.C.C. section 2-714). 
224 U.C.C. § 2-712. 
225 U.C.C. § 2-713(1); see also Cetkovic v. Boch, Inc., No. 1472, 2003 WL 139779, at *1 
(Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 13, 2003) (“Perhaps to avoid a windfall, the buyer’s damage recovery is 
to be reduced by the expenses the buyer avoids by not having to perform.”); Watson v. 
Tom Growney Equip., Inc., 721 P.2d 1302, 1305 (N.M. 1986) (holding that the measure of 
damages is the fair market value of the good minus the contract price). 
226 See Aubrey’s R.V. Ctr., Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 731 P.2d 1124, 1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) 
(noting that a buyer obtaining revocation of acceptance is entitled to return of purchase 
price and “any expenses incurred by the buyer in reasonable reliance upon the contract, 
plus incidental and consequential damages arising from the breach”).  Additionally, 
finance charges less any amount saved if buyer is released from future finance charges will 
also be included.  Id.  The court in Aubrey’s stated: 
The objective behind awarding damages to a buyer who justifiably 
revokes acceptance is different [from breach of warranty].  [With 
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partially resolves Brooks and Stremitzer’s concern that the U.C.C. is too 
generous with expectation damages for the revoking buyer. 
In other principles regarding cover, case law recognizes that it is a 
mechanism that allows the buyer to avoid lost profits where the seller 
has failed to perform.227  In responding to the seller’s breach, the buyer 
under U.C.C. section 2-712(1) may cover “by making in good faith and 
without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to 
purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller.”228  This 
remedy accords with commercial reality, “because the buyer usually 
needs the goods he has bargained for, and he covers to realize one of the 
objects of the initial contract, namely to exchange money for goods.”229  
The amount of cover damages, as against the seller, under U.C.C. section 
2-712(2) will be based on the difference between the cost of cover and the 
contract price together, including incidental or consequential damages as 
defined in U.C.C. section 2-715, but minus the expenses the buyer has 
saved as a result of the breach.230  Therefore, in a codification of the rule 
that a buyer must mitigate damages, the U.C.C. limits the recovery of 
consequential damages to those amounts that the buyer could not have 
“obviated by cover.”231 Once again, the U.C.C. guards against 
overcompensation to the buyer. 
                                                                                                             
revocation], the buyer is not merely seeking the benefit of his or her 
bargain.  Rather, the buyer seeks to be restored to the position he or 
she would have been in if the contract had never been entered into.  
Thus, the objective of this remedy is primarily restitution. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also U.C.C. § 2-720 (noting that, without clear intentions to the 
contrary, an action for rescission does not waive the right to seek damages). 
227 See Bishop v. Hyundai Motor Am., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 134, 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 
(interpreting “cover” as a way for parties in commercial transactions to avoid lost profits 
where they failed to perform). 
228 U.C.C. § 2-712(1). 
229 HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-713:1 (2002). 
230 Compare Allied Semi-Conductors Int’l, Ltd. v. Pulsar Components Int’l, Inc., 907 F. 
Supp. 618, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that damages from cover are the difference between 
the higher cover cost and the contract price, plus incidental or consequential damages), 
with Export Dev. Can. v. Elec. Apparatus & Power, L.L.C., No. 03 Civ.2063(HBP), 2008 WL 
4900557, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2008) (disallowing cover damages when cost of cover is 
less than contract price). 
231 U.C.C. § 2-712 cmt. 3; see also Sun-Maid Raisin Growers of Cal. v. Victor Packing Co., 
194 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (allowing consequential damages only to the 
extent that they could not be avoided by cover); Panhandle Agri-Service, Inc. v. Becker, 644 
P.2d 413, 419 (Kan. 1982) (noting that a buyer’s failure to use the remedy of cover when 
reasonably available will preclude recovery of consequential damages, such as lost profits). 
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2. Consequential and Incidental Losses 
Still other U.C.C. policies limit the revoking buyer’s monetary 
recovery.232  U.C.C. section 2-715 addresses consequential damages, even 
when they overlap to an extent with incidental damages.  Consequential 
losses resulting from the seller’s breach include “any loss resulting from 
general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the 
time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably 
be prevented by cover or otherwise.”233  The “reason to know” language 
concerning the buyer’s requirements comes from the English decision of 
Hadley v. Baxendale.234  Hadley remains a leading case in the United States 
on consequential damages, setting out that such damages include lost 
operating profits of a business.235 
Another important point comes from comment 6 to U.C.C. section 2-
715.  This comment provides that if the seller knows that the buyer is in 
the business of reselling the goods, the seller is charged with knowing 
that the buyer will be selling the goods in anticipation of a profit.236  
Because U.C.C. section 2-715 imposes an objective rather than a 
subjective standard in determining whether the seller should have 
anticipated the buyer’s needs, the seller’s actual knowledge of the 
                                                 
232 See U.C.C. § 2-715 (defining what should be included as incidental and consequential 
damages under the U.C.C.). 
233 Id. § 2-715(2)(a).  As the court observed in Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A. v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 
While the distinction between the two is not an obvious one, the Code 
makes plain that incidental damages are normally incurred when a 
buyer (or seller) repudiates the contract or wrongfully rejects the 
goods, causing the other to incur such expenses as transporting, 
storing, or reselling the goods.  On the other hand, consequential 
damages do not arise within the scope of the immediate buyer-seller 
transaction, but rather stem from losses incurred by the non-breaching 
party in its dealings, often with third parties, which were a proximate 
result of the breach, and which were reasonably foreseeable by the 
breaching party at the time of contracting. 
372 F. Supp. 503, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (citation omitted). 
234 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), cited in WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 70, § 6-5, at 224 & 
DOBBS, supra note 176, § 12.16(4), at 378. 
235 See Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing lost profits as the 
most common form of consequential damages).  The U.C.C. approach differs from common 
law lost profits in the sense of the contract market differential.  See DOBBS, supra note 176, 
§ 12.16(4), at 377 n.1 (“Profits does not refer to a market gain of the kind represented in the 
contract-market differential but to income from an ongoing set of operations.”). 
236 U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 6; see also Canusa Corp. v. A & R Lobosco, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 723, 
731 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“When the aggrieved buyer is in the business of reselling the 
breaching seller’s goods, the buyer may recover the lost profits as consequential 
damages.”); Larsen v. A.C. Carpenter, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1084, 1131 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting 
that a buyer may recover lost profits if they were contemplated by the parties). 
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buyer’s requirements is not required.237  Instead, “[t]o recover loss of 
profits plaintiff has the burden to show that he could not have 
covered.”238  These standards avoid the overcompensation problem 
posed by Brooks and Stremitzer, because the U.C.C. here goes no further 
than making the buyer whole as a consequence of the seller’s breach. 
U.C.C. section 2-715(1) contains another compensation policy as it 
describes “incidental damages” from the seller’s breach to include, but 
not limited to: 
[E]xpenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, 
transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully 
rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses 
or commissions in connection with effecting cover and 
any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or 
other breach.239 
Examples of other compensable losses in this category would be 
interest, finance charges, extra overhead, labor, and expenses.240  This 
redress to the buyer is eminently fair and avoids the overcompensation 
feared by Brooks and Stremitzer, because “[t]here is no justice in such a 
case in compelling [the buyer] to relinquish his actual damages as a 
condition of getting rid of an obnoxious and useless chattel.”241 
3. Overall U.C.C. Policy 
U.C.C. section 1-106 states the overarching policy that all remedies 
should be liberally construed so that the aggrieved party shall be put in 
as good a position as if the breaching party had performed, which means 
that damages are proper where consistent with actual losses.242  A related 
policy is that “the very essence of a sales contract” is for the existence of 
                                                 
237 See Sun-Maid Raisin Growers of Cal. v. Victor Packing Co., 194 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining the standard that the U.C.C. uses in determining whether 
the seller should have anticipated the buyer’s needs). 
238 Kanzmeier v. McCoppin, 398 N.W.2d 826, 833 (Iowa 1987). 
239 U.C.C. § 2-715(1).  “The incidental damages listed are not intended to be exhaustive 
but are merely illustrative of the typical kinds of incidental damage.”  Id. § 2-715 cmt. 1. 
240 See City Nat’l Bank of Charleston v. Wells, 384 S.E.2d 374, 382–83 (W. Va. 1989) 
(allowing recovery of these losses combined with revocation under U.C.C. section 2-608). 
241 Kimball & Austin Mfg. Co. v. Vroman, 35 Mich. 310, 326 (1877). 
242 See Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 209 Cal. Rptr. 60, 64 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1984) (noting that damages are permitted to put the aggrieved party in as good of a 
position as if the breach had never happened); Delano Growers’ Coop. Winery v. Supreme 
Wine Co., Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1066, 1075 (Mass. 1985) (explaining that remedies under the 
U.C.C. should be liberally construed and stating that damages should not overcompensate 
the buyer). 
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minimum adequate remedies.243  These doctrines apply equally to the 
revocation of acceptance remedy.  Accordingly, a revoking buyer is 
permitted not only to avoid the obligation to pay the purchase price, but 
also to seek those damages that would be available to a non-accepting 
buyer, including reliance damages stemming from his incidental 
expenses and his consequential damages that were within the reasonable 
contemplation of the seller.244  As stated in Williston on Contracts, “This is 
a sensible result since, following the revocation, the buyer is in 
essentially the same position as if he or she had rejected initially.”245  
These recoveries therefore are different from a windfall to the buyer, 
which is never permissible;246 nonetheless, Brooks and Stremitzer do not 
mention any of these policies in their critique of the U.C.C.247 
On a more fundamental level, the U.C.C. rules on revocation and 
monetary redress are fair to both buyers and sellers.  The U.C.C. in 
section 1-103 adopts the principles of law and equity when consistent 
with the Code; this standard is important because “[a] plaintiff electing 
rescission is entitled to those damages that are necessary to make him 
whole.”248  To this same end courts have said, “In equity, the court 
makes the calculated adjustments necessary to do complete justice.  If 
complete justice requires that damages be awarded with the rescission, 
the court will award them.”249  Where the law has a choice, it should 
always impose the loss upon the wrongdoer whose conduct has caused 
the harm rather than upon the innocent party.250  The U.C.C. makes this 
same choice in fully protecting the revoking buyer’s losses.251 
                                                 
243 Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 374 A.2d 144, 149 (Conn. 1976) (citing U.C.C. 
section 2-719 comment 1). 
244 See 14 WILLISTON, supra note 26, § 40:23, at 89–90 (explaining generally the damages 
available to a revoking buyer). 
245 Id. 
246 See Admiral Fin. Corp. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting 
that it is never permissible to use restitution to bestow a windfall). 
247 See generally Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3. 
248 Landin v. Ford, 727 P.2d 331, 332 (Ariz. 1986). 
249 Head & Seemann, Inc. v. Gregg, 311 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981), aff’d, 318 
N.W.2d 381 (Wis. 1982); see also Atkins v. Beasley, 544 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) 
(noting that rescission is an equitable remedy and will be allowed if it is necessary to 
restore full justice). 
250 Compare Amber Res. Co. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 738, 747 (2006) (suggesting that, 
when given a choice on which of two parties should receive a windfall, “there is no reason” 
for a court to confer it upon the party in breach), and Mayer v. Town of Hampton, 497 A.2d 
1206, 1210 (N.H. 1985) (“[I]t is better for unexpected losses to fall upon the intentional 
wrongdoer than upon the innocent victim.”), with EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. 
Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113, 117 (Colo. 1995) (“It is a principle of the law of restitution 
that one should not gain by one’s own wrong.”) (citation omitted). 
251 See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2003) (providing the protections available for the revoking buyer). 
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By contrast, Brooks and Stremitzer never cite the precedents 
discussed above, which provide that “[t]he only real reason to deny both 
rescission and damages is the danger of allowing recovery more than 
once for a single item of loss.”252  The authors further leave out the 
mandatory nature of U.C.C. section 1-106 and its command to award the 
revoking buyer his restitution interest, his reliance damages, and his 
consequential losses, including lost profits where they are attributable to 
the seller’s wrongful conduct.253  While the common law in denying 
profits for rescission places more emphasis on the logical inconsistency 
between affirming and disaffirming the same contract, the U.C.C. is not 
subject to this objection because revocation is always an “on-contract” 
U.C.C. remedy.254  As stated above, the contract contains this remedy as 
a matter of law unless properly disclaimed.255  The U.C.C. also 
exemplifies the forward-thinking policy that “[t]he constant tendency of 
the courts is to find some way in which damages can be awarded where 
a wrong has been done.”256  Accordingly, Brooks and Stremitzer have not 
shown that the U.C.C.’s approach to rescission and damages is illogical, 
overly generous, or a threat to contractual stability. 
C. Should the Contract Price Limit Restitution?:  The Case of Boomer v. 
Muir 
As part of their critique that the restitution after rescission is too 
generous under current legal doctrine, Brooks and Stremitzer contend 
                                                 
252 Fousel v. Ted Walker Mobile Homes, Inc., 602 P.2d 507, 510 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) 
(quoting DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS ON REMEDIES 634 (1973)); see also Brandeis Mach. & Supply 
Co. v. Capitol Crane Rental, Inc., 765 N.E.2d 173, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“[O]ne of the 
broad remedial goals of the U.C.C. is that the aggrieved party be put in as good a position 
as if the other party had fully performed, but not in a better position.”). 
253 Compare U.C.C. § 1-106 (explaining the mandatory nature of the damages to be 
awarded for buyer revocation of a contract), with Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off 
Contract, supra note 3, at 716 n.70 (noting that the magnitude of a payout allowed under 
restitution can be an incentive to rescind) (emphasis added). 
254 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
256 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946).  The CISG and U.C.C. 
rules on the measure of damages are very similar.  See 1 RALPH H. FOLSOM, INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 1:32, at 76 (3d ed. 2008) (citing Flechtner, supra note 68); see also 
Henry D. Gabriel, A Primer on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods:  
From the Perspective of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 279, 303 
(1997) (noting that the aggrieved seller can recover the price and incidental costs of 
replacing the damaged or nonconforming goods).  Indeed, courts have held that the U.C.C. 
principles can be useful analogues in the interpretation of CISG damage requirements 
when they are similar.  See Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 
1995) (explaining that case law interpreting article 2 of the U.C.C. can be helpful in the 
interpretation of certain CISG provisions when the language of the two are similar). 
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that restitution can provoke “ex post inefficiency.”257  By this concept, 
they mean that after the parties make their investments and the value of 
the exchange is known, a payoff in restitution exceeding the contract 
price incentivizes the injured party “to search for, or even induce, a cause 
of rescission.”258  As support, they reference what they deem the “most 
infamous example” of this scenario, the well-known case of Boomer v. 
Muir, where a subcontractor obtained a judgment in restitution for its 
incurred costs resulting from the prime contractor’s prevention of the 
subcontractor’s performance on a hydroelectric dam project.259 
Brooks and Stremitzer’s main objection to Boomer is that the contract 
price was $300,000, and the prime contractor had already paid the 
subcontractor $280,000, but the California Court of Appeals nevertheless 
awarded the plaintiff subcontractor another $258,000.  Brooks and 
Stremitzer opine, “Hence, Boomer’s expectation damages were $20,000, 
which the court disregarded when it ordered Muir to pay him $258,000 
in restitution.”260  The authors further argue that only after the 
subcontractor realized that it was in a losing contract did it bring the 
action of rescission and restitution instead of enforcing the contract.  
Thus, they are particularly critical of the Boomer court’s ruling that 
restitution following rescission should not be limited by the contract 
price.261 
As will be shown, Brooks and Stremitzer have misconstrued the facts 
of this prominent case, because no evidence existed that the 
subcontractor in Boomer acted opportunistically in searching for an 
excuse to exit the contract or that it had any inkling at the time of the 
events that a quasi-contractual recovery could exceed a contractual 
recovery.  Instead, Boomer’s enforcement of quantum meruit with 
recovery above the contract price has a sound legal, normative, and 
economic grounding. 
1. Boomer v. Muir:  The Court’s Opinion 
In Boomer, R.C. Storrie & Co. (“Storrie”), a partnership of Robert B. 
Muir and Robert C. Storrie, had a general contract with the Feather River 
Power Company to build a hydroelectric dam in California.  In a 
subcontract with H.H. Boomer, with a completion date of December 1, 
1927, defendant Storrie’s obligation was to deliver to the dam site all the 
cement, gravel, sand, steel, and other metal work, which was to become 
                                                 
257 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 716. 
258 Id. n.70. 
259 Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 580 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933). 
260 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 716 n.70. 
261 Id. at 716 n.70, 719 & n.83. 
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a permanent part of the dam.  Boomer’s obligation was to furnish all 
other materials, labor, and equipment.  The contract’s firm fixed price 
was $300,000.   
Soon after contract execution, the parties experienced continuing 
performance disputes regarding the defendant Storrie’s failure to furnish 
compressed air, deliver materials, maintain roads, and conveniently 
locate a quarry.  Boomer continually sought to make the arrangement 
succeed as the parties renegotiated important contract terms.262  After 
eighteen months on the job, Boomer finally left the site even though the 
dam was 95% complete.  Boomer quit the contract in frustration because 
Storrie had persistently prevented Boomer’s performance, which caused 
Boomer to incur significant delays and increased costs.  The evidence 
specifically showed that as late as approximately two weeks before 
Boomer left the site, Boomer reaffirmed to Storrie his willingness to 
complete performance, but to no avail.263 
The contract entitled Boomer to receive monthly progress payments 
for satisfactory work based on a schedule of unit prices.  The agreement 
also entitled Storrie to withhold ten percent of the progress payments for 
those months where Boomer failed to place a minimum amount of 
material in the dam.  When Boomer finally felt compelled to cease 
performance after the year and a half of trying to work with the prime 
contractor, Storrie had paid Boomer all but $20,000 of the $300,000 
contract price.264 
Boomer then filed an action in a California court for rescission and 
restitution for the value of its partial performance.265  The court found 
that Storrie had committed an unexcused material breach by failing to 
provide the requisite materials and the other items and that Boomer 
justifiably had ceased performance.  The evidence also showed that the 
prime contractor’s defaults delayed Boomer’s operations and had made 
performance more expensive.  The court made no finding that Boomer 
had worked inefficiently or had underbid the job so that it would 
                                                 
262 Boomer, 24 P.2d at 571–73.  Storrie increased the subcontractor’s price and the amounts 
retained, and Boomer agreed to meet new periodic targets for pouring cement.  Id. at 572. 
263 Id. at 572–73. Shortly before terminating performance, Boomer sent Storrie the 
following telegram on November 27, 1927:  “I am prepared to complete my contract on 
time.  Ran out of material last night.  Do you want me to hold crew here to put through the 
three unfinished slabs of the third section?  This extra cost must be paid by you.  I await 
your answer today.”  Id. at 573.  After waiting unsuccessfully on Storrie’s response from 
December 3–15, 1927, Boomer left the site.  Id. 
264 Id. at 572. 
265 Id.  Boomer originally pled two theories in his complaint, rescission and restitution 
and enforcement of a mechanic’s lien upon the dam.  Id.  Upon the defendant’s motion, 
which the court granted, Boomer elected his remedy in rescission and restitution and 
dropped the count for the mechanic’s lien.  Id. at 572, 579. 
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inevitably be in a loss status.  The court also made no finding that the 
contract contained what is commonly called a “no damages for delay” 
clause, which typically provides that no claim shall be made or allowed 
to the contractor for any damages that may arise out of any delay caused 
by the owner of a construction project.266  Lastly, the court made no 
finding that Boomer had breached any of his obligations.267 
Ultimately, the trial court granted Boomer a judgment in rescission 
and restitution for an additional $258,000 for the market value of his 
extra labor and materials, which was the difference between Boomer’s 
costs attributable to Storrie’s delays and other interferences and what 
Storrie had already paid this subcontractor. Storrie then appealed. 
Citing numerous cases throughout its opinion, the California Court 
of Appeals began by citing the well-settled rule that a contractor in 
Boomer’s position has a choice of three remedies:  (1) action in rescission 
and quantum meruit, which is a judicially implied-in-law contract that 
takes the place of the formal contract; (2) an action for enforcement of the 
contract and a remedy in damages for the delays and expenses; or (3) an 
action for repudiation that puts the contract to an end and allows a 
remedy for the unrealized profits. 268  Therefore, Boomer’s choice of 
rescission and quantum meruit was proper. 
The Boomer court explained that where the plaintiff rescinds the 
contract as a remedy for breach, such as where the defendant has 
prevented the plaintiff’s performance, the plaintiff may file an action in 
quantum meruit to recover the reasonable value of what it had provided 
in performing under the contract.269  The court observed that the 
quantum meruit remedy is of “equitable origin” and subject to 
considerations of “natural justice.”270  Next, the Boomer court relied on 
the nature of rescission as extinguishing ab initio all contract obligations, 
                                                 
266 Id. at 573, 579.  See generally Maurice T. Brunner, Validity and Construction of “No-
Damage” Clause with Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3D 187 
(1976) (explaining no damage for delay clauses). 
267 Boomer, 24 P.2d at 573, 579. 
268 See Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States, 654 F.3d 1305, 1317 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (“A recovery in quantum meruit is based on an implied-in-law contract.”); Newbery 
Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 1392, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that quantum 
meruit “rests upon the equitable theory that a contract to pay for services rendered is 
implied by law for reasons of justice”) (citation omitted); Campbell v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. 
Co., 573 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex. 1978) (stating that the right to recover under quantum meruit 
is “based upon the promise implied by law to pay for beneficial services rendered and 
knowingly accepted”).  Similarly, the U.C.C. has not precluded application of quantum 
meruit.  See J.L. Teel Co. v. Hous. United Sales, Inc., 491 So. 2d 851, 861 (Miss. 1986) 
(applying the quantum meruit theory even in light of the U.C.C.). 
269 Boomer, 24 P.2d at 573. 
270 Id. at 575. 
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including the price.  The court also noted that the contract price is set “on 
condition that the entire contract be performed,” and, therefore, the 
contract price should not control in partial performance cases involving 
restitution.271  
Along the same lines, in answer to Storrie’s claim that Boomer’s 
recovery would exceed the $300,000 contract price ($280,000 + $258,000), 
the court drew upon the equitable nature of quantum meruit.  The 
Boomer court observed that the subcontractor deserved this relief because 
it had acted in good faith and had incurred the extra expenses.  
Accordingly, the court commented, “Where the defendant undertakes to 
limit the plaintiff’s recovery by treating the contract price as a limitation 
upon such recovery, he [by his wrong] is asserting a right under the very 
contract which he himself has discharged.”272  Given that the contract 
and its price limitation no longer existed in the eyes of the law, Boomer, 
under the particular facts, could properly enforce his equitable claim 
(which was adequately documented) and against which Storrie lacked a 
meritorious defense. 
2. Boomer v. Muir:  Analysis 
Boomer is consistent with established doctrine that a general 
construction contractor has an implied obligation not to hinder or delay 
a subcontractor’s performance.273  As the Boomer court correctly 
indicated, redress above the contract price is proper where the partially 
performing party, faced with the obstructions of the breaching party, 
never agreed to exchange his partial performance and extra costs in 
return for a cap on the original contract price.274  The plaintiff’s right to 
                                                 
271 Id. at 577. 
272 Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia v. Tripple, 79 A. 703, 706 (Pa. 1911)). 
273 See Cont’l Masonry Co. v. Verdel Constr. Co., 369 A.2d 566, 567 n.1 (Md. 1977) 
(explaining that generally a contractor has an implied duty not to delay work performed by 
a subcontractor); R.C. Tolman Constr. Co. v. Myton Water Ass’n, 563 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 
1977) (“It is true that there is an implied obligation arising out of a construction contract 
that the person hiring the work to be done will cooperate with the contractor and will not 
hinder or delay him in his performance.”) (footnote omitted). 
274 Boomer, 24 P.2d at 579.  Where the injured party has fully performed the contract, 
however, the contract expectancy is the limit on recovery.  See DOBBS, supra note 176, 
§ 12.7(5), at 802 (“The full performance/liquidated sum rule in effect makes expectancy a 
ceiling in the cases to which it applies.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37(2), at 613 (2011) (“Rescission as a remedy for breach of 
contract is not available against a defendant whose defaulted obligation is exclusively an 
obligation to pay money.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2) (1981) (“The 
injured party has no right to restitution if he has performed all of his duties under the 
contract and no performance by the other party remains due other than payment of a 
definite sum of money for that performance.”).   
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quantum meruit exists not because of the contract the parties once had, 
but because there is no longer a contract.275  Thus, the theory behind 
quantum meruit is that “[t]he law implies a promise by the party to pay 
for what has been thus received, and allows him to recover any damage 
he has sustained by reason of the breach, for this is exact justice.”276 
Regarding the remedy, what must always be kept in mind is that 
“[i]n its very nature rescission implies the extinction of the contract, and, 
once accomplished, neither party can base any right of recovery upon 
it.”277  Accordingly, Boomer exemplifies the “overwhelming weight of 
authority” that allows a partially performing plaintiff’s restitutionary 
                                                                                                             
The rationale here is that the price of the contract is a liquidated debt, and the injured 
party may not claim that the services are worth more than the original agreement.  See Judy 
Beckner Sloan, Quantum Meruit:  Residual Equity in Law, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 430 (1992) 
(“A further limitation on the breaching party’s recovery is that she will not ‘be allowed to 
recover more than a ratable portion of the total contract price where such a portion can be 
determined.’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 cmt. b).  But see 
Andersen, supra note 42, at 26–29 (criticizing the full performance rule because the 
partial/total breach situations are “economically equivalent”). 
275 See James v. Hogan, 47 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Neb. 1951) (explaining that a seller’s right to 
return or redelivery extends from the non-existence of a contract); see also Murdock-Bryant 
Constr., Inc. v. Pearson, 703 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Ariz. 1985) (“[R]estitution through an implied-
in-law contract . . . [is] imposed for the purpose of bringing about justice without reference 
to the intentions of the parties.” (quoting Artukovich & Sons v. Reliance Truck Co., 614 
P.2d 327, 329 (Ariz. 1980))); Sneed v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 683 P.2d 525, 528 (Okla. 
1983) (“The law requires that every right acquired under a contract be absolutely 
surrendered as a condition precedent to its avoidance.”). 
276 Hayman v. Davis, 109 S.E. 554, 556 (N.C. 1921) (citation omitted). 
277 James, 47 N.W.2d at 852 (citation omitted). 
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recovery to exceed the contract rate or price,278 even as the contract price 
can be evidence of the reasonable value.279 
Further analysis proves the logic of the court’s approach.  This 
remedy combines elements of preventing both the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment and the plaintiff’s unjust impoverishment.280  Boomer also 
satisfied the requirement that the plaintiff has conferred a benefit upon 
the defendant, because the benefit here was the value of Boomer’s 
services that Storrie solicited by the contract.281  Brooks and Stremitzer 
                                                 
278 Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 
37, 44 (1981) (quoting 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 4.4).  Cases are numerous in this regard.  
E.g., United States v. W. States Mech. Contractors, Inc., 834 F.2d 1533, 1539 (10th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 498 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Zara Contracting Co., 
146 F.2d 606, 610 (2d Cir. 1944); Johnston v. Star Bucket Pump Co., 202 S.W. 1143, 1152 (Mo. 
1918); Smith v. Brocton Preserving Co., 296 N.Y.S. 281, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937); see also 
Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., 557 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Under 
quantum meruit, damages are ‘measured by the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s 
services’ . . . and calculated at ’the customary rate of pay for such work in the community at 
the time the work was performed.’” (quoting Mead v. Ringling, 64 N.W.2d 222, 225 
(1954))); Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Tundra Tours, Inc., 719 P.2d 1020, 1029 n.15 (Alaska 
1986) (“[T]he measure of recovery on quantum meruit is the reasonable value of the service 
rendered to the benefited defendant, and ‘not the value of the actual benefit realized and 
retained by the recipient.’” (quoting Peavey v. Pellandini, 551 P.2d 610, 616 (Idaho 1976))). 
 For a rare decision ruling that the contract price is a cap on restitution, see, e,g., 
Johnson v. Bovee, 574 P.2d 513, 514 (Colo. App. 1978) (“We believe using the contract price 
as a ceiling on restitution is the better-reasoned resolution of this question.”). 
279 See City of Damascus v. Bivens, 726 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Ark. 1987) (“The contract price is 
some evidence of the value of the benefit conferred.”); Busch v. Model Corp., 708 N.W.2d 
546, 552 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that, for the purposes of quantum meruit, 
“[d]etermination of the ‘reasonable value’ can be based on the contract price, even though 
recovery is sought in equity” (quoting Confer Bros. v. Currier, 204 N.W. 929, 931 (Minn. 
1925))); Mills Realty, Inc. v. Wolff, 910 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (“[Plaintiff] may 
rely on the contract as prima facie evidence of the reasonable value of services provided.”).  
Further, courts have observed, “As the best means of restoring the status quo ante, cost of 
performance is often used as the basis for determining the amount of quantum meruit 
recovery, in the absence of ‘any challenging evidence.’”  Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United 
States, 347 F.2d 509, 530 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev’d on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966). 
280 See Algernon Blair, 479 F.2d at 641 (explaining that restitution provides a strong case 
for relief because it involves a combination of unjust impoverishment and gain); see also 
W.F. Magann Corp. v. Diamond Mfg. Co., 775 F.2d 1202, 1208 (4th Cir. 1985) (indicating 
that the underlying purposes of quantum meruit are to prevent the breaching party from 
being unjustly enriched and restore the aggrieved party to the position it occupied before 
entering the contract).  But see supra note 36 (noting the debate on this issue). 
281 See W.F. Magann Corp., 775 F.2d at 1208 (“[A] threshold requirement for recovering 
quantum meruit damages is that the defendant receive the benefit of the plaintiff’s 
performance.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 370 (1981) (“A party is entitled to 
restitution under the rules stated in this Restatement only to the extent that he has 
conferred a benefit on the other party by way of part performance or reliance.”).  But see 
Lindquist Ford, Inc., 557 F.3d at 477 (“[A] plaintiff can recover under quantum meruit even if 
he confers no benefit on the defendant.”); Ramsey v Ellis, 484 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Wis. 1992) 
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devote no analysis to the Boomer court’s use of the above well-settled 
legal doctrines, especially regarding the nature of quantum meruit.  The 
authors also overlook the line of authority implicitly adverted to in 
Boomer endorsing the use of equitable estoppel against the wrongdoer’s 
attempt to limit the valuation of the injured party’s loss.282 
                                                                                                             
(“[R]ecovery in quantum meruit is based upon an implied contract to pay reasonable 
compensation for services rendered.”).  Indeed, the law is so protective of the victim’s 
interests that the plaintiff can recover for the value of the services “even if the plaintiff 
would have lost money on the contract if it had been fully performed.”  Bausch & Lomb 
Inc. v. Bressler, 977 F.2d 720, 730 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Lindquist Ford, Inc., 557 F.3d at 478 
(“[T]o recover under quantum meruit, the plaintiff must prove that ‘the defendant 
requested the [plaintiff’s] services’ and ‘the plaintiff expected reasonable compensation for 
the services.’” (quoting Ramsey, 484 N.W.2d at 333))); United States for Use of Wallace v. 
Flintco Inc., 143 F.3d 955, 965 n.9 (5th Cir. 1998) (“When a general contractor actively 
interferes with its subcontractor’s performance, the subcontractor may treat the contract as 
rescinded and recover under quantum meruit the full value of work done.”); Murdock-
Bryant Constr., Inc. v. Pearson, 703 P.2d 1197, 1203 (Ariz. 1985) (“What is important is that 
it be shown that it was not intended or expected that the services be rendered or the benefit 
conferred gratuitously, and that the benefit was not ‘conferred officiously.’” (quoting 
Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196, 203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982))); City of Philadelphia v. Tripple, 
79 A. 703, 706 (Pa. 1911) (explaining that sufficient benefit existed where the promisor 
“expended the money in good faith and in the course of attempted performance.  This is 
sufficient to give him an equitable claim for reimbursement”); 1 PALMER, supra note 31, 
§§ 1.8, 4.2, at 45–46, 370 (making the specific characterization noted in the text). 
 The authorities have posed several other tests for this element.  In one version, 
regarding this benefit to the defendant, the award “may as justice requires be measured by 
either (a) the reasonable value to the other party of what he received . . . or (b) the extent to 
which the other party’s property has been increased in value or his other interests 
advanced.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (1981), quoted in Bernstein v. 
Nemeyer, 570 A.2d 164, 169 (Conn. 1990).  Another popular standard for measuring the 
value of the supplier’s services is the amount for which the services and materials supplied 
could have been purchased from one in the supplier’s position at the time and place the 
services were rendered.  W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 498 F.2d at 338 (explaining the standard); see 
also City of Portland ex rel. Donohue & Fleskes Corp. v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 596 P.2d 1305, 
1313–14 (Or. 1979) (indicating that the standard is not the value of the benefit conferred 
upon defendant, but the reasonable value of the contractor’s work itself which is a market 
value measure and not a reimbursement for actual costs).  Any of these tests support the 
result in Boomer. 
281  United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1973); see also W.F. 
Magann Corp., 775 F.2d at 1208 (underlying purposes of quantum meruit are “to prevent 
the breaching party from being unjustly enriched and to restore the aggrieved party to the 
position it occupied before entering the contract”). 
282 See McLaughlin v. Shamaly, 26 N.W.2d 733, 734 (Mich. 1947) (explaining a situation 
where “the defendant was estopped to deny the benefit” (quoting Hemminger v. W. 
Assurance Co., 54 N.W. 949, 950 (1983))).  In United States v. Behan, the U.S. Supreme Court 
expressly adopted the estoppel principle in this circumstance.  110 U.S. 338, 346–47 (1884).  
The Court further commented: 
It does not lie . . . in the mouth of the party, who has voluntarily and 
wrongfully put an end to the contract, to say that the party injured has 
not been damaged at least to the amount of what he has been induced 
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Perhaps the authors’ most serious error is that they have greatly 
confused matters by implying that Boomer received a windfall because 
Boomer’s expectation damages would have been the remaining $20,000 
on the contract price of $300,000 had Boomer brought an action in 
damages to enforce the contract.283  Under established principles, the 
contract price is never a cap on breach damages, because the plaintiff 
always has the right to recover for those losses fairly anticipated under 
the contract and the losses that might naturally flow from the breach, 
such as delay costs and excess labor.284  As another commentator 
observes: 
The error, often committed in cases involving an injured 
supplier, is asking whether restitution may be awarded 
in excess of the contract price.  This question seems to 
assume, uncritically, that the unpaid portion of the 
contract price is synonymous with the expectation 
interest of the injured supplier—an assumption that 
often is incorrect. 
. . . . 
The material breach leading to [contract] cancellation 
very often consists, at least in part, of the owner’s (or 
general contractor’s) breach of these obligations.  When 
that occurs, the contractor (or subcontractor) may be 
palpably injured by delays in the job, having to work 
around other contractors, or other difficulties.  Under 
                                                                                                             
fairly and in good faith to lay out and expend, (including his own 
services,) after making allowance for the value of materials on 
hand . . . unless he can show that the expenses of the party injured 
have been extravagant, and unnecessary for the purpose of carrying 
out the contract. 
Id. at 345–46. 
283 See Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 716 n.70 (noting 
the authors’ views on Boomer). 
284 See Fournier Furniture, Inc. v. Waltz-Holst Blow Pipe Co., 980 F. Supp. 187, 191 n.5 
(W.D. Va. 1997) (explaining generally a plaintiff’s rights during a breach of contract claim); 
see also S. Leo Harmonay, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1014, 1036–37 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(noting that a subcontractor is entitled to damages for delay, including extra material costs, 
excess equipment costs, and additional labor costs); Moore Constr. Co. v. Clarksville Dep’t 
of Elec., 707 S.W.2d 1, 14–17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that a contractor is also entitled 
to damages for delay, including extra supervisory costs and loss of the use of equipment). 
 Yet another way of looking at the prime contractor’s hindrance and delays of the 
subcontractor in Boomer is that the prime’s interference with the subcontractor was a 
constructive change to the contract entitling the subcontractor to an equitable price 
adjustment.  See Metric Constr. Co. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 804, 817–18 (2008) (stating 
that the subcontractor is entitled to a price adjustment in equity when the conduct of the 
prime contractor can be considered a constructive change in the contract).  
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standard principles of contract damages, the owner or 
general contractor owes compensatory damages to the 
subcontractors for those injuries, separate and apart 
from the unpaid contract price.  Whether those damages 
are characterized as “consequential” or “incidental 
damages,” or as a loss in value of the primary 
performance owed by the party in breach, they 
demonstrate that the unpaid contract price is but one 
component of the victim’s expectation interest.285 
Accordingly, Brooks and Stremitzer have failed to consider that it is only 
when the supplier’s entire loss consists of the unpaid portion of the 
purchase price will restitution equal the supplier’s expectation interest.286 
The above analysis shows that the Boomer court’s allowance of 
quantum meruit recovery above the contract price stands on firm legal 
grounding.  It also has persuasive normative force.  As one commentary 
on Boomer observes: 
 The proposition, announced and followed in the 
cases considered, that a defendant who interferes with 
and prevents good faith performance by the plaintiff 
cannot use the contract to limit plaintiff’s recovery is 
sound.  When the rule is otherwise, the defendant is 
allowed to preserve the terms of a hard bargain which 
he himself failed to keep and to use them to prevent a 
plaintiff who made a good faith effort to perform from 
being restored to the position he occupied before 
entering performance.  Such a rule rewards the 
defendant who did not observe the contract by giving 
the benefit of the effort and expenditures above the 
contract price at the expense of a plaintiff who made a 
bona fide attempt to perform.  A rule which rewards the 
party who breached the contract at the expense of the party 
who made a bona fide attempt to perform a bad bargain is 
unfair and contrary to concepts of justice.287 
                                                 
285 Andersen, supra note 42, at 22–23 (footnotes omitted). 
286 See generally Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3. 
287 Austin C. Wilson, Comment, The Contract Price as a Limit on a Quantum Meruit 
Recovery, 27 TEX. L. REV. 44, 52 (1948) (emphasis added); see also 1 PALMER, supra note 31, 
§ 4.4, at 392 (“[I]t would be a gross miscarriage of justice to award this same prospective 
gain to the defendant, through deduction from the plaintiff’s recovery, when the defendant 
is the party guilty of a breach of contract.”).  The breaching party of the contract is the 
wrongdoer and must accept the consequences of his actions.  See id. at 269–73 (explaining 
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Lastly, regarding the economic aspects of the remedy, some authors 
have argued that granting the injured party restitution above the 
contract price creates three related incentives for both parties.288  First, 
the buyer understands that the seller strongly desires contract 
completion, and, therefore, the buyer could be tempted to hold up 
performance by seeking unjustified price or performance concessions 
from the seller.289  The possibility that the seller could obtain a remedy 
above the contract price tends to discourage such opportunistic behavior, 
which would otherwise result in an unfair advantage to the buyer.290  
Second, the possibility of a restitutionary remedy discourages inefficient 
breaches, i.e., where a breaching party causes harm to the injured party 
without being forced to pay a properly-calibrated amount of damages 
and where the external, social harm outweighs the breaching party’s 
private benefits.291  This specter of a restitutionary remedy above the 
contract price is both an expensive negative sanction that deters breach 
and a positive enticement for the seller to enforce any benefits it 
negotiated with the original contract.292  Third, the restitutionary remedy 
encourages efficient contracting that might otherwise occur by allowing 
the parties to take advantage of asymmetries of information.293  More 
specifically, the seller usually knows the quality of the goods or services 
better than the buyer, and, therefore, the seller is better able to calculate 
the odds that it will do good enough work that would increase its 
business reputation or the incidence of buyer reciprocity.294  Other 
commentators agree that a “fault-based economic theory offers a 
                                                                                                             
that the basis for awarding damages to the plaintiff is that the breaching party pay for his 
conduct); see also Bernard E. Gegan, In Defense of Restitution:  A Comment on Mather, 
Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract:  The Case of the Partially Performing Seller, 57 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 723, 728 (1984) (noting that the breaching party should be precluded from 
seeking the protection of the contract).  Case law sounds these same themes.  E.g., 
Schwasnick v. Blandin, 65 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1933) (“Justice demands no more than that 
the promisor shall not profit at the promisee’s expense.”); Johnston v. Star Bucket Pump 
Co., 202 S.W. 1143, 1153 (Mo. 1918) (“To permit him to use his breached contract to limit a 
recovery against him would be to pay to him a premium for his own wrong.  The law does 
not contemplate such.”); City of Philadelphia v. Tripple, 79 A. 703, 706 (Pa. 1911) (“The 
owner, on the other hand, has deprived himself of the legal right which would have 
sufficed to defeat the equity.  He accordingly stands defenseless in the presence of the 
builder’s claim.”). 
288 See Wendy J. Gordon & Tamar Frankel, Comment, Enforcing Coasian Bribes for Non-
Price Benefits:  A New Role for Restitution, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1541–50 (1994) (explaining 
the incentives for granting restitution to the non-breaching party). 
289 Id. at 1541. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 1541–42. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. at 1542. 
294 Id. 
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satisfactory explanation of Boomer” because of the inequity of forcing the 
faultless seller to pay for unanticipated costs above the contract’s firm 
fixed price that the buyer has directly caused by its material breach.295  
Although commentary is divided on the Boomer result and 
reasoning, the facts in Boomer demonstrate the subcontractor’s consistent 
good faith performance and the prime contractor’s obstruction of those 
efforts.296  Contrary to the impression left by Brooks and Stremitzer, no 
                                                 
295 George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1305 (1994). 
296 Brooks and Stremitzer fail to mention that not every commentator views Boomer as an 
outlier in the law.  There is a split among academics with regard to their support for or 
opposition to Boomer.  Compare DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 648–51 
(3d ed. 2002), Kull, supra note 1, at 1471–83, and Perillo, supra note 278, at 44–45, with Cohen, 
supra note 295, at 1304–08, Gordon & Frankel, supra note 288, at 1523–24, and Wilson, supra 
note 287, at 52. 
 The commentators opposing Boomer are mainly concerned that (1) rescission is a 
fiction (there is no mutual restoration), because the case is really about breach of contract, 
and therefore courts cannot ignore the contract’s allocation of risks and benefits for 
measuring the supplier’s recovery, and (2) restitution here was supra-compensatory and 
therefore punitive.  See Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the “Restitution Interest,” and 
the Restatement of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2041 nn. 48–49 (2001) (providing ten 
reasons against the rule formulated in Boomer). 
 My first response is that the debate misses the point on whether Boomer is a proper 
example of rescission versus breach of contract.  Irrespective of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the remedies, the judicial task is to provide the injured party a fair 
remedy and “[n]ot quibble about the analytical construct.”  See First Annapolis Bancorp, 
Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 765, 799 (2009) (citations omitted) (recognizing a similar 
point about whether restitution focuses on the detriment to the injured party or the gain to 
the breaching party).  The Boomer court properly did not get bogged down in this detail.  
But, even still, the Boomer case in the larger sense is indeed about rescission if one applies 
the overriding concept that “[t]he term rescission refers to the avoidance of the transaction 
or the calling off of the deal.”  DOBBS, supra note 176, § 4.3(6), at 615.  It is also true that 
restoration to the status quo is not an inexorable command of restitution but is a matter of 
judicial discretion.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37 
cmt. a (2011); see also Ennis v. Interstate Distrib., Inc., 598 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1980) (“[R]estoration is not indispensable.”).  Moreover, even if the Boomer case is sub 
silentio about breach of contract, the facts show that the Boomer court properly awarded 
Boomer its expectation interest.  See supra notes 283–86 and accompanying text (explaining 
the mandatory nature of expectation damages for the non-breaching party). 
 My next response to the opponents is that judicially allocating the contractual risk of 
non-performance to one party or the other in forging a remedy for rescission and 
restitution is no longer relevant; quantum meruit to support restitution is not based on the 
intentions of the parties or their prior agreement.  See supra notes 273–82 and 
accompanying text (describing the history and basis behind quantum meruit recovery).  
The plaintiff experiencing a material breach has an undoubted right to avoid the 
transaction, and necessarily the rescinded contract which, as courts have repeatedly 
observed, is annihilated for all purposes.  See supra note 33 (providing cases supporting the 
notion that the rescinded contract is no longer in effect).  Moreover, in quantum meruit, the 
plaintiff is simply seeking relief for the market value of the requested services (along with 
reasonable incidental expenses and minus payments previously received), which were a 
benefit to the defendant.  This rule is fair to both sides in that the seller’s extravagances or 
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evidence existed of subcontractor opportunism or machinations to 
escape performance.  The Boomer decision has been good law in 
California for eighty years without criticism from any California court or 
indeed from any other court in the United States.  The likely reason is the 
case’s sound legal, normative, and economic foundations, which 
promote both sides’ good faith performance to the ultimate benefit of the 
contracting system.  Accordingly, Brooks and Stremitzer have not 
proven their argument that the plaintiff’s recovery in restitution 
exceeding the contract price creates a possible windfall for partially 
performing promisors or inherently tends to incentivize opportunistic 
rescission.297 
D. Restitution, Reliance, and Disgorgement 
After considering the various avenues of relief potentially available 
to the rescinding buyer—reliance, restoration, disgorgement, and specific 
performance—Brooks and Stremitzer state that “the remedy in 
restitution following rescission should be limited to restoration of price 
or other conferred benefits to the promisor under the contract.”298  The 
most intriguing aspects of their analysis are their equivocal rejection of 
reliance damages and their failure to address disgorgement in any 
substantial fashion. 
1. Reliance Damages in Restitution 
Brooks and Stremitzer acknowledge that accepted legal doctrine 
reimburses the rescinding buyer’s expenditures made in reliance on the 
                                                                                                             
unnecessary services will make it improper for the courts to rely upon the seller’s costs as 
evidence of the work’s value to the owner.  United States v. Behan, 110 U.S 338, 345–46 
(1884) (explaining why recovery in quantum meruit is equitable to both sides).  Thus, 
placing the parties in the status quo ante and transitioning them to quantum meruit is a 
neutral default position that achieves the corrective justice goal of restitution.  See Eyal 
Zamir, The Missing Interest: Restoration of the Contractual Equivalence, 93 VA. L. REV. 59, 108 
(2007) (“The basic idea underlying corrective justice is that people have a duty to remedy 
wrongful losses they inflict on others.”). 
 Ironically, Brooks and Stremitzer do not question the remedy of quantum meruit and 
freely accept the prevailing definition of rescission as “eliminating all obligations under the 
contract.”  Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 692 n.2.  This 
position should have led to the authors’ support of Boomer. 
297 The authors further omit that “[t]he opportunistic use of rescission is barred, within 
traditional doctrine, by a rule that a claimant seeking to rescind must give notice of the 
election to do so with reasonable promptness after learning of the grounds for rescission.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 54 cmt. k. 
298 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 693; see also id. at 719 
(noting that promisees should be prohibited from recovering any sums beyond the 
purchase price); id. at 725 (“Rescission should come at a price.”). 
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contract.299  Some common instances of reliance costs, as cited by the 
authors, are the buyer’s expenses in transporting defective goods back to 
the seller or for repairing the buyer’s other property injured by the 
seller’s defective goods.300  While they question how the rationale 
supporting this recovery can be consistent with contract doctrine if the 
contract has been abrogated, they do not tarry on the legal point.  Their 
rationale for not arguing the point further is that “[r]eliance . . . is 
available both on and off the contract” and has “long been granted under 
restitution.”301  Notably, they also fail to mention the moral aspects of 
placing the economic burden of reliance expenditures not on the 
breaching party, but on the injured party. 
Instead, Brooks and Stremitzer question the availability of reliance 
losses on economic grounds.302  They first state that the possibility of the 
buyer’s award of reliance and restoration should deter the seller’s breach 
of contract.303  On the other hand, Brooks and Stremitzer claim “it is 
clear” that the buyer has a greater monetary incentive to disaffirm if he 
rescinds and gets both restoration of the purchase price and his reliance 
expenses, as opposed to recouping just the purchase price.304  
Oftentimes, they note, there will be no reliance expenses where the buyer 
has not made any investments except for the purchase price, which 
would lower the buyer’s incentive to rescind.305  Therefore, the authors 
are equivocal on the validity of reliance losses in restitution, stating that 
this area would be “[a] fruitful avenue of future research.”306  They also 
seem unaware that their ambiguous analysis of reliance losses 
contradicts their repeated assertion that restoration of the price and any 
other benefits provided to the seller should be the buyer’s sole recourse 
in restitution.307 
Some background on reliance damages is first needed for a response 
to the authors’ critique on this subject.  Brooks and Stremitzer correctly 
indicate that an established principle of the remedy of rescission is to 
restore the injured party by requiring the breaching party to compensate 
                                                 
299 Id. at 719, 726. 
300 Id. at 718 n.79. 
301 Id. at 719, 726; see also Amber Res. Co. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 738, 742 (2006) 
(“[R]estitution in the context of express contracts is merely a subset of reliance damages.”). 
302 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 725–26. 
303 Id. at 726. 
304 Id. 
305  Id. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. at 693.  “Hence, the final point of our argument:  the remedy in restitution 
following rescission should be limited to restoration of price or other conferred benefits to 
the promisor under the contract.”  Id. 
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the injured party’s reliance damages.308  What they do not mention is 
that these damages encompass those foreseeable, actual expenditures 
made in preparation or in performance of the contract with no 
requirement that the breach itself caused the losses or that they have 
benefited the breaching party.309  Courts also hold that “rescission and 
restorative damages are consistent remedies which work together to 
restore the injured party to his precontract position.”310  In this way, 
reliance costs do not represent the plaintiff’s loss of the benefit of the 
bargain in the sense of expectation damages.  When a plaintiff does 
receive a recovery in reliance, a court awards only the net reliance loss, 
such that if the plaintiff had reaped a benefit from those expenditures, 
the defendant will receive a credit.311  In essence, courts award these 
damages to the plaintiff “for the purpose of undoing the harm which his 
reliance on the defendant’s promise has caused him.”312 
                                                 
308 See CBS, Inc. v. Merrick, 716 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining that, in 
rescission cases, a plaintiff may recover reliance damages); In Re DeRosa, 98 B.R. 644, 649 
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1989) (noting that when an agreement is deemed to be rescinded, reliance 
damages are awarded). 
309 See Hansen Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1297, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As 
reliance damages, the non-breaching party ‘may recover expenses of preparation of part 
performance, as well as other foreseeable expenses incurred in reliance upon the contract.’” 
(quoting CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 55, § 14.9)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 349 (1981) (explaining that damages based on reliance interest includes 
“expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance, less any loss that 
the party in breach can prove with reasonable certainty the injured party would have 
suffered had the contract been performed”); see also 1 PALMER, supra note 31, § 4.8, at 434–37 
(discussing the recovery of damages in connection with restitution).   
 One authority asserts that reliance damages are always foreseeable.  DOBBS, supra note 
176, § 12.16(4), at 377–82 (“Essential reliance expenses are always within the parties’ 
contemplation.”); see also IT Corp. v. Motco Site Trust Fund, 903 F. Supp. 1106, 1134 (S.D. 
Tex. 1994) (explaining that plaintiff’s reliance damages were the reasonable value of the 
expenditures it actually incurred and not the projected profits on the contract); Amber Res. 
Co. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 738, 746 (2006) (“Reliance, in short, attempts to make the 
injured party whole by reimbursing it for amounts expended, even if they do not benefit 
the breaching party.”).  The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment supports 
the award of reliance or incidental damages in rescission cases.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37(2) & cmt. c (2011) (“Damages measured by 
the claimant’s expenditure can be included in the accounting that accompanies rescission, 
in order to do complete justice in a single proceeding.”). 
310 Head & Seemann, Inc. v. Gregg, 311 N.W.2d 667, 673 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981), aff’d, 318 
N.W.2d 381 (Wis. 1982); see also First Equity Inv. Corp. v. United Serv. Corp. of Anderson, 
386 S.E.2d 245, 248 (S.C. 1989) (“Rescission entitles the party to a return of the consideration 
paid as well as any additional sums necessary to restore him to the position occupied prior 
to the making of the contract.”). 
311 See DOBBS, supra note 176, § 12.3(1), at 51–52 (“[T]he reliance damages recovery is a 
recovery for net reliance loss, so that the defendant is credited with any benefit the plaintiff 
receives from the expenditures in reliance.”) (footnote omitted). 
312 Amber Res. Co., 73 Fed. Cl. at 744 (quoting Fuller & Perdue, supra note 45, at 53–54). 
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While they criticize the doctrinal basis for reliance damages, Brooks 
and Stremitzer do not consider any of its precepts that show the 
consistency with notions of restitution.  The award of reliance damages 
is fully in sync with rescission, because “[a] buyer is not returned to the 
‘precontract’ position if he or she is not allowed, in a proper case, to 
claim any additional amount he or she has incurred in reliance on the 
contract.”313  Brooks and Stremitzer overlook that reliance expenses are 
also awardable in rescission cases as a matter of equitable jurisdiction.  
Courts have stated that “[c]omplete and full justice is a fundamental 
doctrine of equity jurisprudence, and if damages, as well as rescission, 
are essential to accomplish full justice, they will both be allowed.”314  In 
this manner, the law allows trial courts broad discretion to fashion 
flexible equitable remedies on a case-by-case basis to make the injured 
party whole.315  This principle has particular resonance with rescission 
and restitution being a “flexible, equitable remedy,” where the defendant 
“is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to make 
compensation for benefits received.”316 
More fundamentally, conspicuously absent from Brooks and 
Stremitzer’s analysis is any mention of the moral imperative for 
reimbursing reliance damages.  The moral problem arises because 
“[r]eliance losses . . . may be valueless to the promisee.”317  With these 
reliance losses, “the promisee is now in a worse position than he would 
have been had only his expectations been thwarted.  Not only has he lost 
these hoped-for gains but also he has suffered a decrease in assets.”318  
                                                 
313 Aubrey’s R.V. Ctr., Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 731 P.2d 1124, 1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); see 
also CBS, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1296 (“When a breach occurs after the execution of the contract, 
the injured party in a contract action is entitled to both restitution and reliance damages.”). 
314 Holland v. W. Bank & Trust Co., 118 S.W. 218, 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909); see also 
Maruca v. Phillips, 90 A.2d 159, 161 (Conn. 1952) (“The governing motive of equity in the 
administration of its remedial system is to grant full relief.” (quoting Nichols v. Nichols, 66 
A. 161, 164 (Conn. 1907))); Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 67 P.2d 632, 638 (Utah 
1937) (“Where necessary to effect complete justice, equity will award to the party not in 
default his expenses necessarily incident to contract.”); Head & Seemann, Inc., 311 N.W.2d at 
672 (“If complete justice requires that damages be awarded with the rescission, the court 
will award them.”). 
315 See Umphres v. J.R. Mayer Enters., Inc., 889 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (”Courts 
in equity must remain free to consider all equitable considerations and to fashion flexible 
remedies to meet the needs of justice on a case by case basis.”); see also Cal. Fed. Bank v. 
United States, 395 F.3d 1263, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Contract remedies are designed to 
make the nonbreaching party whole.”). 
316 Murdock-Bryant Constr., Inc. v. Pearson, 703 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Ariz. 1985) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
317 Robert J. Nordstrom, Restitution on Default and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (1966). 
318 Id. 
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Accordingly, by restoring this equilibrium, the reliance remedy helps to 
achieve corrective justice between the parties, which is the very aim of 
rescission and restitution.319  In diverse areas, moreover, given the 
choice, the law places liability for loss upon the wrongdoer and not his 
innocent victim.320  The concept has equal relevance in contract disputes, 
including recovery in restitution following a rescission for breach.  The 
reason is that many jurisdictions in the United States have called the 
contract breaker a “wrongdoer” and the other party the “victim.”321  
Forcing the innocent buyer to bear the expense inflicted by a seller’s 
unexcused breach of contract undermines this general tenet of American 
jurisprudence regarding liability for wrongdoing. 
2. Disgorgement in Restitution 
Brooks and Stremitzer mention several times that disgorgement of 
the wrongdoer’s profits made as a consequence of the breach is one 
possible remedy in restitution.  For example, the authors recognize that 
“if the promisor exploited to great gain the monies briefly held as a 
consequence of the contract, restitution may call for disgorgement as a 
means of returning that party to the status quo ante.”322  Despite this 
recognition, however, they do not explain why they would ultimately 
                                                 
319 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 55, 55 (2003) (explaining that “corrective justice” remedies correct the wrong that 
the plaintiff has suffered at the hands of the defendant); see also In re DeRosa, 98 B.R. 644, 
648 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1989) (noting that the purpose of rescission is to “restore both parties to 
their former position as far as possible and to bring about substantial justice by adjusting 
the equities between the parties” (quoting Runyan v. Pac. Air Indust., 466 P.2d 682, 691 
(Cal. 1970))) (internal quotations omitted); Bernstein v. Nemeyer, 570 A.2d 164, 169 (Conn. 
1990) (“The award of a restitutionary remedy for breach of contract depends upon a 
showing of what justice requires in the particular circumstances.”). 
320 Cf. Wild W. Radio, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office of Colo., 886 P.2d 304, 306 
(Colo. App. 1994) (“In every legal loss-distribution mechanism, there are two things to be 
accomplished:  first, to make the victim whole, and second, to see to it as far as possible 
that the ultimate loss falls on the actual wrongdoer, as a matter of simple ethics and as a 
deterrent to harmful conduct.”) (citation omitted); Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 466 N.E.2d 500, 
506–07 (Mass. 1984) (Abrams, J., concurring) (“[T]he moral idea [is] that the ultimate loss 
from wrongdoing should fall upon the wrongdoer.”) (citation omitted). 
321 See Steven W. Feldman, Autonomy and Accountability in the Law of Contracts:  A Response 
to Professor Shiffrin, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 184 nn.27–28 (2009) (citing results of a Westlaw 
search showing that forty-six states, ten federal circuits, and the U.S. Supreme Court have 
used the term “wrongdoer” to describe the breaching party and that twenty states, seven 
federal circuits, and the U.S. Supreme Court have used the term “victim” to describe the 
injured party). 
322 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 718 (footnote 
omitted). 
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reject disgorgement as a form of restitutionary relief.323  This oversight is 
especially puzzling because disgorgement has recently attracted 
significant discussion in the restitution literature.  Indeed, the authors 
have cited several of the most prominent pieces, and Professor Brooks 
himself has written a full length article endorsing disgorgement.324 
The first response to Brooks and Stremitzer’s position on 
disgorgement is that by rejecting this remedy in rescission cases and by 
endorsing only restoration of the purchase price and other benefits 
conferred upon the defendant, the authors fall into the error of 
establishing a one-size-fits-all restitution formula.  Courts have 
specifically rejected this type of thinking in rescission actions based on its 
quintessentially “equitable” nature.325  In a basic principle of equitable 
authority, “the decision to award a remedy for rescission for breach of 
contract always depends upon a showing of what justice requires in the 
particular circumstances, and thus necessarily rests in the discretion of 
the trial court.”326 
The second response is that emerging case law unmentioned by 
Brooks and Stremitzer supports disgorgement in rescission and 
restitution actions.  While the general rule is that a mere breach of 
contract will not make a defendant liable for return of the profits it 
achieves as a consequence of the breach,327 except where the parties have 
a confidential or fiduciary relationship,328 it is also true that in certain 
                                                 
323  See id. at 692, 718  (eliminating disgorgement as a proposed remedy and suggesting 
that restoration of price is the best form of restitutionary relief without providing reasons 
for the rejection of disgorgement). 
324 See id. at 700 n.26 (citing E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain?  The Dilemma of 
the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339 (1985)); Daniel Friedmann, 
Restitution for Wrongs:  The Measure of Recovery, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1879 (2001)); see also Richard 
R.W. Brooks,  The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568, 573 (2006) (arguing that 
a promisee should be given the choice between requiring the promisor to perform or 
disgorging the promisor of his benefit from the breach). 
325 See, e.g., Anderson v. Doms, 75 P.3d 925, 929 (Utah. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting the 
notion that any “one precise formula . . . applies to all rescission cases”). 
326 Petrucelli v. Palmer, 596 F. Supp. 2d 347, 374 (D. Conn. 2009) (quoting Diamond v. 
Marcinek, 632 A.2d 46, 47 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993)); see also Far W. Fed. Bank, S.B. v. Office of 
Thrift Supervision-Dir., 119 F.3d 1358, 1367 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The proper measure of 
restitution depends on the particular circumstances of a given case.  It is within the trial 
court’s discretion to determine the measure of restitution that justice requires.”). 
327 See Watson v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1194 (Colo. App. 2011) (“[G]enerally a 
mere breach of contract will not make a defendant liable for return of the profits . . . .”); see 
also Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1494 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[D]isgorgement of 
profits earned is not the remedy for breach of contract.”). 
328 See UDV N. Am., Inc. v. Tequila Cuervo La Rojena, S.A., No. 00-50609, 2001 WL 
1223638, at *10 (5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2001) (“[D]isgorgement is not available as a remedy for 
breach of contract unless the contracting parties have a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship.”). 
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circumstances an injured party in a rescission action may recover profits 
obtained by the breaching party under a remedy of disgorgement.329  
While the body of law is limited on this subject, the leading case is the 
Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere 
Resource Consultants, Inc.330 
In EarthInfo, the parties had a contract to exploit information 
collected by governmental agencies.331  The payment terms were for 
fixed fees and royalties.332  The trial court found that EarthInfo had 
breached the contract by wrongfully withholding royalty payments on 
derivative products.333  Further, the breach was substantial, damages 
would be inadequate, and rescission was appropriate.334  The trial court 
therefore required EarthInfo to pay the net profits it had realized from 
the date it stopped making royalty payments until the rescission date.335 
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the disgorgement of profits 
and stated the applicable standard: 
[T]he [trial] court must resort to general considerations 
of fairness, taking into account the nature of the 
defendant’s wrong, the relative extent of his or her 
contribution, and the feasibility of separating this from 
the contribution traceable to the plaintiff’s interest. . . .  
Thus, the more culpable the defendant’s behavior, and 
the more direct the connection between the profits and 
the wrongdoing, the more likely that the plaintiff can 
recover all defendant’s profits. . . .  The trial court must 
ultimately decide whether the whole circumstances of a 
case point to the conclusion that the defendant’s 
retention of any profit is unjust.336 
                                                 
329 See Watson, 254 P.3d at 1195 (“[L]iability in restitution with disgorgement of profits is 
an alternative to liability for contract damages measured by injury to the promisee.”). 
330 900 P.2d 113 (Colo. 1995). 
331 Id. at 115–16. 
332 Id. at 116. 
333 Id. 
334 Id. at 116–17. 
335 Id. 
336 Id. at 119 (citations omitted); see Dastgheib v. Genentech, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 546, 552 
(E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating that disgorging the profits, which would be inequitable for 
defendant to retain, is appropriate in certain circumstances); Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. 
Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1233 (D. Colo. 2001) (holding that disgorgement 
was within the court’s discretion to provide the plaintiffs with a complete remedy); see also 
Gassner v. Lockett, 101 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1958) (holding for disgorgement in the sale of 
land context); Foss v. Heineman, 128 N.W. 881, 885 (Wis. 1910) (upholding disgorgement 
relief in a breach of contract context).   
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The result in EarthInfo is supportable on several grounds.  Consistent 
with the view that restitution is not punitive,337 disgorgement—an 
equitable remedy—does not punish the defendant.338  Instead, it requires 
him to “yield up gains that it cannot justly retain” and to restore the 
wrongdoer to the position he should have occupied but for the breach.339  
Indeed, disgorgement in a broad sense is always the objective of 
restitution, because the latter remedy takes from the defendant and gives 
to the plaintiff.340  Disgorgement also serves a deterrent function of 
                                                                                                             
 In a famous example of disgorgement and breach of contract, a former CIA agent 
published a book about his work for the agency but breached his CIA contract without 
obtaining pre-clearance.  Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507–08 (1980).  Because the 
former agent’s breach of contract was also a breach of his fiduciary duty, the Court held 
him liable in restitution for all profits he realized on the book.  Id. at 508–09.  The law 
further recognizes the legitimacy of disgorgement in that courts generally use the 
promisor’s profits as the measure of relief when those profits tend to define the plaintiff’s 
losses.  As stated in Seymour v. McCormick, 
[T]he general rule is that the plaintiff, if he has made out his right to 
recover, is entitled to the actual damages he has sustained by reason of 
the infringement; and those damages may be determined by 
ascertaining the profits which, in judgment of law, he would have 
made, provided the defendants had not interfered with his rights. 
57 U.S. 480, 483 (1853); see also Cincinnati Siemens-Lungren Gas Illuminating Co. v. W. 
Siemens-Lungren Co., 152 U.S. 200, 204–07 (1894) (quoting Seymour, 57 U.S. 483). 
337 See Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 38 n.6 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Actions of restitution are 
not punitive.” (quoting Brooks v. Conston, 72 A.2d 75, 79 (Pa. 1950))). 
338 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) (noting that the disgorgement of 
improper profits is traditionally considered an equitable remedy); see also S.E.C. v. First 
City Fin. Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Disgorgement is an equitable 
remedy designed to deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment and to deter others from 
violating the securities laws.”). 
339 Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 1577, 1625 
(2002); see also Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Mass. 1977) (stating 
that disgorgement is not punitive, “it merely deprives the defendant of a profit wrongfully 
made, a profit which the plaintiff was entitled to make”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The 
Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 559, 561 n.3 (2006) (“‘[P]erfect 
disgorgement’ is ‘a sanction that restores the wrongdoer to the same position that she would 
have been in but for the wrong’ and thus ‘strips the agent of her gain from 
misappropriation and leaves her no better or worse than if she had done no wrong.’”) 
(quoting ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 234 (3d ed. 2000)); Scott L. 
Watson, Note, Winstar Damages:  Restitution Where Benefit Conferred on the Defendant Is 
Greater than Plaintiff’s Out-Of-Pocket Cost, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 305, 330 (1999) (“Basic equitable 
principles necessitate that where one party must profit from a breach, it should be the non-
breaching party.”). 
340 See Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 852 (Okla. 1987) (“Beneath 
the cloak of restitution lies the dagger that compels the conscious wrongdoer to ‘disgorge’ 
his gains.”) (footnote omitted).  “Where a wrongdoer is shown to have been a conscious, 
deliberate misappropriator of another’s commercial values, gross profits are recoverable 
through a restitutionary remedy.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  See also Old Stone Corp. v United 
States, 63 Fed. Cl. 65, 75 (2004), rev’d in part on other grounds, 450 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(explaining that restitution is primarily a demand for disgorgement).  In their seminal 
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discouraging opportunistic breach,341 because disgorgement “gives teeth 
to the long-standing case law principle” of pacta sunt servanda, i.e., that 
promises are to be kept.342  Otherwise, to reject disgorgement on a 
wholesale basis undermines the contracting system, because “the 
anomalous result would be to legitimate a kind of private eminent 
domain (in favor of a wrongdoer) and to subject the claimant to a forced 
exchange.”343 
The utilitarian version of this observation is that “a promisor who 
wishes not to perform owes a moral duty of respect to the promisee to 
seek a mutual accommodation, rather than to unilaterally breach and 
thereby convert the promisee from a voluntary actor to an involuntary 
litigant.”344  As the Restatement (Third) Of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment also points out, “The broader function of disgorgement . . . is 
not merely to frustrate conscious wrongdoers but to reinforce the 
stability of the contract itself, enhancing the ability of the parties to 
negotiate for a contractual performance that may not be easily valued in 
money.”345  In all these respects, the promisee bringing the lawsuit is 
ideally situated as society’s representative, similar to a private attorney 
general, to deprive the promisor of his ill-gotten gain and to uphold the 
legal and moral objective that promises are meant to be kept and not 
broken.346 
                                                                                                             
articles on restitution, Fuller and Perdue repeatedly use the term “disgorge” in defining the 
restitution interest.  See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 45, at 54–55 n.2; L. L. Fuller & William 
R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:  2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 393–94 (1937). 
341 See Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass for Breach of 
Contract, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 991, 995 (2009) (examining whether disgorgement will actually 
deter the breaching party’s behavior); see also Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515 (stating that 
disgorgement is a reliable deterrent to breach); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 cmt. c (2011) (supporting disgorgement against a conscious 
wrongdoer for both moral reasons and for the creation of adequate incentives for lawful 
behavior); Id. § 39(3) (accepting disgorgement as a remedy for opportunistic breach).  
Caprice L. Roberts has provided thoughtful analyses of restitutionary disgorgement under 
the new Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.  See generally Caprice L. 
Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of 
Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131 (2008); Caprice L. Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective 
on Restitutionary Disgorgement for Breach of Contract, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945 (2008). 
342 Weinrib, supra note 319, at 73; see also Panitz v. Panitz, 799 A.2d 452, 459 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2002) (“It is an accepted maxim that pacta sunt servanda, contracts are to be kept.”). 
343 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 cmt. c. 
344 Eisenberg, supra note 339, at 580. 
345 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. b. 
346 Brooks and Stremitzer acknowledge that plaintiffs that recover the purchase price in 
restitution are “typically entitled” to interest on the price for the time defendants held this 
money.  Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 718 n.80.  The 
longstanding policy for allowing a plaintiff prejudgment interest—generally a matter of 
statute—is that the defendant has harmed the plaintiff by depriving him of the opportunity 
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The nascent development of disgorgement as a restitutionary 
remedy, recognized by the Restatement (Third) Of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment, comports with fundamental rules of damages. 347  The law 
recognizes that courts have flexibility, as dictated by the interest of 
justice, to apply these rules on damages, which are all merely “useful 
guides” that are “subject to modification and adjustment, just as were the 
antecedent rules they have modified and replaced.”348  Allowing 
disgorgement where justified is backed by established case law that each 
case is sui generis, whereby the law upholds the animating principle that 
damage awards as a response to breach prevent similar harms in the 
future.349  This emerging acceptance of disgorgement as a remedy in 
rescission and restitution is just another example in the common law 
                                                                                                             
to forego the use of these funds.  See Scholz v. S.B. Int’l., Inc., 40 S.W.3d 78, 82 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2000) (explaining that the rationale behind allowing prejudgment interest is not to 
punish the wrongdoer, but to compensate the wronged party for the use of the money that 
he should have received earlier).  Also, the general rule is that if a claim is liquidated, pre-
judgment interest follows as a matter of right, but if the claim is unliquidated, the 
allowance of this interest is a matter of the trial court’s discretion.  See Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, 
Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 328 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Under Kentucky law, if the claim is liquidated, 
interest follows as a matter of right, but if it is unliquidated, the allowance of interest is in 
the discretion of the trial court.” (quoting Hale v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 795 F.2d 22, 24 
(6th Cir. 1986))).  This well-established rule on pre-judgment interest is a first cousin of 
disgorgement, because in both instances courts award the plaintiff a monetary recovery in 
excess of the purchase price. 
347 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39; see also 
Eisenberg, supra note 339, at 559–62 (providing comprehensive arguments that contract law 
should and does protect a plaintiff’s disgorgement interest).  See generally Sidney W. 
DeLong, The Efficiency of a Disgorgement as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 22 IND. L. REV. 
737 (1989) (arguing that a broad disgorgement remedy undermines cost avoidance goals); 
Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep Your Promises:  A Disgorgement Theory of 
Contract Remedies, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1181 (2011) (explaining generally that 
disgorgement is a part of standard contract doctrine). 
348 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 55.6; accord Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc., 564 
N.W.2d 692, 704 n.10 (Wis. 1997) (supporting the notion that contract law has flexibility 
and that courts have discretion in applying the law) (citation omitted); see also Cassinos v. 
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that equitable 
remedies will be asserted as the complexities of the changing times increase) (quoting 
Bertero v. Nat’l Gen. Corp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)).  The Cassinos court also 
provided: 
[E]quity has contrived its remedies “so that they shall correspond both 
to the primary right of the injured party, and to the wrong by which 
that right has been violated,” and “has always preserved the elements 
of flexibility and expansiveness, so that new ones may be invented, or 
old ones modified, in order to meet the requirement of every case . . . .” 
Id. 
349 See Brandon & Tibbs v. George Kevorkian Accountancy Corp., 277 Cal. Rptr. 40, 47–48 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“[E]ven more than in the case of other rules of law, [the damages 
rules] must be regarded merely as guides to the court, leaving much to the individual 
feeling of the court created by the special circumstances of the particular case.”). 
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tradition.  With their implicit categorical rule that disgorgement should 
not be available in rescission cases, Brooks and Stremitzer would 
hamstring this flexibility in the administration of remedies for breach of 
contract. 
E. Restitution, Rational Choice Theory, and Relational Contracting 
While this Article is devoted primarily to Brooks and Stremitzer’s 
treatment of the legal aspects of rescission and restitution, some 
commentary is appropriate regarding the economic foundations of the 
authors’ reform proposals.  In addressing the economic effects of 
rescission and restitution, Brooks and Stremitzer establish a model of 
contracting behavior that repeatedly reflects the perspective of “rational” 
buyers and sellers: 
 Rational parties, we argue, would often desire a 
right of rescission followed by restitution even if 
damages were fully compensatory and costless to 
enforce.  The mere presence of a threat to rescind, even if 
not carried out, exerts an effect on the behavior of 
parties.  Parties can enlist this effect to increase the value 
of contracting.  To illustrate, consider the situation of a 
seller of goods who knows that the buyer has a right to 
rescind the contract if the goods are defective.  Since 
rescission is generally disfavored by the seller, she will 
try to reduce its incidence.  The seller knows that 
rescission occurs only when the contract price is more 
than the goods’ value, as measured by expectation 
damages.  That is, the buyer will want to rescind only 
when the contract is a losing one:  when the value that 
the buyer derives from the goods is less than the price 
that he paid for them. . . . By lowering the price, the 
seller can reduce the likelihood that the buyer will want 
to rescind the contract, and by investing in the quality of 
the goods, the seller can reduce the probability that the 
buyer will have the legal right to do so.350 
                                                 
350 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 699 (footnotes 
omitted).  For other references to the contracting choices the authors believe that “rational” 
parties will make, see id. (“The effect of rescission on quality investments may often be 
desired by rational parties as they strive to increase the value of their contracting 
relationship.”); id. at 700 n.23 (noting the sequence of decisions “rational” parties make on 
the equilibrium path); id. at 711 (describing the decision by a “rational seller” in making 
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The authors employ an elaborate array of equations to support these 
theories.351  Because they repeatedly place emphasis on rational actors, 
they implicitly subscribe to the doctrine sometimes used in economics 
called “rational choice theory.”352  The basic assumption of this school of 
thought is that actors are rational maximizers, i.e., persons who try to get 
the most out of their resources.353   
This form of rational determinism posits that actors always seek 
wealth/profit maximization and cost minimization.354  The defining 
features of this approach are that participants (1) maximize their utility 
(2) from a stable set of preferences and (3) accumulate an optimal 
amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.355  The 
authors’ heavy reliance on these “intuitions” about the hypothetical 
rational actor drives Brooks and Stremitzer’s (empirically unsupported) 
notions that highly liberalized rights of rescission and greatly restricted 
rights of restitution will motivate the seller to (1) reduce the likelihood of 
promisee rescission by investing to enhance the quality of performance 
and (2) minimize the buyer’s possible use of rescission by lowering 
prices.356 
                                                                                                             
investments as compared with the seller’s payoff); and id. (discussing the price levels that 
“rational parties should set”).  Interestingly, Brooks and Stremitzer do not specifically 
acknowledge their adherence to rational choice theory. 
351 These theories include the “Seller’s Payoff as a Function of Produced Quality,” 
“Seller’s Payoffs with Low Warranted Quality,” “Effect of Renegotiation on Buyer’s 
Payoffs,” and “Seller’s Payoffs Under Cumulative Concurrence and Renegotiation.”  Id. at 
706, 711, 723, 724. 
352 Jacob Jacoby, Is it Rational to Assume Consumer Rationality?  Some Consumer 
Psychological Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 81, 85 
(2000). 
353 See id. at 87 (“[R]ational behavior dictates that one seek to maximize utility.”). 
354 See id. at 99 (“Rational maximization, in turn, may be defined as seeking 
‘wealth/profit maximization’ and ‘cost minimization.’”). 
355 See id. at 100–01 (explaining the key features of the rational choice theory).  The Article 
explains: 
 Implicit in Rational Choice Theory are a number of key 
assumptions.  Among these are:  (1) objective criteria exist that enable 
one to differentiate rational from irrational; (2) the differences between 
organizational behavior and individual (consumer) behavior are 
negligible; (3) consumer behavior is predicated upon consciously 
considered factors; (4) consumer behavior is predicated solely upon 
rational considerations; (5) consumers make their choices from among 
“a stable set of preferences;” (6) consumers always seek to maximize 
utility[;] (7) in maximizing utility, consumers consider the risks 
involved; (8) when not presumed, satisfaction can easily be assessed; 
and (9) information provision will translate into information impact. 
Id.  But see id. at 101–22 (strongly disputing these assumptions). 
356 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 693, 715, 724.  The 
authors further claim that “the buyer will want to rescind only when the contract is a losing 
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Many commentators have extensively debunked the notion that 
contracting parties consistently proceed exclusively or even primarily on 
rational motivations,357 and several writers have gone so far as to say 
that economic explanations of contract are a “failure.”358  Common 
observation further tells us that contracts are not strictly formed or 
performed based on economic formulas or the strict terms of the 
contract, either explicitly or implicitly.  “[P]sychological variables, 
sociological variables, cultural variables, [and] environmental 
variables . . . will often override economic considerations.”359  Rather 
than maximize utility in decision-making, actors typically will settle—
“satisfice”—for the best solution among a limited number of choices.360  
                                                                                                             
one:  when the value that the buyer derives from the goods is less than the price that he 
paid for them.”  Id. at 699.  To the contrary, the buyer often can have legitimate reasons for 
rescission for issues unrelated to the quality of the goods.  Thus, courts have approved 
buyer revocation of acceptance where the seller was unable to furnish a clear certificate of 
title.  See 67 AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 1057 & n.5 (2003) (citing numerous cases that have upheld 
this notion). 
357 E.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 211, 213–25 (1995) (noting that while rational-actor psychology is the foundation of 
the standard economic model of choice, the empirical evidence shows that this model often 
diverges from the actual psychology of choice because of the parties’ bounded rationality, 
irrational disposition, and defective capabilities); Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—
Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 47–59 (2011) (persuasively arguing 
individuals do not necessarily act rationally in the marketplace and contracts are not 
always the product of informed choice); Jacoby, supra note 352, at 126 (“Rational Choice 
Theory is a simplistic theory having little correspondence with the real world of 
(individual) consumer behavior.”) (footnote omitted); Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 
27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 135, 171 (2009) (explaining that rational choice theory does not 
describe the real behavior of consumers and sellers); see also Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and 
Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal 
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) (arguing that the alleged greater realism of behavioral 
law and economics as compared with rational choice theory is more illusion than reality). 
358 See Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract 
Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 832 (2007) (“Economic accounts of the current 
doctrine governing contract damages have failed, and the nature of that failure places 
limits on the role of economics in an integrated theory of contract law.”); Eric A. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 
830 (2003) (“[T]he economic approach does not explain the current system of contract law, 
nor does it provide a solid basis for criticizing and reforming contract law.”). 
359 Jacoby, supra note 352, at 85. 
360 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 300 n.161 (2011).   
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex 
problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose 
solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real 
world . . . . The human mind adapts to these shortcomings by 
developing unconscious cognitive shortcuts that generally make it 
easier to make sense of new situations even in the absence of complete 
information.  Thus, rather than maximiz[ing] their choices, humans 
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Therefore, while rational economic concerns clearly will play a role for 
most persons most of the time, as will the strict contract terms, parties 
generally make contracting decisions based on the transaction in context 
of the parties’ relationship and the other surrounding factors and 
circumstances. 
Indeed, parties will sometimes reach their decisions on biased, 
incorrect, or missing information, and irrational emotional 
considerations might well rule the day.  The dollar value of and the need 
for the contract, the general state of the parties’ business, the need to 
uphold business reputations, the parties’ views of business morality, and 
the nature and reliability of their prior course of dealings will all 
commonly enter into the parties’ calculation regarding contract 
performance and the possibility of rescission.  Some sellers might give 
less consideration to rescission where the buyer has demanded a refund 
in a rude and disrespectful way, but give more consideration to this 
remedy when the buyer has requested rescission in a polite and 
considerate manner.  Because buyers and sellers commonly consider a 
particular agreement in the wider context of their general needs and 
objectives, their decisions on a single contract might not be tied to the 
advantages or disadvantages of an individual sale or purchase. 
Other factors come into play as well.  As a motivator of a decision to 
rescind, the contract price also can be more or less important to the 
parties depending on their individual business circumstances, just as 
contract quality can be more or less important to the parties depending 
on the particular party’s definition of the value of the bargain.  Another 
important point is that the person who purchases for the purpose of 
resale, a category unmentioned by Brooks and Stremitzer, is in a 
transaction with entirely different motives and goals than the typical 
buyer because the former actor is both a buyer and a seller.361  Brooks 
and Stremitzer’s narrow focus on individual transactions to the exclusion 
of the full context of the parties’ general needs and objectives is the major 
shortcoming in their economic analysis.362 
                                                                                                             
consider only a few possible courses of action and satisfice, choosing to 
settle for a solution that is adequate. 
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
361 The seller here also has different potential liabilities.  See Harbor Hill Lithographing 
Corp. v. Dittler Bros., Inc., 348 N.Y.S.2d 920, 924 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (“[T]he Code and 
commentary . . . make quite clear that resale circumstances put the seller on notice of 
potential exposure to liability for lost profits.”). 
362 The reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment has argued 
to the contrary of Brooks and Stremitzer’s views.  See Andrew Kull, supra note 1, at 1501–18 
(“[C]ontracting parties would not, however, agree ex ante to a right of rescission as a 
remedy for every material breach[.]”).  While they reject Kull’s analysis, Brooks and 
Stremitzer do not answer Kull’s critique in any meaningful way.  See Brooks & Stremitzer, 
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Another school of thought has a superior, empirically-supported 
understanding of contracting behavior that does give proper weight to 
contracts in context.  As Stewart Macaulay has argued in an influential 
series of articles,363 contracts are always more than a paper document 
and its terms and conditions.  To business persons, reciting contract 
clauses to one another in an adversarial setting is seldom viewed as a 
reasonable way of solving a contract dispute or for deciding whether to 
stay in the relationship.  Indeed, purchasing agents, sales personnel, and 
                                                                                                             
Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 696 n.11, 700 n.24 (rejecting Kull’s position on 
the right to rescission); see also Jacoby, supra note 352, at 91 (commenting that the 
established principle from economics that sellers may have valid reasons not to lower 
prices so they can avoid a signal of (1) lower quality and prestige or (2) that the item was 
going to be discontinued and replaced by a more advanced model).  Apart from economic 
considerations, buyers also may reject a transaction for social policy reasons, such as those 
consumers placing significant emphasis on the seller’s environmental program.   
363 E.g., Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal:  Empirical Pictures of Relationships, 
Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44 (2003); Stewart 
Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom?  Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian 
Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775 (2000); Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical 
View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465 (1985); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations 
in Business:  A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).  Stewart Macaulay has 
reviewed my Article and seriously doubts the premises of Brooks and Stremitzer’s 
proposal: 
(1) Many times the buyer really is a collection of people.  Why do we 
assume that the purchasing agent or the production engineers even 
would learn about whether restitution could be combined with an 
expectation damages remedy in case [of] breach?  They do know that 
there might be a contract there, and this means that the seller might be 
able to cause some kind of annoying trouble.  But why learn details 
about something unlikely to happen?  If these people don’t know 
about the law, how can it have an incentive effect?  Of course, lawyers 
can tell them, but how much power do lawyers have over the day to 
day buying and selling in most corporations?  Except in unusual 
situations, lawyers run meaningless rituals.  If this is true, details like 
restitution plus lost profit will have little incentive effects.  (2) In most 
supply chain situations, there is a powerful sanction that is much more 
important than law—reputation.  A firm that doesn’t honor its 
promises, both express and implied, doesn’t get too much repeat 
business.  There are norms supported by the sanction of a loss of profit 
in the future.  Sales people often act as the buyer’s “agent” within the 
sales personnel’s own corporation.  They lobby to treat customers very 
well.  This means that in many cases the kinds of incentives that the two 
authors talk about is not very important if important at all. 
E-mail from Stewart Macaulay, Malcolm Pitman Sharp Professor & Theodore W. Brazeau 
Professor, University of Wisconsin, to author (April 11, 2012) (on file with the author) 
(emphasis added).  In a similar vein, Douglas Laycock observes that dollars and cents do 
not always drive the decision to rescind, noting that plaintiffs may choose to rescind 
“[b]ecause of personal preferences not reflected in market values.” Douglas Laycock, 
Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929, 942 (2012). 
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other vendor and vendee employees may see the written contract as a 
formality created only to please the demands of lawyers. 
This view of contract ties back to the nature of modern day bargains.  
Most commercial contracts contain extensive boiler-plate written in 
dense and technical language that is not meant to be read or well-
understood by the buyer (or even the seller in many instances) on such 
important topics as disclaimers of warranties, limitations of liability, and 
other seller-friendly exculpatory clauses.  Nevertheless, promisees and 
promisors frequently assume there are exceptions or qualifications to the 
written terms that are not worth the effort to spell out in advance.  
Business persons are rarely fully cognizant of key principles of contract 
law and seldom face contract litigation.364  Indeed, the buyer might not 
even be aware of any right to rescind a contract based on a breach.365  
The reality is that many reasons exist for why the paper deal is often 
ignored, misunderstood, or discounted and how it fails to capture the 
actuality of contractual decision-making.366 
Except for one brief footnote allusion,367 Brooks and Stremitzer do 
not refer in any substantive detail to these real world aspects of 
contracting.  Instead, the authors bank on a one-size-fits-all theory, 
theorizing that every party largely explicitly or implicitly subscribes to 
rational and even mechanical cost-benefit economic analyses as the 
moving force in performing or rescinding their agreements.  By contrast, 
courts and commentators have observed that it is “extremely 
common”368 that contracts will have a “relational” aspect, i.e., they 
involve parties who are presently performing a long-term contract or 
have dealt with one another repeatedly in the past and are likely to do so 
in the future.369  Robert Gordon has aptly explained relational 
contracting as where: 
                                                 
364 See generally Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, supra 
note 363. 
365 See 1 CONSUMER Law SALES PRACTICE AND CREDIT REGULATION § 259 (2011) (noting 
that consumers frequently are unaware of their U.C.C. right to revoke acceptance). 
366 See DOBBS, supra note 176, § 12.1(1). 
367 See Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 697–98 n.14 
(stating that rescission could be more likely with a plaintiff that has particular personal 
preferences in market values or where the plaintiff has lost confidence in the defendant and 
the transaction). 
368 Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, supra note 363, at 
64; see also infra notes 369–72 (illustrating the idea that relational principles play a 
substantial role in contracting). 
369 Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:  A Preliminary Study, supra note 363, at 
64.  As one commentator has pointed out, all contracts “tend to fall along a relational-
discrete continuum,” because some contracts have more relational elements than others.  
Hart, supra note 357, at 53 n.286.  Thus, all contracts are relational, because even one-time 
contracts have relational elements.  Id. 
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parties treat their contracts more like marriages than like 
one-night stands.  Obligations grow out of the 
commitment that they have made to one another, and 
the conventions that the trading community establishes 
for such commitments; they are not frozen at the initial 
moment of commitment, but change as circumstances 
change; the object of contracting is not primarily to 
allocate risks, but to signify a commitment to cooperate.  
In bad times parties are expected to lend one another 
mutual support, rather than standing on their rights; 
each will treat the other’s insistence on literal 
performance as willful obstructionism; if unexpected 
contingencies occur resulting in severe losses, the parties 
are to search for equitable ways of dividing the losses; 
and the sanction for egregiously bad behavior, is always, 
of course, refusal to deal again.370 
All these insights point to the empirically-confirmed view that 
contract performance will frequently rest more on relational norms than 
upon strict legal or economic considerations.371  As several commentators 
                                                 
370 Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in 
Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 569 (1985).  As just indicated, the late Professor Ian 
Macneil was also a highly influential proponent of relational contract doctrine.  See IAN R. 
MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT:  SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 9 
(David Campbell ed., 2001) (providing one of his many scholarly writings on the subject); 
see also Tamara L. Kuennen, Private Relationships and Public Problems:  Applying Principles of 
Relational Contracting Theory to Domestic Violence, 2010 BYU L. REV. 515, 538–44, 554–621 
(2010) (providing a summary of relational contracting principles).  See generally Richard E. 
Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823 (2000) 
(noting various relational contracting approaches). 
371 See Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1, 
16–24 (1992) (verifying the prevalence of relational contracting in an empirical study); 
Zamir, supra note 296, at 128 n.183 (“Numerous studies have indicated that the fear of legal 
sanctions is only one incentive to keep contractual promises (along with short- and long-
term self-interest motivations, social norms, and moral sentiments), and not necessarily the 
most powerful one.”); Woolsey v. Funke, 24 N.E. 191, 192 (N.Y. 1890) (“There is no surer 
way to find out what parties meant than to see what they have done.”); see also Baldwin 
Piano, Inc. v. Deutsche Wurlitzer GmbH, 392 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Because these 
long-term relations produce continuing profits for both sides, both have something to lose 
by taking the exit option without trying to work out differences first.”); Mor-Cor Packaging 
Prods., Inc. v. Innovative Packaging Corp., 328 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Many, we 
suspect most, material breaches are forgiven, either in the hope that they will be cured or 
because self-help (as through termination) or legal remedies would cost the victim of the 
breach more than they were worth.”); Becho, Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 595, 604 
(2000) (“Commercial reality suggests that, in some circumstances, a contractor may wish to 
remain silent in the face of what it perceives to be abusive . . . conduct in order to get paid 
promptly or to maintain a valuable customer relationship.”).  See generally Cambee’s 
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have pointed out, “There are some empirical data to suggest that U.S. 
businessmen in some regions will perform their contracts because they 
value honor and reputation over money no matter how much they might 
lose.”372  These well-known and accepted principles of relational 
contracting are missing in Brooks and Stremitzer’s analysis.  
Furthermore, Brooks and Stremitzer do not acknowledge that when 
parties encounter shortcomings in the contract language or problems 
with performance (even serious deficiencies), parties commonly do not 
seek to exit the contract or even to modify their contracts formally.  It 
also may occur that the contract states that the terms will be adjusted in 
light of a potential contract breach or changed circumstances.  For 
example, federal government contracts will include such a clause 
providing that if a described event occurs, such as a change in the 
designs, drawings, or specifications, the terms will be equitably 
adjusted.373  Even absent such a clause, the likelihood of party flexibility 
during the course of performance and the frequent uncertainty or 
ambiguity of the contract itself will be a major buffer against the 
possibility of rescission.  Consistent with Gordon’s view of relational 
contracting, the critical point missed by Brooks and Stremitzer is that 
almost all parties when signing a contract honestly commit to 
performance and rarely think about the possibility of rescission.  Each 
party makes the tacit assumption that even with a serious breach, both 
sides will proceed in good faith and will cooperate in resolving disputes 
short of contract cessation and possible litigation.  As courts understand 
through long experience, the parties exhibit a “natural wariness” before 
entering an agreement, but upon making the contract, the parties expect 
a “cooperative enterprise” and higher levels of mutual trust.374 
The U.C.C. is in line with these practical insights into contract 
relations.  As stated in U.C.C. section 2-609, comment 1, “[T]he essential 
purpose of a contract . . . is actual performance and [parties] do not 
bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus the right to win a 
                                                                                                             
Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d 167, 173 n.10 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting 
the concept of “relational contracts”).  Without using the term “relational,” the above 
analysis shows that courts have employed several of the underlying principles as early as 
the nineteenth century. 
372 Gordon & Frankel, supra note 288, at 1531 & n.47. 
373 See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-1 (2010) (providing an example of this kind of regulation). 
374 Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594–95 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Zamir, 
supra note 296, at 131 n.191 (“[T]ypically the parties’ actual intentions are to treat each other 
according to the prevailing norms of reasonableness, fairness, and cooperation, rather than 
according to the written text of the formal agreement, and that, for this reason, application 
of former norms is also efficient.”). 
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lawsuit . . . .”375  In actuality, contrary to their asserted thesis favoring 
liberal rights of rescission, the authors actually endorse a more restricted 
right of rescission in practice—rescission should not be available as the 
buyer’s “dominant strategy” but should exist primarily to disincentivize 
the rational seller from breach of contract.376  In other words, the authors 
offer the conflicted theory that parties should enjoy broad rights of 
rescission—so long as they are not frequently exercised. 
As Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman once observed, 
“The only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of 
prediction with experience.”377  Accordingly, by offering the empirically 
unsupported contentions that many, if not all, parties in a contract 
dispute:  (1) understand and rely heavily on the written contract terms; 
(2) seek bargaining leverage based on the possibility of avoiding or 
seeking rescission; (3) strongly base their purchasing or selling strategy 
on the relation between rescission, price, and quality considerations; (4) 
place little importance on non-legal norms and informal practices in 
responding to breach; and (5) disregard the full context of their 
individual needs and objectives.  Brooks and Stremitzer’s theories 
provide an inaccurate and incomplete portrayal of the relational world of 
contract. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Brooks and Stremitzer’s proposal to restructure the law of rescission 
and restitution has numerous legal and economic shortcomings.   
As reflected in the U.C.C. and other federal and state policies, the 
authorities are much more liberal in allowing rescission than the authors’ 
descriptions.  Brooks and Stremitzer’s reliance on the material breach 
doctrine as a regulator of rescission is unpersuasive because this vague 
doctrine is inherently unreliable for fact-finders as a means to determine 
the right of withdrawal.  Perhaps more importantly, they do not mention 
that common mercantile practice favors buyer rescission on a no-
questions-asked basis under generous circumstances, because many 
merchants are less interested in strictly enforcing individual contracts 
and more interested in maintaining good customer relations for future 
purchases.  Brooks and Stremitzer’s thesis suffers seriously from these 
oversights.  All told, the law in this area properly reflects a principle of 
                                                 
375 U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. n.1 (2011).  See generally Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational 
Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 789 (1993) (arguing that the U.C.C. incorporates 
attributes of relational contract theory).  
376 Brooks & Stremitzer, Remedies on and off Contract, supra note 3, at 702. 
377 Christopher P. Guzelian, Scientific Speech, 93 IOWA L. REV. 881, 888 n.27 (2008) 
(quoting economist Milton Friedman). 
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fair redress, whereby the consistent thread is a liberal grant of rescission 
to help parties achieve their reasonable expectations.  Except for 
clarification of the material breach doctrine, no major doctrinal changes 
are needed to achieve this goal. 
Brooks and Stremitzer’s analysis of restitution after rescission is 
similarly problematic. Regarding the election of remedies between 
rescission and damages, the authors fail to distinguish the election 
doctrine in the common law and U.C.C. settings.  This Article has shown 
that each version in its own way protects against overcompensation to 
plaintiffs.  As for the authors’ objection that the U.C.C. inappropriately 
allows expectation damages along with rescission, the U.C.C. and its case 
law support the opposite conclusion that these combined remedies make 
the injured party whole as against the seller’s wrongdoing.  The next 
flaw in their argument is their (equivocal) rejection of reliance damages, 
because, under Brooks and Stremitzer’s analysis, the law should burden 
the innocent party with the loss created by the breaching party.  Next, 
the authors’ failure to explain their opposition to disgorgement is 
puzzling, especially in view of the strong normative and legal support 
for this remedy in the proper circumstances.  Last, the authors’ treatment 
of the economic issues is unsatisfactory, because Brooks and Stremitzer 
necessarily rely on the largely discredited rational choice theory to the 
near-total exclusion of relational contracting principles. 
Ultimately, the authors’ proposal to limit restitution after rescission 
to restoration of the contract price and other benefits conferred is faulty 
because Brooks and Stremitzer’s economic and legal premises for their 
reform lack merit.  The authors have overlooked the well-established 
principle that rescission and restitution are equitable remedies that defy 
a one-size-fits-all solution.  Instead, the law must avoid rigid formulas 
and remain free to fashion flexible remedies that meet the ends of justice 
on a case-by-case basis. 
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